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Zusammenfassung
Die vorliegende Arbeit beleuchtet mathematische Aspekte der Theorie o¨konomischer und fi-
nanzieller Risiken. In den drei versammelten Beitra¨gen werden das Fortsetzungsproblem fu¨r
Risikomaße unter Knight’scher Unsicherheit sowie die Optimierung von Risiko- und Nutzenauf-
teilungen studiert.
Der erste Beitrag, Model Spaces for Risk Measures, widmet sich dem Fortsetzungsproblem fu¨r
Risikomaße. Letztere sind als Kapitalanforderungen definiert, welche durch das Zusammenspiel
einer konvexen Menge akzeptabler Positionen und eines mehrdimensionalen Security-Markts
zur Absicherung nicht akzeptabler Positionen induziert werden. Die Nettoverluste, deren Risiko
gemessen wird, werden durch Zufallsvariablen auf der Menge mo¨glicher ku¨nftiger Zusta¨nde der
O¨konomie modelliert. Wir betrachten allerdings Risikomaße, welche auch Knight’sche Unsicher-
heit abbilden: Die Realisierung ku¨nftiger Zusta¨nde la¨sst sich nur partiell oder u¨berhaupt nicht
durch einen Zufallsmechanismus mit bekannten Parametern beschreiben. In der Fortsetzungs-
frage gehen wir deshalb von einer simplen Situation aus, in der das Risiko von beschra¨nkten
Nettoverlusten durch szenarioweise U¨berlegungen und ohne ein zugrundeliegendes Wahrschein-
lichkeitsmodell bestimmt wird. Wir zeigen, dass unter milden Annahmen ein solches Risikomaß
eine intrinsische probabilistische Sichtweise auf die Realisierung ku¨nftiger Zusta¨nde erlaubt.
Diese kann als Ausgangspunkt einer Fortsetzung dienen, da sie im Vergleich zur modellfreien
Betrachtung keinen Informationsverlust verursacht. Um das Risiko komplexerer Verluststprofile
bestimmen zu ko¨nnen, muss ein geeigneter gro¨ßerer Definitionsbereich gefunden werden. Wir
konstruieren einen Banachverband von Zufallsvariablen, dessen analytische Struktur durch die
urspru¨ngliche Risikomessung diktiert wird. Er ist invariant unter allen relevanten probabilis-
tischen Modellen und fungiert als maximaler natu¨rlicher Definitionsbereich des urspru¨nglichen
Risikomaßes, da er verschiedene Fortsetzungen desselben auf unbeschra¨nkte Zufallsvariablen er-
laubt. Diese beleuchten und vergleichen wir detailliert. Die Diskussion von Bedingungen, unter
welchen regula¨re Subgradienten, d.h. sinnvolle Preisregeln, existieren, schließt sich an.
Der zweite Beitrag, Risk Sharing for Capital Requirements with Multidimensional Security
Markets, studiert die Existenz optimaler Risikoaufteilungen. Betrachtet wird ein System von n
Agenten, welche in einer Handelsperiode individuelle Nettoverluste erleiden. Deren Risiko quan-
tifiziert jeder Agent mit einem individuellen Risikomaß, welches wie im ersten Beitrag eine aus
Akzeptanzmenge und endlichdimensionalem Security-Markt resultierende Kapitalanforderung
ist. Die Frage ist nun, ob die aggregierten (d.h. addierten) individuellen Risiken durch restlose
Umverteilung der individuellen Verlustpositionen minimiert werden ko¨nnen. Nettoverluste wer-
den als Elemente eines zugrundeliegenden Riesz-Raums modelliert. Individuell relevante und
individuell akzeptable Verlustpositionen sowie individuelle Security-Ma¨rkte ko¨nnen sehr hetero-
gen sein. Wir treffen einzig eine schwache Kooperationsannahme, welche den Agenten u¨berhaupt
erst ein gemeinsames Pooling der Risiken ermo¨glicht. Es wird gezeigt, dass nur Pareto-optimale
Allokationen (Aufteilungen) eines gegebenen Gesamtverlusts die Aggregation der Einzelrisiken
minimieren. Das minimale aggregierte Risiko eines aufgeteilten Gesamtverlusts stellt eine Kapi-
talanforderung fu¨r den Markt dar, die sich durch eine Markt-Akzeptanzmenge und einen globalen
Security-Markt charakterisieren la¨sst. Das Problem la¨sst sich also mittels eines repra¨sentativen
Agenten formulieren. Fu¨r Agentensysteme mit polyhedralen und verteilungsinvarianten Akzep-
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tanzmengen wird die Existenz von Pareto-optimalen Allokationen und Equilibria gezeigt und
ihre Stabilita¨t unter Perturbation des aggregierten Verlusts analysiert. Als Anwendung wer-
den optimale Portfolio-Aufteilungen unter Tochterfirmen in Ma¨rkten mit Transaktionskosten
untersucht.
Der dritte Beitrag, Efficient Allocations under Law-Invariance: A Unifying Approach, wech-
selt die Perspektive vom Risiko von Verlusten auf den Nutzen, den die Aufteilung eines durch
stochastische Faktoren unsicheren ku¨nftigen Guts unter n Agenten mit heterogenen Pra¨ferenzen
erzeugt. Gu¨ter werden als Zufallsvariablen u¨ber einem atomlosen Wahrscheinlichkeitsraum
(Ω,F ,P) modelliert. Die Pra¨ferenzen der einzelnen Agenten sind durch quasikonkave vertei-
lungsinvariante Nutzenfunktionale kodiert. Alle Agenten sind also insofern kompatibel, als dass
sie indifferent zwischen zwei Gu¨tern mit derselben Verteilungsfunktion unter dem Referenz-
maß P sind. Wir nehmen an, dass die individuellen Nutzen mit einer allgemein gehaltenen
Funktion zu einem Gesamtnutzen aggregiert werden, beispielsweise durch (gewichtete) Sum-
mation. Allokationen sind effizient, wenn sie bei Aggregation zum optimalen, d.h. maximalen
aggregierten Nutzen unter allen mo¨glichen Allokationen fu¨hren. Fu¨r große Klassen individu-
eller Nutzenfunktionen und Aggregationsfunktionen zeigen wir die Existenz komonotoner ef-
fizienter Allokationen. Hiermit verallgemeinern wir viele der bereits bekannten Resultate zu
optimaler Nutzenaufteilung mit verteilungsinvarianten Nutzenkriterien und fu¨hren sie zu einem
Meta-Theorem zusammen. Als Anwendungen der allgemeinen Existenztheorie zeigen wir die Ex-
istenz von Allokationen mit verschiedenen o¨konomisch motivierten Optimalita¨tseigenschaften:
(schwache, verzerrte und individuell rationale) Pareto-Optimalita¨t, systemisch faire Allokatio-
nen und Kern-Allokationen.
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Abstract
This dissertation examines mathematical aspects of the theory of economic and financial risks.
The three collected contributions study the extension problem for risk measures under Knightian
uncertainty as well as the optimisation of risk and utility allocations.
The first contribution, Model Spaces for Risk Measures, addresses the extension problem for
risk measures. The latter are defined as capital requirements which are induced by the interplay
of a convex set of acceptable positions and a multidimensional security market for securing
non-acceptable positions. The net losses whose risk is to be measured are modelled by random
variables on the set of future states of the economy. However, we consider risk measures which
can also account for Knightian uncertainty: The realisation of future states of the economy can
only partially or not at all be described with known parameters. In the extension question, we
thus depart from a simple situation in which the risk of bounded net losses is determined by
scenariowise considerations without an underlying probabilistic model. We show that under mild
assumptions such a risk measure admits an intrinsic probabilistic perspective on the realisation
of future states of the economy. It can serve as starting point for an extension as it does not
lead to any loss of information compared to the model-free risk measure. In order to determine
the risk of more complex loss profiles, a suitable larger domain of definition must be found.
We construct a Banach lattice of random variables whose analytic structure is dictated by the
initial risk measure. It is invariant under all relevant probabilistic models and plays the role of a
maximal natural domain of definition of the initial risk measure, as it admits several extensions
thereof to unbounded random variables. We examine and compare them in detail. A discussion
of conditions under which regular subgradients exist, i.e. sensible pricing rules, concludes.
The second contribution, Risk Sharing for Capital Requirements with Multidimensional Se-
curity Markets, studies the existence of optimal risk allocations. We consider a system of n
agents who incur individual net losses in a one-period market. Each agent quantifies their risk
with an individual risk measure which is a capital requirement resulting from an acceptance set
and a finite dimensional security market as in the first contribution. This raises the question
whether the aggregated (i.e. added) individual risks can be minimised by complete redistribu-
tion of the individual losses. Net losses are modelled as elements of an ambient Riesz space.
Individually relevant and individually acceptable losses as well as individual security markets
may be very heterogeneous. We only make a weak cooperation assumption which allows the
agents to pool their risks in the first place. It is shown that only Pareto optimal allocations of a
given aggregated loss minimise the aggregation of the individual risks. The minimal aggregated
risk of an allocated aggregated loss defines a capital requirement for the market which may be
characterised by a market acceptance set and a global security market. The problem can hence
be formulated with a representative agent. For agent systems with polyhedral and law-invariant
acceptance sets, the existence of Pareto optimal allocations and equilibria is shown and their
stability under perturbation of the aggregated loss is analysed. As an application, we study
optimal portfolio splits among subsidiaries in markets with transaction costs.
The third contribution, Efficient Allocations under Law-Invariance: A Unifying Approach,
shifts the perspective from the risk of losses to the utility produced by the allocation of a future
good, uncertain for stochastic factors, among n agents with heterogeneous preferences. Goods
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are modelled as random variables on a non-atomic probability space (Ω,F ,P). The preferences
of the individual agents are encoded by quasi-concave law-invariant utility functions. All agents
are thus compatible insofar as they are indifferent between two goods with the same distribution
function under the reference measure P. We assume that individual utilities are aggregated with
a general aggregation function, for instance (weighted) summation. Allocations are efficient if
under aggregation they lead to the optimal, i.e. maximal, aggregated utility among all attainable
allocations. For wide classes of individual utility functions and aggregation functions we show
the existence of comonotone efficient allocations. We hereby generalise many of the the known
results on optimal utility allocation under law-invariant utility criteria and unify them in a meta
theorem. We apply the general existence theory by showing the existence of allocations with
different economically motivated optimality properties: (weak, biased, and individually rational)
Pareto optimality, systemically fair allocations, and core allocations.
iv
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Chapter 1
Introduction
By “uncertain” knowledge ... I do not mean merely to distinguish what is known for certain from
what is only probable. The game of roulette is not subject, in this sense, to uncertainty ... Even
the weather is only moderately uncertain. The sense in which I am using the term is that in which
the prospect of a European war is uncertain, or the price of copper and the rate of interest twenty
years hence, ... or the position of private wealth-owners in the social system in 1970. About these
matters there is no scientific basis on which to form any calculable probability whatever. We simply
do not know. Nevertheless, the necessity for action and for decision compels us ... to do our best
to overlook this awkward fact and to behave exactly as we should if we had behind us a good
Benthamite calculation of a series of prospective advantages and disadvantages, each multiplied by
its appropriate probability, waiting to be summed.
(J. M. Keynes, The General Theory of Employment)
Yet that “probability” is, in the strict sense, indefinable, need not trouble us much; it is a charac-
teristic which it shares with many of our most necessary and fundamental ideas.
(J. M. Keynes, The Principles of Probability)
1.1 A brief history of risk measures
The consequences of future events, as crucial as they are for making good decisions in the present,
cannot be known until they have realised. Spurred by this simple truth, disciplines ranging
from economics to climate sciences have over decades developed methodologies to manage the
uncertain rationally. These all face the challenge to make conceptual and intellectual sense of
uncertainty. Moreover, they have to balance sufficient caution concerning impacts which are
unlikely but possible on the one hand, and pragmatism, serving the practical applicability of
the reasoning in question, as well as cost efficiency on the other hand.
In the field of mathematical finance, one of the most prominent of such methodologies is
the theory of risk measures. They are a mathematically rigorous way to capture the financial
risk posed by a future loss — to which we will also refer as a loss profile or loss. Note that in
contrast to the majority of the literature on risk measures, we define them to measure the risk of
losses net of gains, not gains net of losses.1 This is in line with the later chapters of this thesis.
In the case of static risk measures, two time points are fixed, “today” and “tomorrow”. The
1 In more financial terms, they can be interpreted as liabilities net of assets or negative P&L (profits and
losses).
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objective is to attribute a risk level to an uncertain loss occurring tomorrow based on imperfect
knowledge about the actual size of the loss available today. Ideally, this risk level should have
an immediate interpretation in terms of actions which can be taken today in order to mitigate
the loss tomorrow.
Risk measures were introduced in an axiomatic way in the seminal 1999 paper Artzner et al.
[11]. The immediate popularity of the axiomatisation presented there is likely due to two of its
most appealing features. Firstly, it offers a very flexible framework for risks which can capture
“market risks as well as nonmarket risks” [11, p. 203]. Secondly, the way in which an agent
measures the risk of a loss is nevertheless highly operational and dependent only on very few
extrinsic fundamentals. Given an ambient set of possible loss profiles which may occur tomorrow
and whose risk is to be measured, these fundamentals are:
(i) identifying the set of “acceptable” losses which pose a risk the agent can fathom without
further mitigation.
(ii) identifying a so-called “prudent” financial reference instrument. Given a loss profile outside
of the set of acceptable losses, the agent can raise extra capital and invest in this reference
instrument in a way such that the future loss combined with the future payoff of this
investment is acceptable in the sense of (i).
Bringing (i) and (ii) together, the risk of a loss profile is defined as the minimal amount of
capital which needs to be raised and invested in the prespecified prudent financial instrument
such that the combined loss profile is acceptable in the prespecified manner. Note that if
the loss is acceptable already, its risk is minus the maximal amount of capital which can be
obtained without losing acceptability by shorting the prudent instrument today and offsetting
the liabilities tomorrow with the initial acceptable loss profile. Hereby, risk has both a monetary
and an operational interpretation: What exactly needs to be done today in order to mitigate
risks occurring tomorrow?
The risk measure associated to this procedure is eventually defined as the function on the
set of potential losses mapping a particular loss to its capital requirement as computed above.
The mathematical axiomatisation of such an operational understanding of risk should ideally
prescribe properties of the two fundamentals, the acceptance set and the prudent instrument,
which are meaningful from an economic perspective. Without going into too much detail, two
of the axioms introduced in [11] need to be singled out.
The authors model future losses whose risk is to be determined with the risk measure as a
vector space of real-valued functions X over the set Ω of future states of the economy. For such
a function X : Ω → R, the value X(ω) is the net loss X renders provided state ω ∈ Ω realises.
Potential losses are thus naturally ordered by an “objective order” and can be compared. This
objective order is the pointwise order ≤, and X ≤ Y holds if the net loss Y is at least as large
as the net loss X in each state, i.e. X(ω) ≤ Y (ω) for all ω ∈ Ω. However, Artzner et al. only
consider finite sets of states, i.e. the cardinality of Ω is finite. Since their paper [11], considering
function spaces as the domain of definition of risk measures has become standard.
The second remarkable axiom concerns the acceptance set. It is assumed to contain the
negative cone, i.e. if X : Ω → R is acceptable if X(ω) ≤ 0 for all ω ∈ Ω and no actual loss
is produced. Also, the authors mainly focus on coherent risk measures: A risk measure is
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coherent if the acceptance set is a convex cone in that λX + µY is acceptable whenever X
and Y are acceptable and λ, µ ≥ 0 are non-negative scaling factors. Convexity has a widely
accepted economic interpretation: If the agent diversifies between two acceptable losses, this
does not increase risk to a degree at which acceptability is lost. Conicity, however, is a more
questionable property. It would mean that any arbitrarily large quantity of an acceptable loss
remains acceptable. Liquidity effects are thus entirely ignored in the measurement of risk.
Whereas a bet on the outcome of a coin paying or costing 1e appears to be quite acceptable
for any financial agent, the same cannot be said of a similar bet paying or costing 1,000,000e.
This peculiarity quickly led to the further development of the axioms and to the suggestion
to replace the coherence axiom by mere convexity; cf. Fo¨llmer & Schied [51] and Fritelli &
Rosazza Gianin [55]. However, the negative cone being acceptable and the coherence of the
acceptance set imply together a property which remained to be widely accepted, monotonicity
of the acceptance set. That is, if Y is acceptable and X is a loss which is at most as large as Y
(X ≤ Y ), then the agent should also accept X.
Equally important are the early contributions of Delbaen [33, 34]. Firstly, they generalise
coherent risk measures decisively to situations where no assumption on the number of relevant
future states of the economy is made. The set Ω may have any arbitrary cardinality. However, in
certain contrast to Artzner et al. [11], losses are modelled as random variables measurable with
respect to some σ-agebra F ⊂ 2Ω of events observable tomorrow, and a probability measure P is
present assigning probabilities to these events. Losses are identified to a single equivalence class
if they agree in all states outside of an “impossible” set of states of P-probability 0. Moreover,
there is a natural generalisation of the pointwise objective ordering of losses in Artzner et al.
[11], given by the P-almost-sure (P-a.s.) order. More precisely, X ≤ Y P-a.s. if for each choice
of representatives f and g of the equivalence classes of X and Y , respectively, f(ω) ≤ g(ω)
holds for all states ω outside an event of P-probability 0.2 A priori, the probability measure P is
extrinsic. [33, 34] as well as most of the literature do neither explain the origin of P nor provide
an interpretation of it.3
Another important and lasting contribution of [33, 34] concerns the reference instrument
used to produce acceptability for general losses. In Artzner et al., this reference instrument
is mostly illustrated as a default-free zero coupon bond in a particular currency. Its payoff is
therefore deterministic and governed by the respective interest rate. Such an instrument can
obviously be used as a nume´raire. In Delbaen [33, 34], losses are therefore a priori assumed to
be discounted by the reference instrument, i.e. each loss is expressed in units of the reference
instrument:
Here we only remark that we are working in a model without interest rate, the
general case can “easily” be reduced to this case by “discounting”. [34, p. 4]
An immediate consequence is cash-additivity of the resulting risk measure: adding or withdraw-
2 As usual, we will in the following treat equivalence classes as random variables and make no further mention
of representatives in statements which hold P-almost surely, i.e. with full P-probability.
3 We will argue in Section 1.2 that the role of the reference probability measure P entails non-trivial interpre-
tational queries whether a given risk measure actually accounts for Knightian uncertainty. [33, 34] mostly avoid
these issues by considering risk measures on the “robust spaces” L∞ and L0 of equivalence classes of bounded and
arbitrary real-valued random variables, respectively. These spaces only depend weakly on a particular probability
measure P in that their definition merely uses the set of its null sets.
3
ing a constant amount m of (discounted) capital to or from a loss X results in decreasing or
increasing the risk by precisely that amount. If ρ denotes the risk measure as a function of the
loss,
ρ(X +m) = ρ(X) +m.
These contributions have been so style-forming that, usually, risk measures are introduced
along the following lines, cf. Fo¨llmer & Schied [52, Chapter 4]: Suppose X is a vector space
of real-valued functions containing all constant functions and carrying a vector space order 
which, restricted to the set of constant functions, agrees with the usual ordering on the real line.
This space models (discounted) losses net of gains, the ordering admits a comparison of losses.
A functional ρ : X → R∪ {∞} is a monetary risk measure if is has the following two properties:
(R1) Monotonicity: Whenever X,Y ∈ X satisfy X  Y , ρ(X) ≤ ρ(Y ) has to hold.
(R2) Cash-additivity: ρ(X+m) = ρ(X)+m for all X ∈ X and all constant functions m ∈ R.
ρ is a convex monetary risk measure if, beside properties (R1) and (R2), it satisfies
(R3) Quasi-convexity: For all X,Y ∈ X and all real numbers λ ∈ [0, 1],
ρ(λX + (1− λ)Y ) ≤ max{ρ(X), ρ(Y )}.
The economic interpretation of (R1) is immediate: If a loss X is better in comparison to Y ,
its risk should be less than that of Y . The emergence of (R2) is explained above. Similar to
convexity of the acceptance set in Artzner et al. [11], quasi-convexity reflects the generally ac-
cepted economic paradigm that diversification does not increase risk. Note that the conjunction
of (R2) and (R3) is logically equivalent to the conjunction of (R2) and
(R4) Convexity: ρ(λX + (1− λ)Y ) ≤ λρ(X) + (1− λ)ρ(Y ) for all X,Y ∈ X and every choice
of a parameter λ ∈ [0, 1].
As the presentation here employs a very general domain of definition, i.e. the space X , it makes
both sense when X is a vector space of pointwisely defined functions as in Artzner et al. [11]
or [52, Chapter 4.1], and when X is a space of equivalence classes of measurable functions over
a probability space as in Delbaen [33, 34]. Nevertheless, such a definition embodies a complete
shift in the understanding of risk measurement. A risk measure is not a functional arising from
a particular choice of extrinsic objects such as acceptance set and reference instrument, but a
functional defined ad hoc with particular axiomatic properties. This is important to keep in
mind.
The question how in a concrete situation financial risk can actually be determined by an
agent has remained untouched so far. The losses net of gains as well as the resulting risk of a
financial position are often determined on the basis of historically measured or simulated payoff
patterns of the same or similar classes of financial instruments. These yield a distribution of
losses and gains which is assumed to provide relevant information for the future payoff of the
financial position. Although this approach is intuitive, it is a priori in contrast to the framework
of determining payoffs in the presence of isolated future states of the economy resolving all
uncertainty as posited by Artzner et al. [11]. However, it can well be incorporated in Delbaen’s
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setting of risk measurement, where losses are modelled by random variables in the presence of a
probability measure. Each equivalence class X of real-valued random variables on a probability
space (Ω,F ,P) induces a distribution of losses on the real line relative to the probability measure
P. This distribution can be captured, for instance, by the cumulative distribution function
FPX defined by FPX(x) := P(X ≤ x), x ∈ R. A risk measure ρ on such random variables
is now called law-invariant if the measured risk only depends on the distribution under the
reference measure P: if X and Y have the same cumulative distribution functions, i.e. FPX =
FPY , then they pose the same risk, i.e. ρ(X) = ρ(Y ). Demanding such an invariance of the
risk measure implies that the probability space (Ω,F ,P) in its role as collection of the future
states of the economy becomes obsolete. Instead, the risk of probability distributions on the
real line is measured, and the distributional patterns derived from simulations or historical
data are taken at face value. Important early contributions on law-invariant risk measures are
Filipovic´ & Svindland [48], Fritelli & Rosazza Gianin [56], Jouini et al. [65], Kusuoka [74], and
Svindland [93, 94]. They also demonstrated that the assumption of law-invariance has very
strong and rather surprising analytic consequences. An important one which we shall get back
to frequently in this introduction is that the extension problem can be solved for law-invariant
convex monetary risk measures. Let L∞ := L∞(Ω,F ,P) denote the space of equivalence classes
of bounded random variables up to agreement with P-probability 1. Suppose ρ : L∞ → R
is a law-invariant convex monetary risk measure. If the probability space is rich enough and
p ∈ [1,∞) is an arbitrarily chosen parameter, there is a unique lower semicontinuous (l.s.c.),
cash-additive and convex function ρ] : Lp → (−∞,∞] such that ρ](X) = ρ(X) for all X ∈ L∞;
cf. [48, Theorem 2.2]. Here, Lp := Lp(Ω,F ,P) denotes the space of equivalence classes of real-
valued random variables whose p-th moment with respect to the probability measure P is finite.
Lower semicontinuity means that for each level c ∈ R the lower level set {X ∈ Lp | ρ](X) ≤ c}
is closed in the natural topology of convergence in p-th mean. ρ] thus extends ρ in a consistent
manner to unbounded losses. For this important property of law-invariant risk measures, we
refer to Chen et al. [26], Filipovic´ & Svindland [48], and Gao et al. [58].
This very brief summary of the evolution of static risk measures is naturally subjective in
its selection and presentation of aspects. However, it presents some of the deeper tenets of and
predicaments in the theory relevant for this thesis: To which degree does a theory of risk have
to be operational? Can thinking about risk in terms of functionals obscure their operational
interpretation? Is cash-additivity a good axiom, and what does it say about the interpretation
of the objects whose loss is measured?
We close this introductory tour de force of mathematical risk theory with a caveat. In this
thesis we will only consider losses occurring at a single particular prespecified future time point
and measure the risk from the perspective of “today”. Risk measurement will therefore take
place in an (abstract) static market model. The rich literature on dynamic risk measurement
in multi-period frameworks will not play a role. We refer the interested reader to, e.g., Acciaio
& Penner [3], Detlefsen & Scandolo [38], Fo¨llmer & Penner [50], Fo¨llmer & Schied [52, Chapter
11], and the references therein.
Unfortunately, we will also have to ignore the literature on quasi-convex static risk measures
which are not cash-additive. We refer to Cerreia-Vioglio et al. [23], Drapeau & Kupper [39],
and El Karoui & Ravanelli [40].
The focus of this thesis lies on risk which affects the individual losses and gains of agents,
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not risks affecting the financial endowment or stability of a system of agents such as an external
shock of the economy propagating through the banking sector. In recent years, the latter stream
of mathematical risk theory, the theory of systemic risks, has nevertheless gained prominence,
developed quickly, and produced rich amounts of literature. The type of risk measures under
consideration in this thesis introduced in Section 1.4 encompass certain classes of multivariate
systemic risk measures.4 This link has been made explicit in the recent working paper Arduca
et al. [8]. However, the theory of systemic risks extends well beyond systemic risk measures. We
refer the interested reader to the monographs by Fouque & Langsam [54] and Hurd [64] as well
as the references therein.
1.2 Risk, uncertainty, and the Bayesian paradigm
Before we can return to the discrepancies in the theory of risk measures unfolded in the preceding
section, we need to focus on a question of epistemology: What is the “risk” measured by a risk
measure?
In this question, the literature usually quotes Frank Knight’s style-forming distinction of risk
and uncertainty. In his seminal dissertation Risk, Uncertainty, and Profits [72] he argued
for an understanding of risk as “a quantity susceptible of measurement”, a situation with an
unknown outcome whose realisation obeys parameters which can be known. Uncertainty, on
the other hand, refers to situations in which the parameters determining the realisation of an
outcome are ambiguous or simply impossible to be known.
The practical difference between the two categories, risk and uncertainty, is that in
the former the distribution of the outcome in a group of instances is known (either
from calculation a priori or from statistics of past experience), while in the case
of uncertainty that is not true, the reason being that it is impossible to form a
group of instances, because the situation dealt with is in a high degree unique. The
best example of uncertainty is in connection with the exercise of judgment or the
formation of those opinions as to the future course of events, which opinions (and
not scientific knowledge) actually guide most of our conduct. [72, p. 233]
Similar considerations, though of more pragmatic nature, can be found prominently in the works
of Keynes [70]:
By “uncertain” knowledge ... I do not mean merely to distinguish what is known
for certain from what is only probable. The game of roulette is not subject, in this
sense, to uncertainty ... The sense in which I am using the term is that in which
the prospect of a European war is uncertain, or the price of copper and the rate of
interest twenty years hence, ... or the position of private wealth-owners in the social
system in 1970. About these matters there is no scientific basis on which to form
any calculable probability whatever. We simply do not know.
Quoted from [71, p. 265].
4 More precisely, “allocate first, then aggregate”- and “first aggregate, then allocate”-type systemic risk mea-
sures; cf. [8] and the references therein.
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We also refer to Keynes [69].
The devastating economic consequences of the financial crisis of 2007-2009 proved painfully
that the widespread use of advanced mathematical tools had not made financial practices sus-
tainably safe. In its aftermath, Knight’s ideas enjoyed resurgent interest. The role played by
quantitative methods of risk management during the lead-up to the crisis was not judged unan-
imously. Fo¨llmer [49] argues that questionable and partially illegal human behaviour lay at the
root of the crisis, and institutions with a strong quantitative emphasis generally fared better
in the financial turmoil. The Turner Review [100] on the other hand, issued by the British
Financial Services Authority (FSA), shed critical light on the very assumptions of mathematical
modelling in use in a manner more than reminiscent of Knight and Keynes:
More fundamentally, however, it is important to realize that the assumption that
past distribution patterns carry robust inferences for the probability of future pat-
terns is methodologically insecure. It involves applying to the world of social and
economic relationships a technique drawn from the world of physics, in which a ran-
dom sample of a definitively existing universe of possible events is used to determine
the probability characteristics which govern future random samples. But it is unclear
whether this analogy is valid when applied to economic and social relationships, or
whether instead, we need to recognise that we are dealing not with mathematically
modellable risk, but with inherent ‘Knightian’ uncertainty. [100, p. 45]
Such an assessment should not be ignored lightly. It is precisely this methodology of inferring
the future on the basis of “past distribution patterns” which lies at the heart of law-invariant
risk measurement, the both theoretically and practically most commonly used type of risk mea-
surement.
As a rational framework for decision-making often draws its authority and influence from
mathematical validation, Knight’s distinction has had decisive influence on mathematical re-
search dealing with decision-making in ambiguous situations. In particular, Knightian uncer-
tainty (often also referred to as ambiguity) has over the past decade become the subject of
extensive and zealous research in financial mathematics. Its intellectual impact cannot only be
felt in the realm of finance or decision sciences, but also in other economic fields.5 The dis-
tinction may sometimes be too rigid though and for instance ignore the social embeddedness of
decision-making. For a critique in this respect, intellectually based on the ideas of N. Luhmann,
we refer to the introduction of Drapeau & Kupper [39].
It is nowadays widely agreed that Knightian risk should be identified with sampling from a
known distribution, whereas Knightian uncertainty is best understood as imperfect knowledge
about the distribution the sample stems from. In line with statistical tradition, the latter is
canonically modelled by a set of distributions or probability measures, although this is somewhat
at odds with the original ideas of Knight and Keynes. In his review of different philosophies of
uncertainty, Arrow [9] remarks:
The statistician’s problem is of the same general type as the businessman’s, and
even the information-getting aspects have their economic counterparts. The various
5 Innovation economics would be a further example to mention, see Bewley [15], and Reinganum [90].
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theories which have been proposed ... as foundations for statistical inference are
therefore closely related to theories of economic behavior under uncertainty. [9, pp.
409-410]
We also refer to [9, p. 418]. Therefore, Knightian uncertainty is often called model uncertainty in
this strand of thinking. The latter refers to the impossibility to pin down the accurate or “true”
probabilistic model governing the realisation of the future, provided it even exists. Instead, a
potentially large set of models is taken into account which may or may not contain the true
model.
This is perfectly reflected by one of the favourite mathematical toy models of the risk-
uncertainty dichotomy due to Ellsberg [41, Section II]. Consider two urns containing the same
known number of balls, each ball being marked with a colour from a known fixed set of colours.
The composition of the first urn, i.e. the number of balls of each colour in the urn, is known.
Drawing from this urn can be described with a single probability measure on a finite set of
outcomes. Betting on the outcome would thus correspond to risk. The composition of the
second urn, i.e. the precise number of balls of some colour in the urn, is unknown. Betting on
the outcome would hence correspond to uncertainty. As the total number of balls and colours is
fixed and known, drawing from that urn can nevertheless be described by taking into account a
set of probability measures, each modelling a particular possible composition. This set will also
contain the true model.
More fundamentally, this mathematical translation of the epistemological terms “risk” and
“uncertainty” invokes the assumption that imperfect knowledge is modelled best in the language
of probabilities. Cyert & de Groot [30, p. 524] summarise this so-called Bayesian paradigm
poignantly:
To the Bayesian, all uncertainty can be represented by probability distributions.
The relation between the Bayesian paradigm and uncertainty is discussed in more detail in
Gilboa & Marinacci [61].
Taking the perspective that all uncertainty is best modelled in the language of probabilities,
Delbaen’s approach of defining risk measures on random variables relative to a probability
space (Ω,F ,P) seems to adhere to this paradigm. However, one should have a closer look at
the probability measure P. For the sake of simplicity, we consider a canonical choice of the
domain of definition of a risk measure ρ: losses an agent incurs are modelled by equivalence
classes of bounded random variables defined by equality outside of a P-null set, i.e. by the space
L∞ = L∞(Ω,F ,P) from above. This domain of definition appears frequently in the literature.
Suppose a convex monetary risk measure ρ : L∞ → R is applied which has the Fatou property,
a mild regularity property: Every sequence (Xn)n∈N ⊂ L∞ which converges outside of a set
of P-probability 0 to some X ∈ L∞ pointwise6 and is bounded in norm (supn∈N ‖Xn‖∞ < ∞)
satisfies ρ(X) ≤ lim infn→∞ ρ(Xn) — the risk of an approximated loss is essentially bounded
from above by approximating risks. By [52, Theorem 4.33], ρ can then be expressed as
ρ(X) = sup
Q∈∆P
EQ[X]− α(Q), X ∈ L∞. (1.1)
6 In the following, we will also use the standard terminology to refer to such sequences as converging P-almost
surely (P-a.s.).
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Here, ∆P denotes the set of all probability measures Q on (Ω,F) which are absolutely continuous
with respect to P (Q  P),7 EQ[·] denotes the expectation operator with respect to Q, and
α : ∆P → (−∞,∞] is a so-called penalty function uniformly bounded below taking values in the
real numbers or +∞. Probability measures with infinite penalty are clearly irrelevant for the
computation of ρ(X). (1.1) is a dual representation of the convex function ρ adapted from convex
analysis. The literature often refers to it as the robust representation of the risk measure, in
allusion to the computation of ρ(X) as a “worst case” over several alternative probability models.
Justifications for convex monetary risk measures to be “a case study how to deal with model
uncertainty in mathematical terms” [52, Preface to 3rd edition] and thus to account for Knightian
uncertainty are usually based on such representations. In the subjective argument — see also
Fo¨llmer & Weber [53, p. 308] — the agent is uncertain which probability model in ∆P is adequate
or “true”. The penalty function α captures this uncertainty. The larger α(Q), the less reason
the agent sees to believe in the adequacy of the probabilistic model Q to govern the realisation
of the future. Expected losses EQ[X] are thus reduced by α(Q), and Q only contributes to the
supremum in (1.1) in extreme cases, when caution due to the possibility of underestimating its
adequacy is rational. Such an interpretation may remind the reader of Knight’s “opinions as to
the future course of events”. Also, it is an argument essentially adapted from decision theory,
more precisely from the numerical representation of preferences. Representations of a similar
shape as (1.1) as worst case approaches over sets of probability measures have been obtained for
multiple classes of preference structures subject to Knightian risk and Knightian uncertainty. To
name a few of the most canonical examples, this applies to the multiple prior preferences due to
Gilboa & Schmeidler [62] — see also [52, Chapter 2.5] for a presentation more reminiscent of risk
measures —, multiplier preferences introduced by Hansen & Sargent [63] — see also [81, Section
4.2.1] —, and to variational preferences axiomatised by Maccheroni et al. [81] overarching the
two aforementioned examples.8
One could also conceive of a regulatory argument. Assume a regulatory agency prescribes a
set of probabilistic models dom (α) := {Q ∈ ∆P | α(Q) <∞} governing the realisation of states
and a set of model-dependent monetary loss tolerances α : dom (α)→ R. Given a future loss X,
one computes the maximal extent to which the expected loss EQ[X] exceeds the loss tolerance
α(Q) over all models Q. This procedure could be called a stress test.
Here and in the following, the term model space will refer to the domain of definition of a risk
measure consisting of losses whose risk is to be measured. In the present case, the probability
measure P defining the model space L∞ serves as a reference model. We argue that it tends to
play a curious double role.
• The mathematical setting of the problem does not depend too heavily on P. In fact, it only
plays the soft role of a gauge which determines which events A ∈ F the risk assessment
7 That is, Q(N) = 0 holds for each event N ∈ F with P(N) = 0.
8 It should be emphasised, however, that there is a major distinction between variational preferences and risk
measures. In their numerical representation, the former penalise expected utility, computed with a fixed utility
function over the set of consequences, but with respect to different probabilistic models. The usual argument
claims that by this procedure Knightian risk — captured by expected utility under a fixed probabilistic model —
is clearly separated from Knightian uncertainty — captured by taking multiple models into account and penalising
them. As that utility would be linear in case of risk measures, it seems questionable if they account for risk and
uncertainty simultaneously in the described manner.
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inherently deems certain (P(A) = 1) or impossible (P(A) = 0). The model space of losses is
invariant under all choices of P agreeing on the same notions of impossibility and certainty:
If P and P∗ are two equivalent probability measures sharing the same null sets (P ≈ P∗),
then L∞(Ω,F ,P) = L∞(Ω,F ,P∗) and also ∆P = ∆P∗ .
• Consider the dual representation above and assume that two equivalent probability mea-
sures P ≈ P∗ satisfy α(P) <∞ and α(P∗) =∞. In the subjective interpretation, the agent
would assign a certain degree of plausibility to P being the “true model”, but deems P∗
completely implausible. Therefore it should make an interpretational difference whether
the underlying choice of the probability space in (1.1) is L∞(Ω,F ,P) and not L∞(Ω,F ,P∗).
• Suppose P is treated as the unobservable “physical measure” which actually governs the
realisation of future states and which is not known to the agent measuring risk. Does
the mathematical formulation (1.1) then assume a priori knowledge beyond the agent’s
assessment of plausibility?
• Consider the classical Lp-model spaces, p ∈ {0} ∪ [1,∞], which have appeared already in
the discussion of the extension problem for law-invariant risk measures. (Note that L0
is the space of equivalence classes of all real-valued random variables.) They frequently
serve as domains of definition of risk measures, for instance in Filipovic´ & Svindland [48],
Frittelli & Rosazza Gianin [55], and Kaina & Ru¨schendorf [67]. Among them, the only ones
which are invariant under equivalent choices of the probability measure are the extreme
cases p = ∞ and p = 0 discussed in Delbaen [33, 34]. For unbounded random variables
defined by their integrability properties, the choice of the probability model is therefore
essential. If ρ accounts for Knightian uncertainty/model uncertainty, where should this
meaningful probability measure P thus come from?
• If P plays a strong and not a weak role or if P is the unobservable physical measure,
how can a priori assumptions like non-atomicity or standardness of the probability space
(Ω,F ,P) which frequently appear in the literature be justified in the presence of Knightian
uncertainty?9
The role of the reference measure P becomes even more curious if one considers the case of a
P-law-invariant risk measure ρ : L∞ → R under the additional assumption that the probability
space (Ω,F ,P) is non-atomic. In this case, ρ automatically has the Fatou property and a robust
representation in the fashion of (1.1) exists — cf. [65, 94]. Moreover, the penalisation α can
always be chosen as the so-called convex conjugate of ρ, i.e. α = ρ∗ for the function
ρ∗ : ∆P → (−∞,∞], Q 7→ sup
X∈L∞
EQ[X]− ρ(X).
The set of all Radon-Nikodym derivatives
Q := {dQdP | ρ∗(Q) <∞} ⊂ L1+
is a law-invariant or rearrangement invariant subset of the positive cone
9 Non-atomicity of (Ω,F ,P) means that there is a random variable U : Ω → R such that the associated
cumulative distribution function FPU under P is continuous. Standardness — in the terminology of [65] — is the
combination of non-atomicity of (Ω,F ,P) and the separability of L2(Ω,F ,P).
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L1+ := {X ∈ L1 | P(X ≥ 0) = 1};
whenever Z = dQdP ∈ Q and Z ′ ∈ L1 has the same cumulative distribution function as Z, i.e.
FPZ = FPZ′ , then there is a probability measure Q′ ∈ ∆P such that ρ∗(Q′) < ∞ and Z ′ = dQ
′
dP .
However, law-invariance is not preserved under equivalent changes of the reference measure. A
functional or a set may be law-invariant with respect to P, but they are not necessarily law-
invariant with respect to an equivalent measure P∗. In the law-invariant context, the reference
measure P is consequently far more than a soft gauge. Specifying the correct model P compared
to the specification of an equivalent model P∗ a priori provides a plentitude of more crucial
information. Hence, the two roles of the probability measure differ discernibly in the law-
invariant context.
Nevertheless, the law-invariant example provides an important lesson which is the guid-
ing thread throughout the first contribution to this thesis [76]. Suppose a risk measure ρ :
L∞(Ω,F ,P∗)→ R with Fatou property over a non-atomic probability space (Ω,F ,P∗) is given.
We can assume without loss of generality that ρ is normalised, that is, ρ(0) = 0, and infer its
dual representation (1.1) as
ρ(X) = sup
Q∈∆P∗
EQ[X]− ρ∗(Q), X ∈ L∞(Ω,F ,P∗).
If there is reason to believe that ρ is law-invariant with respect to a non-atomic probability
measure P equivalent to P∗, P can be found among the measures
(ρ∗)−1({0}) = {Q ∈ ∆P∗ | ρ∗(Q) = 0 = inf ρ∗};
this follows e.g. from a slight adaptation of the arguments in [78, Remark 6.3]. In the subjective
interpretation of the dual representation above, these measures would be the ones in which the
agent has the highest degree of confidence. If it is identified, switching to the reference measure P
then provides the right probabilistic lens suited to the risk measure ρ which resolves the conflict
outlined above. Moreover, it facilitates further procedures such as extending the risk measure
to larger domains of definition as mentioned in Section 1.1.
Note that the distinguishing feature of this approach is to assume in a first step the risk
measure ρ to be given, for instance by behavioural observations of a concrete agent. Then it infers
the correct probabilistic and analytic structure suited to ρ. It does not posit the probabilistic
and analytic structure a priori and considers ρ relative to these model specifications. This
should be kept in mind when risk measures are supposed to account for Knightian uncertainty.
1.3 Non-dominated models and Knightian uncertainty
As we have illustrated in the preceding section, the existence of a probabilistic reference model
poses interpretational challenges when the aim is to account for Knightian uncertainty. In recent
years this has led to attempts to eliminate reference probability measures from models dealing
with Knightian uncertainty. These developments trade under the names of robust and model-
free mathematical finance, respectively, and we would like to discuss them briefly in this short
interlude.
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Robust mathematical finance concerns mathematical models for situations subject to Knigh-
tian uncertainty where, in accordance with the Bayesian paradigm, the latter is captured by
considering a large set P of probability measures potentially governing the realisation of rele-
vant economic variables. This is akin to the set dom (α) in the dual representation of a risk
measure (1.1). The probability measures P ∈ P are sometimes called priors.
Due to the aforementioned reasons, there has been increasing interest in recent years in
non-dominated sets of priors. The latter means that there is no probability measure P∗ such
that P ⊂ ∆P∗ . Exemplary publications are [16, 18, 19, 29, 60, 82, 86], to mention only a
few. One of the prime examples of such sets of priors is volatility uncertainty in a diffusion
model driven by Brownian motion. In this case, the set P is the set of laws of diffusions having
different volatilities and is usually non-dominated. For the latter, we particularly refer to Denis
& Martini [36] and Soner et al. [92].
Model-free mathematical finance studies models in which no probabilistic assumption is made
on the realisation of relevant economic variables. Instead, one usually focuses on statewise
evaluations. In the implicit or explicit presence of a σ-algebra F on the set of states Ω, this
approach can in fact be seen as a limiting extreme case of robust mathematical finance in which
the set P above is chosen to be the full set of all probability measures over the state space (Ω,F);
cf. Ob lo´j & Wiesel [87]. Such models have played a prominent role early on, for instance in the
initial risk measure framework suggested by Artzner et al. [11]. We also refer to the discussion
of such approaches in the monograph by Fo¨llmer and Schied [52, Chapter 4.2] and the references
therein. However, model-free finance has in recent years gained substantial complexity.
These two strands of mathematics will only play a minor or implicit role in this thesis. As
promising as these attempts at a better mathematical reflection of Knightian uncertainty may
seem, they pose highly non-trivial challenges three of which shall be shortly singled out here as
a justification.
Firstly, if the set P of probability measures under consideration is not dominated, its cardi-
nality must exceed the countable. Moreover, the priors must disperse mass among the events in
such an extreme manner that no dominating measure can be found. In practical applications,
however, the primitives often are empirical distributions rather than genuine random variables.
Therefore one has to be very careful not to lose a clear-cut correspondence between mathematical
theory and economic interpretation. The probabilities under consideration being non-dominated
is furthermore not a raison d’eˆtre in itself. A non-dominated model should always be examined
if it is supported by economic, decision-theoretic or financial reasons.
Secondly, the more Knightian uncertainty a mathematical model of an economic phenomenon
“contains” interpretationally, the less tractable it tends to be mathematically. This is often
mitigated either by using ad hoc methods, or by imposing “regularity assumptions” that make
a mathematical treatment of the problem feasible, but potentially overshadow the economic
content. Such assumptions should be investigated very carefully, as they may in fact reverse
the endeavour to include uncertainty beyond the dominated case. An example of this effect is
discussed at greater length in Section 1.6 and Liebrich & Svindland [76].
Thirdly, intuition learned in the classical setting of a state space (Ω,F) endowed with a single
probability measure P often fails in robust or model-free settings. Even more, as exemplified by
the investigation of a “non-dominated version” of the Grothendieck Lemma in Maggis et al. [82],
widely used analytic tools of fundamental nature do not necessarily have equivalents in the robust
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or model-free world. This lack of the analytic toolbox cannot always be overcome. It is still
a topic of future research to systematically understand the phase transition in complexity that
arises from shifting from a dominated framework to a non-dominated robust or even model-free
one.
1.4 Model spaces and capital requirements
The discussion so far has shown there are good economic reasons for various choices of the
model space of a risk measure. A scenariowise evaluation of incurred losses under certain infor-
mation about future events may best be captured by the model space L∞(Ω,F) of all bounded
measurable random variables over a state space Ω endowed with a σ-algebra F . If losses are
evaluated according to their statistical and distributional properties, saying that a loss behaves
according to a Gaussian distribution would require considering model spaces like Lp(Ω,F ,P),
the space of equivalence classes of random variables with finite p-th moment with respect to
a probability measure P over a measurable space (Ω,F), p ∈ [1,∞). Similar, but more exotic
model spaces appearing in the literature are Orlicz hearts and Orlicz spaces; cf. [27, 58, 59].
One may even consider spaces of random variables built on the basis of a non-dominated set of
probability measures P as in the preceding section; see, for instance, Beissner & Denis [14] and
Denis et al. [35]. If a model space is furthermore infinite dimensional and considered relative to a
topology, usually several choices of this topology are available and can reflect different economic
phenomena. This issue is discussed in Mas Colell & Zame [83, Section 4].
All model spaces in this zoo, however, share the common trait of being Riesz spaces: They
carry a partial order  which is consistent with vector space operations and with respect to which
finite sets of elements have “minima” and “maxima”. Having such an order at hand is a sensible
minimal requirement. It allows to compare losses in an “objective” manner and to combine two
losses in a best- and worst-case manner. Most of the suggested spaces, abbreviated by X , even
have the stronger property of being Banach lattices, i.e. they additionally carry a norm ‖ · ‖
such that the normed space (X , ‖ · ‖) is complete, and such that the norm itself is “compatible”
with the order  on X . For a review of the theory of Riesz spaces and Banach lattices, we refer
to the classical monographs by Aliprantis & Border [5], Aliprantis & Burkinshaw [6, 7], and
Meyer-Nieberg [84].
The different approaches to the model space question, supported by various different ways
of economic reasoning, can hence be unified if risk measures can be defined on arbitrary ordered
vector spaces or Riesz spaces. A nice side effect of such a definition would be that the risk
of objects like vector-valued random variables or stochastic processes can be determined in the
same setting. We therefore argue for such a flexible unifying framework throughout the thesis.
It turns out that this necessitates a return to the initial operational definition of risk measures
as in Artzner et al. [11].
Given a risk measure ρ : X → (−∞,∞] on an arbitrary ordered vector space (X ,), the
axiom of cash-additivity (R4) does not have an immediate sensible counterpart. A remedial idea
might be to replace cash by a reference instrument U which is positive, non-null, and available
at a unit price. In terms of order, 0 ≺ U should hold. Cash-additivity could then be replaced
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by the axiom
∀X ∈ X ∀m ∈ R : ρ(X +mU) = ρ(X) +m. (1.2)
Which implications does (1.2) have for the discounting argument from Section 1.1 though? If
X is a function space, e.g. L∞ over some probability space (Ω,F ,P), its natural order is the P-a.s.
order introduced in Section 1.1: X ≤ Y if P(X ≤ Y ) = 1. Hence, such a reference instrument
U could be any random variable with the property P(U ≥ 0) = 1 and P(U > 0) > 0. However,
this could mean that U can default and not yield any payoff in some event, i.e. P(U = 0) > 0.
The investment in U has the role of de-risking X with a “safe” bet. Such a safe bet could be,
for instance, the investment in a sovereign bond, and the possibility of a default of U cannot
be ruled out a priori as the government-debt crisis ensuing after the last financial crisis proved.
U can therefore not be assumed to be a nume´raire suited for discounting. We also refer to [85,
Section 1.3.1].
Even if U is a nume´raire, i.e. P(U > 0) = 1, the discounting argument leading to cash-
additive risk measures cannot be performed without changing the model space: The space
{XU | X ∈ L∞}
is not a subset of L∞ unless the payoff of U is bounded below, i.e. there is some ε > 0 such
that P(U ≥ ε) = 1. It also cannot be equipped with the usual L∞-topology available before
discounting. Note that the assumption of boundedness from below can be violated even if U
will not default; the payoff can become arbitrarily small with small, but positive probability.
For more information on this problem, we refer to [85, Section 1.3.2].
Moreover, as risk is usually measured after discounting, the discounting procedure should
not add additional risk. This is questionable if the nume´raire is random as above. The reader
may think of the risk posed by uncertain future interest rates, an issue raised and discussed in
El Karoui & Ravenelli [40]. In particular, the crucial law-invariance property is unstable under
discounting; see also [85, Section 1.3.4]. Suppose the nume´raire is not riskless and recall that
FPX denotes the cumulative distribution function of a random variable X under P. Then we may
find losses X,Y and X ′, Y ′ such that
FPX = FPY and FPX′ 6= FPY ′ ,
but
FPX/U 6= FPY/U and FPX′/U = FY ′/U .
If the suggested tradeoff is to assume U to be actually riskless, but no discounting takes
place, it seems questionable financially whether such a payoff exists over long time horizons.
We refer to Munari [85, Chapter 1.3] for a thorough discussion of even more problems arising
from the discounting argument and illustrating examples.
If risk measures are to be defined on general ordered vector spaces, the axiom of cash-
additivity must be dropped. In light of the aforementioned conundrums, however, even replacing
it by the similar-looking axiom (1.2) makes a substantial qualitative difference. Moreover, there
are good financial reasons to embrace these differences.
Inspired by Farkas et al. [43, 44, 45], Frittelli & Scandolo [57], Munari [85], and Scandolo [91]
we opt throughout this thesis for a generalised notion of risk measurement which returns to the
14
initial ideas by Artzner et al. The approach makes sense on any ordered vector space. It is also
interpretationally rigorous in that risk is identified with a capital requirement relative to certain
fundamentals: a notion of acceptability of losses, portfolios of liquidly traded securities allowed
for hedging, and observable prices for these securities.
Suppose an agent would like to determine the risk of loss profiles modelled by a (non-trivial)
ordered vector space (X ,). A first step would be to gain clarity about which losses pose an
acceptable risk to the agent. This is reflected by choosing an acceptance set A ⊂ X within
the ambient space of losses. It should obey the following economically motivated requirements
which have already made their appearance in Section 1.1:
• The set A is a non-empty proper subset of X : ∅ 6= A ( X . This excludes degenerate cases
of risk measurement.
• A is convex: The convex combination λX + (1− λ)Y lies in A for all choices of X,Y ∈ A
and 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1. Economically, diversification among acceptable losses does not lead to the
loss of acceptability.
• A is monotone: Whenever a loss X is better compared to an acceptable loss Y , i.e. X  Y
and Y ∈ A, then X should be acceptable as well, i.e. X ∈ A. Hence, the acceptability
criterion obeys the standard financial paradigm of “more is better” (or equivalently: “less
loss is better”).
Having chosen such a set A, it poses a capital adequacy test for an arbitrary loss X ∈ X , which
is deemed adequately capitalised if it belongs to the acceptance set, and inadequately capitalised
otherwise.
If the loss X does not pass the capital adequacy test, the agent may in a second step want
to take remedial actions. In line with the ideas of Artzner et al. [11] and the definition of a
cash-additive risk measure, the agent has access to a security market: She can raise capital and
buy a portfolio of securities in that market which, when combined with the loss profile X in
question, results in the hedged position to pass the capital adequacy test.
Mathematically, a security market is a pair (S, p) with the following properties:
• S ⊂ X is a non-trivial vector space of finite dimension which contains some non-null and
positive U , i.e. 0 ≺ U . We call S the security space, its elements are called securities.
• p : S → R is a linear and positive functional, the latter meaning 0 ≤ p(Z) whenever Z ∈ S
satisfies 0  Z. Moreover, we assume there is a non-null positive security 0 ≺ U ∈ S such
that p(U) = 1. The functional p is called the pricing functional.
Which assets qualify as securities or adequately “safe bets” for hedging may both be an individual
management decision or prescribed by a regulatory oversight. The assumption that S is only
of finite dimension is not problematic from a real-world perspective and will turn out to be
mathematically instrumental to studying risk sharing problems in the second part of this thesis,
Chapter 3. The definition can be immediately extended to infinite dimensional security spaces
though.
The assets in the security space are liquidly traded at arbitrary quantities, which is reflected
by the linearity of the pricing functional p. Again, the definition can be easily extended to allow
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for convex pricing rules which would model a non-trivial bid-ask spread in the security market,
i.e. p(Z) + p(−Z) > 0 is possible for some Z ∈ S. We will sometimes assume that the security
space is a proper subspace of X , i.e. S ( X . This merely excludes redundant situations in which
only the “risk” of liquidly traded securities is determined. The assumption is met automatically
if the dimension of X is infinite. Note that in our definition of a security market we adopt the
usual market notion of order. A true gain corresponds to a positive security, a true loss or short
sale to a negative security, i.e. Z  0. For a loss X ∈ X , this requires to define the loss secured
with some Z ∈ S as X + (−Z). The existence of some “bond-like” security 0  U ∈ S with unit
price p(U) = 1 in the security market seems natural and well-founded in practical applications.
In contrast to the setting of Artzner et al. [11], our security spaces may be higher dimensional,
and more than one asset may be available in the security market. This results in a decrease of
the cost of securitisation, as the agent may invest in a portfolio of securities specifically designed
to secure a particular loss rather than restricting the remedial action to investing in a single
asset independent of the loss profile.
Having these fundamentals in place, we can now formulate a condition on their interplay
which guarantees that they provide a rational basis to compute capital requirements and thus
risks. Given an acceptance set A and a security market (S, p), we say that the triplet R :=
(A,S, p) is a risk measurement regime if the following condition holds:
∀X ∈ X : sup{p(Z) | Z ∈ S, X + Z ∈ A} <∞. (1.3)
Assume condition (1.3) is violated. Then the agent can find a financial position X and a sequence
(Zn)n∈N of securities which become arbitrarily valuable — 0 ≤ p(Zn) ↑ ∞ — with the following
property: The agent can sell them short in the security market, hedging with X against his short
sale, without at some point failing to pass the capital adequacy test. This opens an arbitrage-like
opportunity and presents a market failure of the security market (S, p) relative to the capital
adequacy test A. It should therefore be excluded.
Now, assuming condition (1.3), we obtain an immediate definition of the risk a loss poses in
the risk measurement regime R = (A,S, p) as a capital requirement: the infimal capital which
needs to be raised and invested in a security portfolio available at market price in the security
market such that the loss hedged with that security portfolio is acceptable and passes the capital
adequacy test. The resulting risk measure associated to the risk measurement regime R would
thus be the functional
ρR : X → (−∞,∞], X 7→ inf{p(Z) | Z ∈ S, X − Z ∈ A} (inf ∅ =∞). (1.4)
By (1.3), the risk measure ρR cannot produce the value −∞, and it is also sensible to assume
that negatively infinite risk, which would correspond to the possibility to withdraw arbitrary
amounts of wealth from a loss, does not exist.
The framework of risk measures as capital requirements explained above is flexible enough to
encompass both the framework of Artzner et al. [11] as well as the usual case of convex monetary
risk measures with the cash-additivity property. However, it goes far beyond those two cases.
Immediate consequences of this definition are the following properties of the functional ρR.
• ρR(Y ) ≤ 0 for any choice of Y ∈ A. Hence, ρR is a proper function, i.e. ρ−1R ({−∞}) = ∅
and ρR 6≡ ∞.
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• ρR is -monotone, i.e. it satisfies axiom (R1).
• ρR generalises axiom (R2) in that it is S-additive: ρR(X + Z) = ρR(X) + p(Z) for all
X ∈ X and all Z ∈ S.
• ρR satisfies axiom (R3) (quasi-convexity) and is even convex.
1.5 Contributions of this thesis
We have finally set the stage with some of the leitmotifs of the contributions [76, 77, 78] collected
in this thesis — the risk-uncertainty problem, general model spaces, and risk measures as capital
requirements. The remainder of this introduction is devoted to the discussion of the articles and
the exposition of their main results. The aforementioned articles are:
(1) F.-B. Liebrich & G. Svindland (2017), Model Spaces for Risk Measures.
Insurance: Mathematics and Economics, Vol. 77, pp. 150–165, November 2017.
(2) F.-B. Liebrich & G. Svindland (2019), Risk Sharing for Capital Requirements with
Multidimensional Security Markets.
Forthcoming in Finance and Stochastics.
(3) F.-B. Liebrich & G. Svindland (2019), Efficient Allocations under Law-Invariance:
A Unifying Approach.
Journal of Mathematical Economics, Vol. 84, pp. 28–45, October 2019.
1.6 Solving the model space problem for risk measures
In Model Spaces for Risk Measures [76], see also Chapter 2, we address the following
question: Can the model space problem be solved for risk measures of type (1.4) defined on a
space of measurable functions? More precisely, this problem considers a specific risk measure
defined on, say, bounded measurable losses on an underlying measurable space (Ω,F) of states,
and the corresponding risk or uncertainty preferences expressed by it. Then the following two
questions arise: Is there a meaningful probabilistic structure on (Ω,F) intrinsic to the risk
measure? Can a maximal domain of definition be found whose structure is inherited from the
risk measure, which carries it as well, and which contains unbounded losses? If the answer to
both questions is affirmative, such a combination of probability measure and model space would
be the “right one” to harmonise the seemingly conflicting two normative paradigms of minimal
model dependence and maximal domain.
The first paradigm reflects that in the presence of Knightian uncertainty, a probabilistic
model P for the realisation of future states of the economy ω ∈ Ω consistent with information
given by a σ-algebra F on Ω may be impossible to be known or elicited, and thus a model
space should not depend too heavily on some specific model. In many standard market models
and financial calculations, though, unbounded distributions appear naturally as limiting ob-
jects of bounded distributions. The Central Limit Theorem, for instance, could imply that the
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distribution of a certain financial object is a Gaussian distribution. Similarly, log-normal distri-
butions appear naturally in the context of the Black-Scholes-Merton model. This leads to the
second paradigm of maximal domain which states that model spaces should include standard
unbounded models. In this respect, [76] embeds in the literature on the extension problem for
risk measures: see, for instance, Cerreia-Vioglio et al. [24] and Filipovic´ & Svindland [48].
Our investigations begin with the completely model-free setting of a measurable space (Ω,F)
and the space of bounded measurable real-valued functions over (Ω,F), L∞ := L∞(Ω,F). It is a
Banach lattice when equipped with the supremum norm |X|∞ := supω∈Ω |X(ω)|, X ∈ L∞, and
the pointwise order ≤. The elements of L∞ model statewise loss estimates contingent on states
ω ∈ Ω. We consider an agent whose risk attitudes over L∞ are captured by a risk measurement
regime R = (A,S, p) as described in the preceding section satisfying S ( X . At the time of
writing the paper, we made the assumption that the pricing functional is in fact strictly positive,
i.e. p(Z) > 0 for all Z ∈ S\{0} with Z ≥ 0. It turns out that this assumption is not needed
right from the beginning and we can in fact begin with the the slightly more general definition
given in the preceding section.
No structural properties have been assumed so far which would prevent the capital require-
ment under consideration to account both for risk or uncertainty. For practical reasons, the
agent’s attitude towards losses that may be large, but bounded in total and increasingly un-
likely to occur, is of crucial importance. If the agent is slightly risk- or uncertainty-seeking, these
losses should not really matter in the limit. Given a risk measurement regime R = (A,S, p)
such that the resulting risk measure ρR is finite, we call ρR continuous from above if
ρR(Xn) ↓ ρR(X)
whenever (Xn)n∈N ⊂ L∞ is a sequence which satisfies Xn ↓ X ∈ L∞ in order, i.e. Xn(ω) ↓ X(ω)
for all ω ∈ Ω. Continuity from above will allow us to derive the structure which fits precisely to
the agent’s attitudes towards risk or uncertainty.
Let ba denote the space of all finitely additive set functions µ : F → R with bounded total
variation, i.e. the dual space of (L∞, | · |∞) up to isometric isomorphism. Let ca ⊂ ba denote the
subspace of countably additive signed measures. For two non-empty sets M,M ′ ⊂ ba, we say
M M ′ if supν∈M ′ |ν|(N) = 0 implies supµ∈M |µ|(N) = 0; here, |µ| denotes the order modulus
of an element µ ∈ ba defined by |µ|(A) = sup{µ(B) − µ(A\B) | B ∈ F , B ⊂ A}.10 M ≈ M ′
means that M M ′ and M ′ M , and for ν ∈ ba we set caν := {µ ∈ ca | {µ}  {ν}}.
In [76, Proposition 3.1 & Corollary 3.2], we develop a thorough description of continuity from
above in terms of the geometry of the fundamentals (A,S, p). If R is such that ρR is finite and
we define the barrier cone B(A) := {µ ∈ ba | supY ∈A
∫
Y dµ <∞}, then ρR is continuous from
above if and only if every lower level set {µ ∈ ba | ρ∗R(µ) ≤ c}, c ∈ R, of the convex conjugate
ρ∗R : ba→ (−∞,∞] defined by
ρ∗R(µ) := sup
X∈L∞
∫
X dµ− ρR(X), µ ∈ ba,
10 There is a typo in the corresponding definition in [76], cf. last paragraph on p. 153. The sentence should
read: “As facilitating notation, for non-empty sets M,M ′ ⊆ ba, we write M  M ′ if and only if |ν|(A) = 0 for
all ν ∈M ′ implies |µ|(A) = 0 for all µ ∈M , A ∈ F .”
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is compact in the σ(ca,L∞)-topology.11 This is equivalent to
{µ ∈ B(A) | ∀Z ∈ ker(p) : ∫ Z dµ = 0} ⊂ ca.
The latter is implied by, but not equivalent to the condition B(A) ⊂ ca. If S is furthermore
constrained to be one-dimensional, ρR is continuous from above if, and only if, B(A) ⊂ ca.
Similar results have been obtained in [24].
Now, by [76, Theorem 3.3], if ρR is continuous from above, there exists a weak reference
probability measure P. This is defined as a probability measure P on (Ω,F) such that
ρ∗R(γP) <∞ for a uniquely determined γ > 0, and {P} ≈ dom (ρ∗R) := {µ ∈ ba | ρ∗R(µ) <∞}.
Hence, dom (ρ∗R) ⊂ (caP)+, where the latter denotes the set of all finite countably additive
measures absolutely continuous with respect to P. Note in particular the condition ρ∗R(γP) <∞.
In the subjective interpretation of the dual representation, this means that the agent at least
assigns a certain degree of plausibility to the model P (or rather the appropriately scaled version
of P, where the scaling factor γ is dictated by the pricing functional p). Note that by means
of dual representation, this implies that ρR(X) = ρR(Y ) whenever X = Y P-a.s. This result
critically illustrates one of the pitfalls of the model-free approach to financial mathematics.
Under a standard and conceptually not far-fetched continuity assumption, the underlying model
framework is necessarily dominated.
Consequently, under the assumption of continuity from above, we may define the same risk
measure ρR on the model space L∞P := L∞(Ω,F ,P) without any loss of information, particularly
without losing continuity from above; see [76, Corollary 3.5]. (We will not suppress dependence
on the reference measure P here.) One should also note that the translated pricing functional is
necessarily strictly positive.
We also discuss a more demanding question: Given a risk measurement regime R = (A,S, p)
on L∞P such that the resulting risk measure is finite, normalised, i.e. ρR(0) = 0, continuous from
above, and has P as weak reference probability model, can we choose P to be a strong reference
model? The latter means that ρ∗R(γP) = 0 for a suitable constant γ > 0, or equivalently
∀X ∈ L∞P : ρ(X) ≥ γEP[X].
The existence of strong reference models is discussed in [76, Theorems 3.9 and 3.10]. In the sub-
jective interpretation of the dual representation, a strong reference model enjoys full confidence
of the agent and captures the complete information given by dom (ρ∗R), where we now consider
the convex conjugate defined on (caP)+. Moreover, it may be interpreted as a generalisation of
the loadedness axiom, cf. Wang [97] who emphasises its importance in the context of insurance
premium pricing and that it unfortunately tends to be neglected as a property of risk measures
and capital requirements. To give an example, [76, Proposition 3.7] shows that if the acceptance
set A is law-invariant with respect to a probability measure P, P will itself be a strong reference
model under mild assumptions. This generalises the observation we made at the end of Section
1.2.
Note that the existence of weak or strong reference models does not conflict with the
paradigm of minimal model dependence. They are not extrinsic, no model space dependent
11 The latter refers to the weak topology arising from the dual pairing 〈ca,L∞〉, i.e. the weakest topology such
that all linear functionals ca 3 µ 7→ ∫ X dµ, X ∈ L∞ arbitrary, are continuous.
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on a particular probability measure P is postulated. Instead, they are implied by or inherent to
the scenariowise risk criterion ρR : L∞ → R.
Our aim is, however, to extend the risk measure to a much larger domain of definition that
also contains unbounded random variables. Assume R = (A,S, p) to be a risk measurement
regime on L∞P such that the resulting risk measure ρR is finite, normalised, continuous from
above, and has P as weak reference model. As before we set
ρ∗R(µ) := supX∈L∞P
∫
X dµ− ρ∗R(µ), µ ∈ caP,
and note that dom (ρ∗R) ⊂ (caP)+. Define the functional
ρ(|X|) = supµ∈dom (ρ∗R)
∫ |X| dµ− ρ∗R(µ), X ∈ L0P,
which will serve as a norming functional. For c > 0 and X ∈ L0P let
‖X‖c,R := inf
{
λ > 0 | ρ (λ−1|X|) ≤ c} (inf ∅ :=∞),
and ‖X‖R := ‖X‖1,R. The Minkowski domain for ρR is the set
LR := {X ∈ L0P | ‖X‖R <∞}.
In [76, Proposition 4.2] we show that X ∈ L0P satisfies ‖X‖c,R < ∞ if, and only if, X ∈ LR,
which is the case if, and only if,
∫ |X| dµ < ∞ for any choice of µ ∈ dom (ρ∗R). Moreover,
if ≤ denotes the P-a.s. order on LR and c > 0 is given, (LR,≤, ‖ · ‖c,R) is a Banach lattice,
and all norms ‖ · ‖c,R are equivalent. Furthermore L∞P ⊂ LR ⊂ L1P, i.e. LR typically extends
beyond bounded random variables, and the Minkowski domain is independent of the choice of P
among weak reference probability models. Spaces like the Minkowski domain have already been
introduced in Kupper & Svindland [73], Owari [88], and Svindland [93].
Note that the structure and geometry of the Minkowski domain is completely determined
by the initial risk measure defined on L∞P or even L∞. As a domain of definition, it thus arises
from the risk measure itself and is robust under transformations within the relevant class of
probabilistic models, the class of weak reference models. If there exists a well-defined extension
of ρR to LR, it seems valid to call the Minkowski domain a canonical choice of the model space.
One may indeed define multiple such extensions, either dually or by approximation of unbounded
random variables using bounded random variables.
Consider the sets
(i) A˜ := {X ∈ LR | ∀µ ∈ dom (ρ∗R) :
∫
X dµ ≤ ρ∗R(µ)},
(ii) Aξ := {X ∈ LR | supm∈N infn∈N ρR((−n) ∨X ∧m) ≤ 0},
(iii) Aη := {X ∈ LR | infn∈N supm∈N ρR((−n) ∨X ∧m) ≤ 0}.
For every choice A ∈ {A˜,Aξ,Aη}, R := (A,S, p) is a risk measurement regime on LR such that
ρR|L∞P = ρR. Moreover, as we show in [76, Theorems 4.4, 4.5, 4.7] and [76, Proposition 4.6], the
following properties hold:
• A˜ = Aξ, and ρR˜ = ρRξ ≤ ρRη .
20
• ρR˜ is order-l.s.c.12
• ρR˜ preserves the dual representation of ρR: for all X ∈ LR,
ρR˜(X) = sup
µ∈dom (ρ∗R)
∫
X dµ− ρ∗R(µ).
• If for some X ∈ LR we have ρRξ(X) = ρRη(X), then
ρR˜(X) = limn→∞ ρR((−n) ∨X ∧ n); (1.5)
As a consequence, there are plenty of well-defined extensions of ρR to the Minkowski domain. We
have demonstrated in [76, Example 5.2] that there are instances when ρRξ < ρRη holds locally.
Hence, whether or not order lower semicontinuity is preserved by extension highly depends on
the order in which the limits in the cut-off operations in (ii) and (iii) above are taken. An open
question is whether or not ρRη is l.s.c.
The paper further complements its solution of the extension problem by studying the peculiar
geometry of LR, which is akin to the one of Orlicz spaces, and the dual space of LR. These
findings allow us to link the validity of the local equality (1.5) to the existence of regular
subgradients of ρR˜ and ρRη , i.e. bounded linear functionals ` : LR → R with the property
ρR(Y ) ≥ ρR(X) + `(Y −X), Y ∈ LR,
which may be identified with integrals with respect to some countably additive measure µ on
(Ω,F): for all X ∈ X , `(X) = ∫ X dµ. More precisely, we prove a number of sufficient conditions
for the existence of such regular subgradients; cf. [76, Section 4.4]. Subgradients will also play
an important role in the next contribution we discuss.
1.7 Risk sharing in agent systems
The two other papers collected in this thesis are less concerned with the conceptual challenges
of Knightian uncertainty. They rather address the part of the title of this thesis so far lacking
in the picture: optimisation on infinite dimensional spaces. It has been mentioned already that
systemic risk — the risk a system of financial institutions faces due to a shock of the economy
— will not play an explicit role in this thesis. However, we will address the question of risk
sharing (and to a lesser extent capital allocation) within a system.
This problem considers an economy populated by finitely many agents. We label them with
numbers i ∈ {1, ..., n} =: [n]. At a fixed future time point, each of them incurs a loss net of
gains Xi whose risk she measures with an individual risk measure ρi. On a systemic level, there
are two key quantities:
12 That is whenever (Xn)n∈N ⊂ LR is a sequence converging to X ∈ LR P-a.s. for which another element
Y ∈ LR can be found such that P(supn∈N |Xn| ≤ |Y |) = 1, then
ρR˜(X) ≤ lim inf
n→∞
ρR˜(Xn).
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• the aggregated loss within the system, which should be X := ∑ni=1Xi (we tacitly assume
here that individual losses are vectors in an ambient vector space which enables us to add
them up);
• the aggregated risk within the system, the quantity ∑ni=1 ρi(Xi).
The risk sharing problem now poses the question how and to which degree the aggregated risk
within the system can be minimised by redistribution. If there are no external constraints on the
nature of such a redistribution apart from the impossibility of sweeping losses under the carpet,
this leads to the optimisation problem
n∑
i=1
ρi(Yi)→ min subject to
n∑
i=1
Yi = X.
A vector Y := (Y1, ..., Yn) of portions of the aggregated loss X with the property
∑n
i=1 Yi = X
is called an allocation of X. Ideally, one would hope to find an allocation Y∗ with the property∑n
i=1 ρi(Y ∗i ) = inf{
∑n
i=1 ρi(Yi) |
∑n
i=1 Yi = X},
i.e. the minimally possible level of aggregated risk is realised by redistributing according to the
allocation Y∗.
Special instances of this general problem and its twin, maximising shared utility (see also
Section 1.8), have been studied extensively in the literature. Arrow [10], Borch [17] and Wilson
[99] consider the problem for expected utilities and with economic applications such as medical
care in mind. We will follow the path pioneered by Barrieu & El Karoui [13] and Filipovic´
& Kupper [46], linking the problem to the inf-convolution of convex functions. Under the
assumption that only convex monetary risk measures are involved which are law-invariant, the
optimisation problem has been shown to be solvable, see Acciaio [1], Acciaio & Svindland [4],
Filipovic´ & Svindland [47], and Jouini et al. [66]. The implications of risk sharing for regulatory
frameworks are discussed in, e.g., Weber [98]. For a review of the existing literature on risk
sharing with monetary risk measures we refer to Embrechts et al. [42]. Another important
connection can be drawn to the microeconomic theory of general equilibrium as surveyed in,
e.g., Mas Colell & Zame [83] and Aliprantis & Burkinshaw [6, Chapter 8].
Our paper Risk Sharing for Capital Requirements with Multidimensional Se-
curity Markets [78], see also Chapter 3, which studies the risk sharing problem, has two
major distinctive features. The first one is that, like in [76], we study the problem for capital
requirements relative to acceptance sets and security markets as introduced in Section 1.4. To
the best of our knowledge, our study is the first on risk sharing for capital requirements of this
kind. We also stick to the principle of keeping the model spaces as general as possible: We
consider an abstract one-period market populated by a finite number n ≥ 2 of agents who seek
to secure losses occurring at a fixed future date. The second distinctive feature is inspired by
Filipovic´ & Kupper [46]: Each agent i ∈ [n] operates on an (order) ideal Xi ⊂ X of an ambient
Riesz space X .13 The latter satisfies X = ∑ni=1Xi and collects systemic losses. The individual
model spaces Xi, i ∈ [n], may differ however. As we keep them very general, note that they can
account for Knightian uncertainty as described in the preceding sections.
13 That is, Xi is a subspace of X , and for all X,Y ∈ X , |X|  |Y | and Y ∈ Xi imply together that X ∈ Xi.
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Each agent i has an acceptance set Ai ⊂ Xi of acceptable loss profiles and has access to an
individual security market (Si, pi) such that Ri := (Ai,Si, pi) is a risk measurement regime on
the space Xi. She measures risks with the resulting risk measure ρi := ρRi defined by
ρi(X) := inf{pi(Z) | Z ∈ Si, X − Z ∈ Ai}, X ∈ Xi.
Note that Ri is typically not a risk measurement regime in the larger space X as Ai may
not be monotone in X . This setting thus admits substantial heterogeneity among the agents
forming the system, their risk preferences being encapsulated by the risk measurement regimes
(R1, ...,Rn) on (X1, ...,Xn).
Therefore, we study a refined version of the risk sharing problem. Given an aggregated loss
X ∈ X we introduce
AX := {X = (X1, ..., Xn) | Xi ∈ Xi, i ∈ [n], and X1 + ...+Xn = X},
the set of attainable allocations of X which respect that agent i only accepts losses in Xi. Usually
AX ( {X ∈ X n | X1 + ...+Xn = X}. The risk sharing problem we consider is
n∑
i=1
ρi(Xi)→ min subject to X ∈ AX (1.6)
under an assumption of minimal cooperation among the agents:
(?) For all i, j ∈ [n], the pricing functionals pi and pj agree on Si ∩ Sj . Moreover, if we set
i ∼ j if i 6= j and pi is non-trivial on Si ∩ Sj , the resulting graph
G = ([n], {{i, j} ⊂ [n] | i ∼ j})
is connected in the sense of graphs.
(?) means that, by potentially invoking intermediaries, any two agents can exchange securities.
Such a requirement is not too far-fetched, in particular if there is no heterogeneity among
the model spaces. Note also that all existing results on risk sharing for convex monetary risk
measures embed neatly in the framework outlined above.
Assume X ∈ X is such that there is an attainable allocation X = (X1, . . . , Xn) ∈ AX which
solves the optimisation problem (1.6) and yields a finite optimal value. Then X is a Pareto
optimal allocation of X; cf. [78, Proposition 3.6]. This economic notion of optimality means
that in a redistribution the situation cannot be improved for one agent without worsening the
fate of another. In the terms of the risk sharing problem, X ∈ AX is a Pareto optimal allocation
of X ∈ X if for all allocations Y ∈ AX the existence of some agent i ∈ [n] with ρi(Yi) < ρi(Xi)
implies the existence of some agent j ∈ [n] with ρj(Yj) > ρj(Xj). However, this resembles
centralised redistribution which attributes to each agent a certain portion of the aggregate loss
in an overall optimal way without considering individual well-being. As an “alternative”, we
consider redistribution by agents trading portions of losses at a certain price while adhering
to individual rationality constraints. This leads to the notion of equilibrium allocations and
equilibrium prices, a variant of the risk sharing problem above. In particular, each equilibrium
allocation is Pareto optimal in our framework; cf. [78, Proposition 3.6].
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Like Barrieu & El Karoui [13] we study the risk sharing functional associated to an agent
system (R1, ...,Rn). This is the function mapping an aggregated loss to the minimal level of
risk which can be obtained by redistribution:
Λ : X → [−∞,∞], X 7→ inf
X∈AX
n∑
i=1
ρi(Xi).
As a first main contribution of [78], we find that the behaviour of the interacting agents in the
market is, under mild assumptions, captured by a market capital requirement of type (1.4):
Λ(X) = inf{pi(Z) : Z ∈M, X − Z ∈ A+}, X ∈ X ,
where A+ :=
∑n
i=1Ai is a market acceptance set consisting of all losses which can be shared
in a way acceptable for everyone, and (M, pi) is a global security market; cf. [78, Theorem 3.1].
This so-called representative agent formulation allows to derive useful conditions ensuring the
existence of optimal risk allocations.14 The most useful of these criteria is the following: If Λ
is a proper function (in the sense of Section 1.4) and X ∈ X admits an optimal payoff ZX , i.e.
ZX ∈M is a market security such that X−ZX ∈ A+ is market acceptable and pi(ZX) = Λ(X),
then X can be allocated in a Pareto optimal way; cf. [78, Theorem 3.3].15 In a topological setting,
the most powerful criterion to allocate any X ∈ ∑ni=1 dom (ρi) = ∑ni=1{Xi ∈ Xi | ρi(Xi) < ∞}
Pareto optimally is thus to check two properties: (i) Λ is a proper function, (ii) the Minkowski
sum A+ + ker(pi) is closed, where ker(pi) := pi−1({0}) denotes the kernel of the global pricing
functional; cf. [78, Proposition 3.4]. Considering the problem is hence also mathematically
worthwhile, as usually it is difficult to decide in an infinite dimensional space if the sum of two
(closed) sets is closed again. The existence of equilibria on a general Fre´chet lattice is based
on this theory of Pareto optima in conjunction with subdifferentiability of the risk sharing
functional; cf. [78, Theorem 3.5].
As a side remark, we would like to comment here on the possible role of the risk sharing
functional as a capital allocation rule. Suppose the market space X collects portfolios of one and
the same firm composed of the individual contributions of subsidiaries or different business units.
The risk of such a portfolio is determined with a capital requirement. A capital allocation rule
then assigns portions of the required capital to the individual units. For more background on this
problem, we refer to Centrone & Rosazza Gianin [22], Deprez & Gerber [37], Kalkbrener [68],
Tsanakas [96], and the references therein. Now, if the risk of such a portfolioX ∈ X is determined
with the risk sharing functional Λ, and if there is a Pareto optimal allocation X of X, a natural
capital allocation rule would then be to assign capital ρi(Xi) to business unit i.
Secondly, based on this general study of the representative agent formulation, we discuss
two prominent cases of risk sharing in detail. They are characterised by the involved notions of
acceptability. In these case studies, we prove that the risk sharing problem (1.6) can be solved
and give mild sufficient conditions under which equilibria can be found. In the first instance
14 By “representative agent”, we mean that the behaviour of the agent system can be aggregated to be equivalent
to the behaviour of a single agent of the same type. This hypothetical single agent acts on the market space X
and is represented by the risk measurement regime (A+,M, pi).
15 The terminology of “optimal payoffs” is adopted from Baes et al. [12] who study under which conditions
minimisers in the definition (1.4) of a single capital requirement can be found. In this regard [78] also complements
this recent paper.
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(see [78, Section 4]), we abstract the notion that individual losses are contingent on the future
state of the economy. A loss is deemed acceptable if certain capital thresholds are not exceeded
under a fixed finite set of linear aggregation rules which may vary from agent to agent. Also,
we fully account for the possibility that model spaces may differ in the sense outlined above.
This reflects that the scenarios or states relevant to one agent may not be the ones relevant
to another. Hence, each agent may have a set of relevant scenarios and one of irrelevant ones
in which she demands neutrality of her stake in the loss. The latter condition could also be
interpreted as uncertainty aversion which demands loss neutrality in states whose potential
realisation is subject to extreme Knightian uncertainty. The resulting agent systems on Fre´chet
lattices will be called polyhedral, and they admit optimal payoffs, Pareto optimal allocations,
and equilibria under suitable mild conditions; see [78, Theorem 4.3 & Corollary 4.5].
In [78, Section 5], we analyse systems of agents operating on one and the same space of
random variables. For each agent, whether or not a given loss is deemed adequately capitalised
only depends on the distributional properties under a fixed reference probability measure P for
which (Ω,F ,P) is non-atomic. Hence, the acceptance sets Ai, i ∈ [n], will be law-invariant
with respect to P. However, the security spaces Si are of finite dimension and usually not law-
invariant. Securitisation depends on the potentially varying joint distribution of the loss and the
security and is thus statewise rather than distributional. This results in a lack of law-invariance
of the individual risk measures ρi, which is particularly interesting against the backdrop of the
existing literature. So far, a powerful solution theory for the risk sharing problem has only
been available in case that the individual risk measures are convex P-law-invariant monetary
risk measures, cf. [47, 66]. We will utilise these findings, but our results on the existence of
optimal payoffs, Pareto optima, and equilibria go far beyond this case; cf. [78, Theorems 5.3,
5.7, Corollary 5.5].
We study the risk sharing problem for law-invariant acceptance sets on general rearrangement
invariant Banach lattices of P-integrable random variables, see [78, Theorem 5.8].16 We will do
so, however, by first considering the maximal case in which all agents operate on the model
space L1 of all P-integrable random variables. We later localise this procedure to general model
spaces. This technique also features prominently in [77], see the following section.
Thirdly, in case of polyhedral agent systems and agent systems with law-invariant acceptance
sets, we carefully study continuity properties of the set-valued map assigning to an aggregated
loss its optimal risk allocations. They reflect an important question in optimisation, namely how
sensitive the set of optimisers is under slight misspecifications of the input of the optimisation
problem. In the context of polyhedral agent systems, the map assigning all Pareto optima to a
certain loss is lower hemicontinuous; cf. [78, Theorem 4.9]. This property means that a given
optimal risk allocation stays close to optimal under a slight perturbation of the underlying ag-
gregated loss. However, the heterogeneity of the involved model spaces and their very general
nature of being Fre´chet lattices necessitate further assumptions for this theorem to hold out-
side of a finite dimensional framework, see [78, Assumptions 4.6–4.8]. In [78, Theorems 5.7 &
5.8], we prove for law-invariant acceptance sets that the set of Pareto optimal allocations (of a
specific shape) is upper hemicontinuous. Approximating a complex loss with simpler losses and
16 That is, L∞ ⊂ X ⊂ L1 is rearrangement invariant or law-invariant as a subset of L1, and it carries a
law-invariant and complete lattice norm ‖ · ‖. In contrast to [77], we assume in [78] the norm ‖ · ‖ to be order
continuous: Whenever (Xn)n∈N ⊂ X is a sequence satisfying Xn ↓ 0 P-a.s., we have ‖Xn‖ ↓ 0.
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calculating optimal risk allocations for these will yield an optimal risk allocation for the complex
loss as a limit point. It is therefore a useful property from a numerical point of view. Upper
hemicontinuity transfers to the map assigning equilibria to a certain extent, see [78, Theorem
5.9].
Fourthly, providing a more financial application, we study optimal portfolio splitting prob-
lems in the spirit of Tsanakas [96] and Wang [97]. Assuming the presence of transaction costs,
we study how a financial institution can split an aggregated loss produced by a portfolio opti-
mally among subsidiaries. These are assumed to be subject to potentially varying regulatory
regimes and to have access to potentially varying security markets. Building on previous results,
we show that this problem admits solutions in the two frameworks considered above, cf. [78,
Corollary 6.2].
1.8 Maximising aggregated utility under law-invariance
The third contribution in this thesis, Efficient Allocations under Law-Invariance: A
Unifying Approach [77], see also Chapter 4, diverges from the theme of risk measures pre-
dominant in [76, 78] and the rather financial language these papers employ. It studies the twin
problem of the risk sharing problem in [78]: How can aggregated utility within a system of
agents be maximised?
This requires to clarify what we mean by “aggregation”. If — as in [78] — each agent
in a group of agents perceives a risk which has a direct monetary interpretation as a capital
requirement, the total capital required in the system can only be the sum of all individual risks.
Hence, the formulation of the risk sharing problem in (1.6) seems to be the only sensible one
if the objective is to minimise aggregated risk. In contrast, if the individual contributions are
utilities expressed in utils, aggregation may, with good reasons, look very differently.
Suppose a commodity X is being shared among n ≥ 2 agents who may be identified with
the numbers {1, ..., n} =: [n]. Each one obtains a share Xi, i ∈ [n]. Assume furthermore that
the utility the share Xi presents for agent i is given by a real number of utils Ui(Xi) ∈ R. Then
aggregating the utility within the group of agents by simply adding individual utilities,∑n
i=1 Ui(Xi),
is very different from ignoring suffering agents with negative utility, which would correspond to
the aggregation ∑n
i=1 Ui(Xi)+.
This point of view is again the opposite of another way of aggregation ignoring agents with
non-negative utility who fare well: ∑n
i=1−Ui(Xi)−.17
Each of these choices of aggregation has its own economic motivation and justification. Conse-
quently, our endeavour in [77] is to harness the full economic spectrum of aggregation of utility.
17 For a real number x ∈ R, x+ := max{x, 0} denotes the positive part, whereas x− := max{0,−x} denotes the
negative part.
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We focus on a commodity space X consisting of commodities or goods X ∈ X , and we
assume X to be a vector space. Each individual agent has preferences over the commodities in
X expressed by a convex preference relation i, i ∈ [n]. These preferences have a numerical
representation by a vector U := (U1, ...,Un) of utility functions Ui : X → [−∞,∞) such that
agent i weakly prefers Y to X (X i Y ) if, and only if Ui(X) ≤ Ui(Y ). Convexity of the
preference relation is translated as quasi-concavity of the utility function: For all X,Y ∈ X and
all λ ∈ [0, 1], we have Ui(λX + (1− λ)Y ) ≥ min{Ui(X),Ui(Y )}. Note that we exclude the case
of infinite utility, but not the case of infinite disutility.
Throughout [77] we assume that goods are modelled as Savage acts, i.e. real-valued random
variables on a measurable space (Ω,F) of future states of the world. Riskiness in the realisation
of the states ω ∈ Ω is assumed to be modelled by a reference probability measure P such that
the probability space (Ω,F ,P) is non-atomic. As such, the acts are risky future quantities, but
may also be interpreted as consumption patterns. We will identify two Savage acts if they lead
to the same consequences P-a.s., i.e. P(X = Y ) = 1. Moreover, we will assume that the first
moment of all X ∈ X exists, i.e. X ⊂ L1.
As before, potential individual preference relations expressed by the collection of utility
functions U are complemented by an objective ordering of the random variables in terms of the
P-a.s. order. In a financial context, the utility functions would widely be assumed to reflect the
“more is better”-paradigm of monotonicity in the P-a.s. order, meaning that Ui(X) ≤ Ui(Y )
whenever Y is better than X in the objective order, P(X ≤ Y ) = 1. The self-evidence of this
assumption outside of finance appears problematic in light of finiteness of resources as well as
the adverse social or ecological effects of economic activities. Our analysis will therefore not
rely on monotonicity whatsoever. When studying the efficiency of allocations, we will therefore
distinguish between sharing with and without free disposal. In the first case, the aggregated good
X ∈ X has to be shared without any remainder, e.g. because of external constraints. Hence,
one considers the consumption set ΓX consisting of all vectors X = (X1, ..., Xn) ∈ X n with
the property X1 + ...+Xn = X. In the second case, a unanimously rejected remainder (in the
objective order) may be left aside in the sharing scheme. That is, one considers the consumption
set Γ̂X consisting of all X ∈ X n with the property X1 + ... + Xn ≤ X with P-probability 1.
Note that in contrast to, e.g., [78], each vector X := (X1, ..., Xn) with X1 + ... + Xn = X or
X1 + ...+Xn ≤ X, respectively, is at least hypothetically feasible, and there are no constraints
on how X can be shared.
Economic efficiency of an allocation means that it has certain economic optimality properties.
The notion of Pareto optimality, here Pareto efficiency, has already been introduced above. It
means that no agent can improve her share (within a certain fixed consumption set of allocations)
without worsening the fate of another agent. The following observation is immediate: If X ∈ X
is a good and X∗ is an allocation in ΓX or Γ̂X such that for appropriate positive weights
w1, ..., wn > 0
n∑
i=1
wiUi(X∗i ) = sup
X∈ΓX
n∑
i=1
wiUi(Xi), or
n∑
i=1
wiUi(X∗i ) = sup
X∈Γ̂X
n∑
i=1
wiUi(Xi), respectively,
and if the optimal value sup {∑ni=1wiUi(Xi) | X ∈ ΓX} or sup{∑ni=1wiUi(Xi) | X ∈ Γ̂X}, re-
spectively, is a real number, then X∗ is Pareto optimal within the consumption set ΓX or Γ̂X ,
respectively.
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The quantity ∑ni=1wiUi(Xi) can be seen as aggregated utility. More precisely, the function
Λw(y) :=
∑n
i=1wiyi, y ∈ [−∞,∞)n, which is non-decreasing in the coordinatewise order on
[−∞,∞)n, is used to aggregate the vector
U(X) := (U1(X1), ...,Un(Xn))
of individual utilities arising from allocation X. The core idea of [77] is thus to study efficiency
properties of allocations of X ∈ X by considering an optimisation problem
Λ(U(X))→ max subject to X ∈ Γ, (1.7)
which is designed in a way such that the associated maximisers automatically have the desired
efficiency property. Here, Γ ∈ {ΓX , Γ̂X} is a consumption set corresponding to sharing with
and without free disposal, and the function Λ : [−∞,∞)n → [−∞,∞) denotes an arbitrary
aggregation function being non-decreasing in the coordinatewise order. We will see that consid-
ering general aggregation functions Λ introduces a substantial degree of freedom which allows
to study numerous efficiency properties of allocations. Also, the problem is embedded in the
classical mathematical literature on general equilibrium, cf. Debreu [32] and Mas-Colell & Zame
[83].
(1.7) is an optimisation problem on an infinite dimensional space and therefore hard to
solve. However, special instances of it have been shown to be solvable — see, for instance,
[31, 66, 89] — under the assumption of law-invariance of the individual utility functions: For all
X,Y ∈ X which agree in distribution under P (FPX = FPY ), Ui(X) = Ui(Y ) holds for all i ∈ [n].
Economically, one might say Ui(X) = Ui(Y ) whenever X and Y induce the same lottery over
the real line under P, and agents with law-invariant preferences display consequentialism in that
they are indifferent between two Savage acts yielding the same lottery consequences.
In many special instances, (1.7) has comonotone maximisers if each Ui, i ∈ [n], is law-
invariant. An allocation X of X ∈ X is comonotone if there are n non-decreasing functions
fi : R → R summing up to the identity — f1 + ...+ fn = idR — such that Xi = fi(X), i ∈ [n].
The key are so-called comonotone improvement results as given by [21, 47, 75, 80], and [77] aims
at exploring their full mathematical power.
Its main contribution is to prove the existence of comonotone maximisers in (1.7), and thus
of economically desirable allocations, in a wide range of situations by laying the groundwork in
clear-cut meta results. The range of applications is rich, the assumptions on the individual utility
functions very general (essentially only quasi-concavity and law-invariance), and the commodity
space may be any rearrangement invariant Banach lattice of P-integrable random variables. In
this respect, we contribute to unifying the existing literature on the problem.
Before we outline our main contributions, we emphasise that the question is neatly embedded
in a rich literature on sharing problems as described above. We refer to Acciaio [1, 2], Carlier &
Dana [20], Chateauneuf et al. [25], Dana [31], Jouini et al. [66], Liu et al. [79], and Ravanelli &
Svindland [89], beside the references on the twin problem of risk sharing cited above. Moreover,
the technical parts of the paper contribute to the general theory of law-invariant functions with
convex level sets, a prominent line of research; cf. [23, 26, 28, 48, 58, 65, 94, 95].
Two of the main results of [77] which essentially lie at the heart of the solution theory
are [77, Theorem 18 & Proposition 20]. Suppose that on a general rearrangement invariant
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Banach lattice L∞ ⊂ X ⊂ L1 with law-invariant lattice norm ‖ · ‖ a quasi-concave function
f : X → [−∞,∞) is given. Then under the mild assumption of order upper semicontinuity,
in case of X ( L1 in terms of the strong Fatou property,18 law-invariance is equivalent to two
standard notions of risk aversion: (i) monotonicity in the concave order, i.e. f(X) ≤ f(Y )
holds whenever every risk averse expected utility agent weakly prefers Y to X; (ii) dilatation
monotonicity, i.e. for every finite measurable partition Π of the state space, f ranks the act
associated to more information encoded by Π, i.e. the conditional expectation E[X|σ(Π)], higher
than X itself: f(X) ≤ f (E[X|σ(Π)]).19 Moreover, in any of these cases, one may define a unique
consistent extension f ] : L1 → [−∞,∞) of f which is upper semicontinuous, quasi-concave, and
proper whenever f is proper.20 This extension result is key to solving the problem (1.7) on
general rearrangement invariant Banach lattices as commodity spaces by means of a localisation
procedure, provided one has developed a solution theory on the “canonical” commodity space
L1; cf. [77, Theorem 23].
As we reduced the general case of (1.7) to the problem on the commodity space X = L1,
we only consider agents i ∈ [n] endowed with utility functions Ui : L1 → [−∞,∞) which are
proper, quasi-concave, upper semicontinuous, and law-invariant. As they are non-decreasing in
the concave order, we may further reduce the problem for X ∈ L1 as
sup
X∈ΓX
Λ(U(X)) = sup
f∈C(n)
Λ (U(f(X)))
and
sup
X∈Γ̂X
Λ(U(X)) = sup {Λ (U(f1(X), ..., fn(X))) | f ∈ C(n+ 1), fn+1(X) ≥ 0} ,
provided free disposal is allowed. Here, for k ∈ N, C(k) denotes the set of comonotone k-
partitions of the identity, i.e. f : R → Rk, each coordinate function fi is non-decreasing, and
f1 + ... + fk = idR; cf. [77, Proposition 7]. In order for this supremum to be a maximum
and the optimal value to be a real number, the most natural approach would be to select a
maximising sequence (fk)k∈N ⊂ C(n) of C(n+ 1) and show that the allocations fk(X) converges
to a maximiser of (1.7). It turns out, however, that this requires to find a constant γ(X) > 0
such that a maximising sequence satisfies ∑i |fi(0)| ≤ γ(X); cf. [77, Proposition 8]. To this
end, we introduce the property of an aggregation function Λ to be coercive for the individual
utilities restricted to riskless commodities, i.e. Ui|R. This is a rather mild property — cf. [77,
Appendix A] — which allows us to prove a general existence result on maximisers of (1.7) —
both with and without free disposal, [77, Theorem 12].
We thereafter exploit the degree of freedom the aggregation function Λ provides and prove
the existence of allocations with different efficiency properties. All results are derived from
suitable conditions on the behaviour of the utility functions on riskless commodities. Given a
18 That is, if (Xn)n∈N ⊂ X is a sequence converging to X ∈ X P-a.s. which satisfies supn∈N ‖Xn‖ < ∞, the
estimate lim supn→∞ f(Xn) ≤ f(X) holds; cf. [26, 58].
19 This result complements and generalises previous similar results, see Cerreia-Vioglio et al. [23, Theorem 5.1],
Cherny & Grigoriev [28, Corollary 1.3], and Svindland [95, Theorem 2.7].
20 In contrast to the preceding sections, we say here that a function f : X → [−∞,∞] is proper if f−1({∞}) = ∅
and f 6≡ −∞.
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parameter 0 < α ≤ 1, we use the aggregation function
Λα(y) := α min1≤i≤n yi + (1− α) max1≤i≤n yi, y ∈ [−∞,∞)
n,
to obtain (biased) weakly Pareto efficient allocations as maximisers for problem (1.7); cf. [77,
Theorem 29]. If we choose the aggregation function
Ξα(y) :=
∑
∅6=S⊂[n]
α min
1≤i≤n
yi + (1− α) max
i∈S
yi, y ∈ [−∞,∞)n,
maximisers will be efficient in the sense of core allocations, which reflect a game-theoretic notion
of fairness; cf. [77, Theorem 31].
We have already seen that for a vector of positive weights w = (w1, ..., wn) ∈ (0,∞)n, the
aggregation function
Λw(y) :=
n∑
i=1
wiyi, y ∈ [−∞,∞)n,
leads to Pareto efficient allocations; cf. [77, Theorem 33]. With a symbolic modification of the
utility functions, one can also show the existence of Pareto efficient allocations respecting certain
individual rationality constraints prescribing minimal utility which must not be undercut in a
redistribution of an allocation; cf. [77, Theorem 35]. Finally, in [77, Theorem 36], we use the
aggregation function
Λp,q,r(y) :=
n∑
i=1
−piy−i + qi(yi − ri)+, y ∈ [−∞,∞)n,
where (p,q, r) ∈ (Rn+)3 is a collection of parameters, to find allocations which are systemically
fair. This application is motivated by the theory of systemic risk measures.
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1. Introduction
There is an ongoing debate on the rightmodel space for financial
risk measures, i.e. about what an ideal domain of definition for risk
measures would be. Typically – as risk occurs in face of random-
ness – the risks which are to be measured are identified with real-
valued random variables on some measurable space (Ω,F). The
question which causes debate, however, is which space of random
variables one should use as model space.
Since risk is often understood as Knightian uncertainty (Knight,
1921) about the underlying probabilistic mechanism, many schol-
ars argue that model spaces should be robust in the sense of not
depending too heavily on some specific probabilistic model. We
refer to this normative viewpoint as paradigm of minimal model
dependence. The literature usually suggests one of the following
model spaces:
(i) L0 or L0P, the spaces of all random variables or P-almost sure
(P-a.s.) equivalence classes of random variables for some
probability measure P on (Ω,F), respectively, see Delbaen
(2000, 2002);
(ii) L∞ or L∞P , the spaces of all bounded random variables or
P-a.s. equivalence classes of bounded random variables, re-
spectively, see Delbaen (2000, 2002), Föllmer and Schied
* Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: liebrich@math.lmu.de (F.-B. Liebrich), svindla@math.lmu.de
(G. Svindland).
(2002, 2011), Kusuoka (2001), Laeven and Stadje (2013) and
the references therein;
(iii) LpP, p ∈ [1,∞), the space of P-a.s. equivalence classes of
random variableswith finite pthmoment, ormore generally
Orlicz hearts, see e.g. Bellini et al. (2017), Cheridito and Li
(2009), Frittelli and Rosazza Gianin (2002) and Rockafellar
et al. (2006).
The spaces in (i) and (ii) satisfy minimal model dependence in
that L0 and L∞ are completely model free, whereas L0P and L∞P in
fact only depend on the null sets of the probability measure P. The
problem with choosing L0 or L0P, however, is that these spaces are
in general too large to reasonably define aggregation based risk
measures on them. The latter would require some kind of integral
to be well-defined. Moreover, if (Ω,F) is not finite, L0 or L0P do not
allow for a locally convex topology which make them unapt for
optimisation. Important applications of risk measures, however,
use them as objective functions or constraints in optimisation
problems. Since L∞ and L∞P are Banach spaces – so in particular
locally convex spaces – and satisfy minimal model dependence,
these model spaces have become most popular in the literature,
and amongst them in particular L∞P due to nicer analytic proper-
ties; see Delbaen (2000, 2002); Föllmer and Schied (2002, 2011),
Kusuoka (2001), Laeven and Stadje (2013) and the references
therein. In applications, however, unbounded models for risks are
standard, like the log-normal distribution in Black–Scholes mar-
ket models, etc. Assuming frictionless markets, there is no upper
bound on the volumes and thus value of financial positions. Hence
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.insmatheco.2017.09.006
0167-6687/© 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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unbounded distributions appear quite naturally as limiting objects
of bounded distributions, and in statistical modelling of random
payoffs, where no upper bound can be assumed a priori. Also, risks
with unbounded support and potentially heavy-tailed distribu-
tions are commonly employed in the insurance business. From this
point of viewmodel spaces should satisfy the paradigm of maximal
domain in that they should at least be sufficiently large to include
these standard unbounded models, and the model spaces in (iii)
have been proposed to resolve this issue. Problematic though is the
strong dependence of LpP, p ∈ [1,∞), (or in general Orlicz hearts)
on the probability measure P in that they are not invariant under
equivalent changes of measure anymore. Consequently, maximal
domain and minimal model dependence seem to be conflicting
paradigms.
In the special case of law-invariant risk measures the measured
risk is fully determined by the distribution of the risk under a
probability measure P on (Ω,F). Thus law-invariance already
entails the existence of a meaningful reference probability model
P, and the risk measurement is fully depending on P. Hence, the
ambiguity structure is such that it is no conceptual problem to de-
fine these riskmeasures on, for instance, L1P (see Filipovic and Svin-
dland, 2012).1 The latter observation shows that the paradigms
of minimal model dependence and maximal domain may not be
as conflicting as they seem, as long as the underlying probability
structure is determined by the considered risk measure. Clearly, a
model space like L∞P is sufficiently robust to carry any kind of risk
measure. But given a specific risk measure – say defined on L∞P –
and the corresponding ambiguity attitude reflected by it, a model
space which respects this ambiguity attitude, which also carries
the risk measure, and which is probably larger than L∞P , is also a
reasonablemodel space for that particular riskmeasure—like in the
(unambiguous) case of a law-invariant riskmeasure and themodel
space L1P.
Our starting point is an a priori completelymodel free setting on
themodel space L∞ and a generalised notion of risk measurement
adopted from Farkas, Koch Medina and Munari in, e.g., Farkas
et al. (2015) and Munari in Munari (2015): all it requires is a
notion of acceptability of losses (encoded by an acceptance setA ⊆
L∞), a portfolio of liquidly traded securities allowed for hedging
(represented by a subspace S ⊆ L∞), and a set of observable
prices for these securities (a linear functional p on S). Using such
a risk measurement regime R = (A, S, p), we can define the
risk ρR(X) to be the minimal price one has to pay in order to
secure the loss X ∈ L∞ with a portfolio in S. This approach has
the indisputable advantage of a clear operational interpretation.
Section 2 introduces this kind of risk measurement in a unifyingly
general framework. In Section 3, we observe that under a standard
approximation property of finite risk measures – continuity from
above – they automatically imply a reference probability measure
P which allows us to view the risk measure as defined on L∞P
without any loss of information. The observation that this often
assumed property necessarily implies that the framework is dom-
inated sheds new and critical light on the current discussion on
model free and robust finance. Next, we demonstrate that under
some further conditions, e.g., sensitivity and strict monotonicity,
we can even find a strong reference probability measure P∗ ≈ P
such that additionally
∀X ∈ L∞P : ρR(X) ≥ cEP∗ [X]
holds for a suitable constant c > 0. These strong reference prob-
ability measures serve as a class of benchmark models in that risk
estimation with ρR is uniformly more conservative than using the
linear risk estimation rules X ↦→ cEP∗ [X].
In Section 4.1, we discuss how these considerations lead to
a Banach space LR typically much larger than L∞P , which has a
multitude of desirable properties, such as
1 In fact, law-invariant risk measures are completely unambiguous.
• invariance under all strong and weak reference probability
models;
• a geometry completely determined by the risk measure ρR;
• robustness in that it carries an extension of the initial risk
criterion ρR, denoted by ρR˜, which preserves the functional
form of ρR, the dual representation, and thus convexity and
lower semicontinuity. Moreover, this extension ρR˜ is a cap-
ital requirement in terms of unchanged hedging securities
and pricing functionals, but with a notion of acceptability
obtained by consistently extending constraints defining A
to LR.
In the latter sense, LR can be seen as a natural maximal domain
of definition of the initial risk criterion on which the ambiguity
attitude is preserved.
We also consider the following monotone extensions of ρR to
unbounded loss profiles in LR given by
ξ (X) = lim
m→∞ limn→∞ ρR((−n) ∨ X ∧m)
= sup
m∈N
inf
n∈N ρR((−n) ∨ X ∧m)
and
η(X) = lim
n→∞ limm→∞ ρR((−n) ∨ X ∧m)
= inf
n∈N supm∈N
ρR((−n) ∨ X ∧m)
which have been studied in for instance Delbaen (2002) and Svin-
dland (2010b). One would maybe expect that always ρR˜ = ξ = η,
but it turns out that ρR˜ = ξ always holds, whereas ρR˜ ̸= η
is possible, see Example 5.2. We characterise the often desirable
regular situation when monotone approximation of risks in the
following sense
ρR˜(X) = η(X) = limn→∞ ρR((−n) ∨ X ∧ n) (1.1)
is possible, see Theorem 4.7, and show that (1.1) holds if ρR˜
shows sufficient continuity in the tail of the risk X . For instance,
any risk measure to which some kind of monotone or dominated
convergence rule can be applied will satisfy (1.1). In Section 4.2,
we decompose LR into subsets with a clear interpretation in terms
of liquidity risk and show how LR allows to view properties of the
risk measure ρR˜ through a topological lens. Finally, in Section 4.4,
we address the issue of subdifferentiability of ρR˜ on L
R based on
a brief treatment of the dual of LR in Section 4.3. Subgradients
play an important role in risk optimisation and appear as pricing
rules in optimal risk sharing schemes, see e.g. Jouini et al. (2008)
and Svindland (2010b). We shall see that the topology on LR being
determined by ρR is fine enough to guarantee a rich class of points
where ρR˜ is subdifferentiable, thereby further illustrating how
suited themodel space LR is to ρR. Beside theirmere existence, we
also aim for reasonable conditions guaranteeing that subgradients
correspond tomeasures on (Ω,F)—whichmeans ruling out singu-
lar elements that may exist in the dual space of LR. Themotivation
for this is the same as in case of L∞P which in general also admits
singular elements in its dual space. It is questionable whether such
singular dual elements are reasonable as, for instance, pricing rules,
because their effect lies mostly in the tails of the distribution, and
the lack of countable additivity contradicts the paradigm of dimin-
ishing marginal risk. Also, measures show a by far better analytic
behaviour which may prove to be crucial when solving optimisa-
tion problems. Our findings suggest that singular elements do not
really matter in a wide range of instances. In particular, we will
also see that the local equality (1.1) characterised in Theorem 4.7
is closely related to regular subgradients of ρR˜ and η. In Section
5 we collect illustrating examples. Some cumbersome proofs are
outsourced to the Appendices A and B.
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2. Some preliminaries
Notation and terminology: Given a set M ̸= ∅ and a function
f : M → [−∞,∞], we define the domain of f to be the set
dom(f ) = {m ∈ M | f (m) < ∞}. f is called proper if it does
not attain the value−∞ and dom(f ) ̸= ∅.
For a subset A of a topological space (X , τ ), we denote by clτ (A)
and intτ (A) the closure and interior of A, respectively, with respect
to the topology τ . If (X , τ ) is a topological vector space and τ is
generated by a norm ∥ · ∥ on X , we will replace the subscript τ by
∥ · ∥.
A triple (X , τ ,⪯) is called ordered topological vector space
if (X, τ ) is a topological vector space and⪯ is a partial vector space
order compatible with the topology in that the positive cone of X ,
denoted by X+ := {X ∈ X | 0 ⪯ X}, is τ -closed. We define
X++ := X+\{0}, andX− andX−− analogously. If (X , τ ,⪯) is a Riesz
space and X, Y ∈ X , we set X ∨Y := sup{X, Y }, X ∧Y := inf{X, Y },
X+ := X ∨ 0, and X− := (−X) ∨ 0.2
In this section we define risk measurement regimes and risk mea-
sures, discuss some properties a risk measure may enjoy, and
introduce the building blocks for a duality theory.
Definition 2.1. Let (X , τ ,⪯) be an ordered topological vector
space. An acceptance set is a non-empty proper and convex subset
A of X which is monotone, i.e. A − X+ ⊆ A. A security space is
a finite-dimensional linear subspace S ⊊ X containing a non-null
positive element U ∈ S ∩ X++. We refer to the elements Z ∈ S as
security portfolios, or simply securities. A pricing functional on
S is a positive linear functional p : S → R such that p(Z) > 0 for
all Z ∈ S ∩ X++.
A tripleR := (A, S, p) is a risk measurement regime if A is an
acceptance set, S is a security space and p is a pricing functional on
S such that
∀X ∈ X : sup{p(Z) | Z ∈ S, X + Z ∈ A} <∞. (2.1)
The risk measure associated to a risk measurement regime R is
the functional
ρR : X → (−∞,∞], X ↦→ inf {p(Z) | Z ∈ S, X − Z ∈ A} . (2.2)
Our definition of riskmeasures is inspired by Farkas et al. (2015)
and Munari (2015). Note that:
(a) The elements X ∈ X model losses, not gains. Thus ρR(X) is
theminimal amountwhich has to be invested today in some
security portfolio Z ∈ S with payoff −Z in order to reduce
the loss X tomorrow to an acceptable level.
(b) We prescribe convexity of the acceptance set A which
means that diversification is not penalised: if X and Y are
acceptable so is the diversified λX + (1 − λ)Y for any λ ∈
(0, 1).
(c) The notion of a risk measurement regime depends on the
interplay of A, S and p by means of (2.1); this condition
guarantees that ρR is a proper function. Farkas et al. (2015,
Propositions 1 and 2) yield criteria for R to be a risk mea-
surement regime in our sense.
If S = R · U for some U ∈ X++ and p(mU) = m, m ∈ R,
the setting of Farkas et al. (2013, 2014) with a single liquid eligible
asset can be recovered fromDefinition 2.1. IfX is a Riesz spacewith
2 For details concerning ordered vector spaces, we refer to Chapters 5 and 7
of Aliprantis and Border (1999). Since risk measures will appear in this treatment
on different domains of definition – in all cases spaces of randomvariables endowed
with a pointwise or almost sure order andwith varying topologies –we define them
as functionals on ordered topological vector spaces. However, the reader may think
ofX as a space of random variables and of⪯ as a pointwise or almost sure order on
the latter.
weak unit 1, S = R · 1 and p(m1) = m, m ∈ R, the definition cov-
ers convex monetary risk measures as comprehensively discussed
in Föllmer and Schied (2011).3 The following is easily verified:
Lemma 2.2. Let R = (A, S, p) be a risk measurement regime on an
ordered topological vector space X . Then ρR is convex, monotone,
i.e. X ⪯ Y implies ρR(X) ≤ ρR(Y ), and S- additive, i.e. ρR(X+Z) =
ρR(X)+ p(Z) holds for all X ∈ X and all Z ∈ S .
In the same abstract setting we introduce further properties a
risk measure can enjoy.
Definition 2.3. Let R = (A, S, p) be a risk measurement regime
on an ordered topological vector space (X , τ ,⪯) and let ρR be the
associated risk measure.
• ρR is called finite if it only takes finite values, or equivalently
A+ S = X .4
• ρR is normalised if ρR(0) = 0, or equivalently
supZ∈A∩Sp(Z) = 0.• ρR is coherent if for any X ∈ X and for any t > 0 ρR(tX) =
tρR(X) holds.
• ρR is sensitive if it satisfies ρR(X) > ρR(0) for all X ∈ X++.
• ρR is lower semicontinuous (l.s.c.) if every lower level set
{X ∈ X | ρR(X) ≤ c}, c ∈ R, is τ -closed.
• ρR is continuous from above if it is finite and for any
(Xn)n∈N ⊆ X with Xn ↓ X in order ρR(X) = limnρR(Xn)
holds.
Remark 2.4.
(i) Normalisation implies that the negative cone X− (no losses)
will be acceptable, which is economically sound. Every risk
measure satisfying ρR(0) ∈ R can be normalised by trans-
lating the acceptance set. Indeed, let U ∈ S∩X++ and define
r := ρR(0)
p(U) and Aˇ := {X + rU | X ∈ A}. If R is a risk
measurement regime, then so is Rˇ := (Aˇ, S, p). Moreover,
− ρRˇ(0) = sup{p(Z) | Z ∈ S, Z − rU ∈ A}
= sup{p(W )+ p(rU) | W ∈ S ∩ A}.
This implies that−ρRˇ(0) = −ρR(0)+ ρR(0) = 0 holds.
(ii) Recall that, in contrast to a large share of the literature on risk
measures, random variables model losses, not gains, in our
setting. Consequently, our notion of continuity from above is
not the same as continuity from above in the sense of Föllmer
and Schied (cf. Föllmer and Schied, 2011, Lemma 4.21). The
equivalent notion in the aforementioned monograph would
be continuity from below (cf. Föllmer and Schied, 2011, The-
orem 4.22), which together with lower semicontinuity of a
risk measure implies the Lebesgue property—see Föllmer and
Schied (2011).
(iii) Our notion of continuity from above means that approxi-
mating the risk of complex payoffs by the one of potentially
easier but worse financial instruments is meaningful as long
as the payoffs range in a bounded regime.
(iv) Lower semicontinuity of ρR implies that {X ∈ X | ρR(X) ≤
0} = clτ (A + ker(p)). In particular, it is implied by A +
ker(p) being closed (see Farkas et al., 2015, Proposition 4)
and invariant under translations of the acceptance set along
S. From an economic perspective this property is not too
demanding: security spaces are always finite-dimensional
in our setting, hence lower semicontinuity is, e.g., implied
3 In the following, we will refer to this particular case with the term monetary
risk measures.
4 Farkas et al. (2015, Propositions 1–3) give further criteria to decidewhether ρR
is finite or not.
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by the condition A ∩ ker(p) = {0} (cf. Farkas et al., 2015,
Proposition 5). The latter is sometimes referred to as absence
of good deals of the first kind (cf. Jaschke and Küchler, 2001).
(v) Note that in the case of X being a Banach lattice with norm
∥ · ∥, every finite risk measure is norm-continuous and
therefore also norm-l.s.c. This follows from Ruszczyński and
Shapiro (2006, Proposition 1): Suppose X is a Banach lattice
and f : X → (−∞,∞] is a proper convex and monotone
function. Then f is continuous on int dom(f ). We will make
frequent use of this fact throughout the paper.
For many questions a dual point of view on risk measures is
crucial. In our case, its formulation requires the following concepts:
Definition 2.5. Assume R = (A, S, p) is a risk measurement
regime on an ordered topological vector space (X , τ ,⪯) with topo-
logical dual X ∗. We define the support function of A by
σA : X ∗ → (−∞,∞], ℓ ↦→ sup
Y∈A
ℓ(Y ), (2.3)
and B(A) := dom(σA). Moreover, the extension set will refer
to the set of positive, continuous extensions of p to X , namely
Ep := {ℓ ∈ X ∗+ | ℓ|S = p}.
3. Model spaces of bounded random variables, and weak and
strong reference probability models
3.1. The model space L∞ and weak reference probability measures
Fix a measurable space (Ω,F) and let L∞ := L∞(Ω,F) be the
set of bounded measurable real-valued functions. We recall that
L∞ is a Banach lattice with norm |X |∞ := supω∈Ω |X(ω)| when
equipped with the pointwise order ≤, so in particular an ordered
topological vector space. On the level of Riesz spaces,Ω ∋ ω ↦→ 1
is an order unit of L∞.5 The dual space of L∞ may be identified
with ba, the space of all finitely additive set functions µ : F → R.
As usual ca denotes the countably additive set functions in ba, and
ca+ is the set of finite measures. In the following, the notation will
not distinguish betweenm ∈ R and the functionΩ ∋ ω ↦→ m.
In this section we study risk measures on L∞. First of all, note
that in the ⟨L∞, ba⟩-dualitymonotonicity ofA implies thatB(A) ⊆
ba+ has to hold, and an application of the Hahn–Banach Separation
Theorem shows
cl|·|∞ (A) = {X ∈ L∞ | ∀µ ∈ B(A) :
∫
X dµ ≤ σA(µ)}. (3.1)
We will mostly assume finiteness of ρR, which is justified by the
domain of definition L∞—that is bounded losses which typically
should be hedgeable at potentially large, but finite cost. ρR is for
instance finite whenever the security space S contains some U ∈
L∞++ being uniformly bounded away from 0, i.e. U ≥ δ for some
constant δ > 0. In Farkas et al. (2013, 2014), such securities are
called non-defaultable. We will show that if the acceptance set is
‘‘nice enough’’, then any finite risk measure arising from it in an a
priorimodel-free framework likeL∞ indeed implies a probabilistic
model, a so-called weak reference model; see Theorem 3.3. As a
first step towards this result, we show now that continuity from
abovemainly depends on the geometry of the acceptance setA. To
this end, let us recall the notion of the dual conjugate of ρR being
defined as
ρ∗R : ba→ (−∞,∞], µ ↦→ sup
X∈L∞
∫
X dµ− ρR(X). (3.2)
5 Recall that e ∈ X+ is an order unit of a Riesz space (X ,⪯) if {X ∈ X | ∃λ > 0 :
|X | ⪯ λe} = X .
Proposition 3.1. Assume R = (A, S, p) is a risk measurement
regime such that ρR(0) ∈ R.
(i) If ρR is l.s.c., B(A)∩Ep is non-empty and for allµ ∈ ba it holds
that
ρ∗R(µ) =
{
σA(µ) ifµ ∈ B(A) ∩ Ep,
∞ otherwise. (3.3)
For all X ∈ L∞ we have
ρR(X) = sup
µ∈dom(ρ∗R)
∫
X dµ− ρ∗R(µ). (3.4)
Moreover, if ρR is coherent, then
ρ∗R(µ) =
{
0 ifµ ∈ B(A) ∩ Ep,
∞ otherwise, (3.5)
and
ρR(X) = sup
µ∈dom(ρ∗R)
∫
X dµ, X ∈ L∞. (3.6)
(ii) Assume R = (A, S, p) is a risk measurement regime such that
ρR is finite, then for every c ∈ R the lower level set Ec := {µ ∈
ba | ρ∗R(µ) ≤ c} of ρ∗R is σ (ba,L∞)-compact.
(iii) Suppose the risk measure ρR associated to the risk measure-
ment regime R = (A, S, p) is finite. Then ρR is continuous
from above if and only if every lower level set Ec , c ∈ R, of
ρ∗R is σ (ca,L∞)-compact. Hence, if B(A) ⊆ ca, then ρR is
continuous from above.
(iv) In the situation of (iii), if S is constrained to be one-
dimensional, then ρR is continuous from above if and only if
B(A) ⊆ ca.
Corollary 3.2. Assume R = (A, S, p) is a risk measurement regime
such that ρR is finite. Then ρR is continuous from above if and only if
B(A) ∩ ker(p)⊥ ⊆ ca. Here,
ker(p)⊥ :=
{
µ ∈ ba
⏐⏐⏐∀Z ∈ ker(p) : ∫ Z dµ = 0}
denotes the annihilator of ker(p).
For the special case of a monetary risk measure, parts of Propo-
sition 3.1 are well-known, see e.g. Föllmer and Schied (2011,
Theorem 4.22 and Corollary 4.35). However, to our knowledge, so
far there is no proof of Proposition 3.1 and Corollary 3.2 in this
general form in the literature. As the proofs of these results are
quite technical and thus lengthy we provide them in Appendix
A. Note that the representation (3.4) is in terms of pricing rules
consistent with (S, p) in that µ ∈ dom(ρ∗R) only if µ|S = p. If S =
R and p = idR, these pricing rules can be identifiedwith probability
measures. Finally, we remark that continuity from above is indeed
mainly a property of the acceptance set as Proposition 3.1(iii)
and (iv) and Corollary 3.2 show: If A is regular in the sense that
B(A) ⊆ ca, then every finite risk measure is continuous from
above. In particular, taking a single hedging asset or multiple ones
will have no effect on continuity from above providedA is properly
chosen. Non-regularity of the acceptance set in that B(A)\ ca ̸= ∅,
however, is equivalent to the fact that no finite risk measure with
a single security is continuous from above; higher-dimensional
security spaces may smooth out the irregularity ofA, as illustrated
in Example 5.1.
The following theorem is the already advertised main result
of this section. As facilitating notation, for non-empty sets of set
functionsM,M ′ ⊆ ba, we writeM ≪ M ′ if and only if ν(A) = 0 for
all ν ∈ M ′ implies µ(A) = 0 for all µ ∈ M , A ∈ F . We setM ≈ M ′
to mean that both M ≪ M ′ and M ′ ≪ M . Instead of {µ} ≪ {ν}
or {µ} ≈ {ν}, we shall write µ ≪ ν and µ ≈ ν. Finally, we define
baν := {µ ∈ ba | µ≪ ν}, and caν analogously.
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Theorem 3.3. Let R = (A, S, p) be a risk measurement regime such
that ρR is finite and continuous from above.
(i) There exists aweak reference probability measure P, that is
a probability measure P on (Ω,F) such that ρ∗R(cP) < ∞ for
a suitable c > 0 and
P ≈ dom(ρ∗R). (3.7)
(ii) For P as in (i) we have that dom(ρ∗R) ⊆ (caP)+.
(iii) If ρR is normalised, then E0 = {µ ∈ ca | ρ∗R(µ) = 0} ̸= ∅.
Proof. For (i), recall from Proposition 3.1 that the assumption on
ρR implies that any lower level set Ec := {µ ∈ ca+ | ρ∗R(µ) ≤ c},
c ∈ R, is σ (ca,L∞)-compact. Togetherwith convexity, this implies
countable convexity, i.e.
(λk)k∈N ⊆ [0, 1],
∞∑
k=1
λk = 1,
(µk)k∈N ⊆ Ec H⇒
∞∑
k=1
λkµk ∈ Ec .
(3.8)
By Bogachev (2007, Theorem 4.7.25, (iv) ⇒ (i)), En, n ∈ N, also
has compact closure in the weak topology σ (ca, ca∗). As En is
already closed in the weaker topology σ (ca,L∞), En has to be
weakly compact. The proof of Bogachev (2007, Theorem 4.7.25,
(i) ⇒ (ii)) shows the existence of a sequence (µnl )l∈N ⊆ En such
that En ≈ {µnl | l ∈ N}. We set νn :=
∑∞
l=12
−lµnl , which lies in
En by (3.8), and satisfies νn ≈ En. By (3.4), the sequence (νn)n∈N
satisfies νn(Ω) ≤ νn(Ω)− ρ∗R(νn)+ n ≤ ρR(1)+ n. Define
ν :=
∑
n∈N
2−nνn, cN :=
N∑
n=1
2−n,
ζN := c−1N
N∑
n=1
2−nνn, N ∈ N.
ν ∈ ca+ follows from the estimate ν(Ω) ≤ ∑∞n=12−n(ρR(1) +
n) = ρR(1) + 2. Every non-trivial scalar multiple of ν satisfies
(3.7), and moreover, ν = limNζN with respect to σ (ca,L∞). Lower
semicontinuity and convexity of ρ∗R and ρ∗R(νn) ≤ n imply
ρ∗R(ν) ≤ lim infN→∞ ρ
∗
R(ζN ) ≤ limN→∞ c
−1
N
N∑
n=1
2−nn = 2.
Choosing c := ν(Ω), the probability measure P := 1c ν is a weak
reference probability model.
(ii) is an immediate consequence of (3.7). In order to prove (iii)
note that normalisation implies 0 = ρR(0) = − inf{ρ∗R(µ) | µ ∈
dom(ρ∗R)}. Hence, ρ∗R ≥ 0 and the family of subsets (Ek)k∈(0,1] of
the compact set E1 has the finite intersection property. Therefore
E0 =⋂k∈(0,1]Ek ̸= ∅. □
Remark 3.4. Continuity from above is sufficient but not necessary
for the existence of weak reference probability models. However,
without continuity from above anything can happen. For example,
let (Ω,F) be the open unit interval (0, 1) endowed with its Borel
setsB((0, 1)), and let P be the Lebesguemeasure on (0, 1). Consider
ess sup(X) := sup{m ∈ R | P(X ≤ m) = 1},
and set
A1 := {X ∈ L∞ | ess sup(X) ≤ 0},
A2 := {X ∈ L∞ | sup
ω∈Ω
X(ω) ≤ 0}.
The triples Ri = (Ai,R, idR), i = 1, 2, are risk measurement
regimes. In the first case, dom(ρ∗R1 ) = (baP)+, and in the second
dom(ρ∗R2 ) = ba+. Thus neither ρR1 nor ρR2 is continuous from
above. P, however, is a weak reference probability model for ρR1 ,
whereas in the case of ρR2 there is no weak reference probability
model asΩ is uncountable.
Whenever a probabilitymeasureP satisfies (3.7) and X, Y ∈ L∞
are equalP-almost surely (P-a.s.), (3.4) shows thatρR(X) = ρR(Y ).
Hence, we may view ρR as a function on the space of equivalence
classes L∞P := L∞(Ω,F,P) with the corresponding properties. We
recall that the least upper bound
∥X∥∞ := inf{m ∈ R | P(|X | ≤ m) = 1}, X ∈ L∞P ,
is a norm on L∞P , making it into a Banach lattice together with
the P-almost sure order, and the equivalence class generated by
Ω ∋ ω ↦→ 1 is an order unit of L∞P . Its dual may be identified
with baP. Let ι : L∞ → L∞P be the canonical embedding, then it is
straightforward to prove the following result.
Corollary 3.5. In the situation of Theorem 3.3 define ρ : L∞P → R
by ρ(X˜) = ρR(X), where X ∈ L∞ satisfies ι(X) = X˜ . Then ρ
is well-defined and agrees with the risk measure ρ(ι(A),ι(S),p¯) on L∞P ,
where p¯(Z˜) = p(Z) whenever Z˜ = ι(Z). It is norm-continuous and
continuous from above. The dual function
ρ∗(µ) := sup
X˜∈L∞P
∫
X dµ− ρ(X˜), µ ∈ baP, (3.9)
where X denotes an arbitrary representative of X˜ , agrees with ρ∗R|baP .
Also
ρ(X˜) = sup
µ∈dom(ρ∗R)
∫
X dµ− ρ∗R(µ), X˜ ∈ L∞P ,
where X and X˜ are related as before.
3.2. The model space L∞P and strong reference probability measures
Supported by our results in Theorem 3.3 and Corollary 3.5 we
will from now on consider the model space L∞P , acceptance sets
A ⊆ L∞P , security spaces S ⊆ L∞P , pricing functionals p : S →
R and resulting finite risk measures ρR directly defined on L∞P ,
whereP is aweak reference probabilitymodel for ρR. Moreover, in
the following we will stick to the usual convention of identifying
an equivalence class of random variables in L∞P with an arbitrary
representative of that class.
By similar reasoning as in Proposition 3.1 and Theorem 3.3 we
have the following result.
Lemma 3.6. Let R = (A, S, p) be a risk measurement regime on L∞P
such that ρR is finite and normalised. Define
ρ∗R(µ) := sup
X∈L∞P
∫
X dµ− ρR(X), µ ∈ baP. (3.10)
Then ρR is continuous from above if and only if all lower level sets
Ec := {µ ∈ baP | ρ∗R(µ) ≤ c}, c ∈ R, of ρ∗R are σ (caP, L∞P )-
compact, which is in particular implied by
B(A) :=
{
µ ∈ baP
⏐⏐⏐ sup
Y∈A
∫
Y dµ <∞
}
⊆ caP.
In that case
ρR(X) = sup
µ∈(caP)+
∫
X dµ− ρ∗R(µ), X ∈ L∞P . (3.11)
In particular, dom(ρ∗R) = B(A) ∩ {ν ∈ (caP)+ | ∀Z ∈ S :∫
Z dν = p(Z)}, and E0 ̸= ∅. If ρR is positively homogeneous, then
the analogues of (3.5) and (3.6) hold as well.
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We devote the remainder of this section to the question
whether there is a strong reference model, i.e. whether there an
element in
P := {µ ∈ E0 | µ ≈ P}.
This notion is well-known in the case of law-invariant monetary
risk measures, and the result can be generalised in our setting:
Proposition 3.7. Let R = (A, S, p) be a risk measurement regime
on L∞P such that ρR is normalised, and assume
(i) the underlying probability space (Ω,F,P) is atomless;
(ii) A is the acceptance set {X ∈ L∞P | r(X) ≤ 0} of a normalised,
P-law-invariant monetary risk measure r which is continuous
from above;
(iii) p = cEP[·] for a suitable constant c > 0.
Then P ∈ P .
Proof. By Svindland (2010a, Proposition 1.1) and Föllmer and
Schied (2011, Corollary 4.65), r is dilatation monotone: for every
sub-σ -algebra G ⊆ F and every X ∈ L∞P , the estimate r(EP[X |G]) ≤
r(X) holds. Thus, for every X ∈ L∞P , EP[X] = r (EP[X |{∅,Ω}]) ≤
r(X). We conclude σA(P) = supY∈L∞P : r(Y )≤0EP[Y ] = 0. □
Clearly, sensitivity (cf. Definition 2.3) is necessary to have P ̸= ∅,
but apart from the coherent case it is not sufficient. As an example
consider two probabilitymeasuresQ≪ P such thatQ ̸≈ P. Define
Pβ := βQ+ (1− β)P,
ρ : L∞P ∋ X ↦→ sup
β∈[0,1]
EPβ [X] − (1− β)2.
For R = ({X | ρ(X) ≤ 0},R, idR), we have that ρ = ρR is a
sensitive risk measure with E0 = {Q} and P = ∅.
In the followingwewill use the notationF+ := {A ∈ F | P(A) >
0}.
Lemma 3.8. Let R = (A, S, p) be a risk measurement regime such
that ρR is finite, continuous from above, and coherent. Then P ̸= ∅ if
and only if ρR is sensitive.
Proof. We only prove sufficiency. If ρR is coherent, then
dom(ρ∗R) = E0; see (3.5). Moreover, continuity from above implies
E0 ⊆ (caP)+. As ρR is sensitive, we have that 0 < ρR(1A) =
supµ∈E0µ(A) for all A ∈ F+. Consequently, there is µA ∈ E0 such
that µA(A) > 0. In other words, E0 ≈ P. (Föllmer and Schied, 2011,
Theorem 1.61) shows that there is a countable family (µn)n∈N ⊆ E0
such that {µn | n ∈ N} ≈ P. (3.8) ensures that also ν :=∑
n∈N
1
2nµn ∈ E0, i.e. P ̸= ∅. □
The following theorems state sufficient conditions under which
P ̸= ∅ without requiring coherence of ρR. First, we characterise
the strong condition E0 = P with the ability of ρR to identify
arbitrage.
Theorem 3.9. Let R = (A, S, p) be a risk measurement regime,
and suppose that ρR is finite, normalised, continuous from above, and
sensitive. The following are equivalent:
(i) E0 = P;
(ii) For all A ∈ F+ we have ρR(−k1A) < 0 for k > 0 sufficiently
large;
(iii) For all X ∈ (L∞P )++ we have ρR(−X) < 0.
Moreover, E0 = P if ρR is strictly monotone, i.e. ρR(X) < ρR(Y )
whenever Y − X ∈ (L∞P )++.
Proof. (iii) trivially implies (ii). Now assume (i) does not hold,
i.e. there is someµ ∈ E0\P , henceµ(A) = 0 for someA ∈ F+. From
0 = ρR(0) ≥ ρR(−k1A) ≥ −kµ(A) = 0 we infer ρR(−k1A) = 0
for all k > 0, contradicting (ii). This shows that (ii) implies (i).
In order to show that (iii) is implied by (i), assume we can find a
X ̸= 0 in the negative cone with ρR(X) = 0. As the level sets of
ρ∗R are σ (caP, L∞P )-compact, we can find a µ ∈ dom(ρ∗R) such that
0 = ρR(X) =
∫
X dµ− ρ∗R(µ). This implies ρ∗R(µ) = 0 =
∫
X dµ,
a contradiction to E0 = P . Finally, strict monotonicity clearly
implies (iii) by normalisation. □
The next aim is a characterisation of P ̸= ∅ in terms of the
components of the risk measurement regimeR = (A, S, p).
Theorem 3.10. Suppose that ρR is finite, continuous from above,
normalised, and sensitive. Let C ⊆ L∞P be the smallest weakly* closed
convex cone containing A+ ker(p).
(i) P ̸= ∅ if and only if C ∩ (L∞P )++ = ∅.
(ii) P ̸= ∅ if A + ker(p) satisfies the rule of equal speed of
convergence: Let (Xn)n∈N ⊆ A and (Zn)n∈N ⊆ ker(p) be
sequences such that ∥Xn + Zn∥∞ ≤ 1 for all n. Suppose (tn)n∈N
is such that tn ↑ ∞. If the rescaled vectors
Vn := tn(Xn + Zn)
satisfy V−n → 0 in probability, then for all sets B ∈ F+, it holds
that
lim sup
n→∞
P(B ∩ {V+n ≥ ε}) < P(B).
(iii) P = ∅ if there are sequences (Xn)n∈N, (Zn)n∈N and (tn)n∈N such
that
sup
n∈N
∥tn(Xn + Zn)∥∞ <∞
violating the rule of equal speed of convergence
A proof is given in Appendix B.
4. The Minkowski domain of a risk measure
4.1. Construction of the Minkowski domain and extension results
Throughout Section 4 fix an acceptance set A ⊆ L∞P , a security
space S ⊆ L∞P , and let p : S → R be a pricing functional such
that ρR : L∞P → R is a normalised finite risk measure which
is continuous from above. Based on the results in Section 3, we
assume that P is a weak reference probability model, i.e. γP ∈
dom(ρ∗R) for a suitable constant γ > 0. The aim of this section is
to lift ρR to a domain of definition denoted by LR whose structure
is completely characterised by ρR and thus consistent with the
initial risk measurement regime, although it is in general strictly
bigger than L∞P . The typical argument for restricting risk measures
to bounded random variables—namely, that this space is robust
and thus not conflicting with the ambiguity expressed by ρR—is
not valid in this case, since LRwill completely reflect the ambiguity
as perceived by ρR. To this end, we remark that
ρ(|X |) := sup
µ∈dom(ρ∗R)
∫
|X | dµ− ρ∗R(µ), (4.1)
where ρ∗R is given in (3.10), is well-defined for all X ∈ L0P :=
L0(Ω,F,P), possibly taking the value∞. In this sense the objects
appearing in the following definition are well-defined.
Definition 4.1. For c > 0 and X ∈ L0P let
∥X∥c,R := inf
{
λ > 0
⏐⏐⏐ ρ ( |X |
λ
)
≤ c
}
(inf∅ := ∞),
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and ∥X∥R := ∥X∥1,R. TheMinkowski domain for ρR is the set
LR := {X ∈ L0P | ∥X∥R <∞}.
Note that we may interpret ∥ · ∥R as a Minkowski functional
given the level set
ρ(|·|)−1(−∞, 1],
and its domain LR is thus called theMinkowski domain.
Proposition 4.2.
(i) For all c > 0 there exist constants Ac, Bc > 0 such that
Ac∥ · ∥c,R ≤ ∥ · ∥R ≤ Bc∥ · ∥c,R.
In particular LR = {X ∈ L0P | ∥X∥c,R < ∞} for all c > 0, and
(∥ · ∥c,R)c>0 is a family of equivalent norms on LR.
Moreover, ∥X∥∞ ≥ B−1ρR(1)∥X∥R, X ∈ L∞P , and thus L∞P ⊆ LR.
(ii) X ∈ LR if and only if ∫ |X | dµ <∞ for all µ ∈ dom(ρ∗R).
(iii) (LR, ∥ · ∥R) is a Banach lattice.
(iv) |X | ≤ |Y | implies ∥X∥c,R ≤ ∥Y∥c,R and thus LR is solid. In
particular, LR is invariant under rearrangements of profits and
losses, i.e. if ϕ ∈ L∞P attaining values in [−1, 1], then ϕ ·X ∈ LR
with ∥ϕX∥c,R ≤ ∥X∥c,R.
Proof. First we set Λc(X) := {λ > 0 | ρ(λ−1|X |) ≤ c},
i.e. ∥X∥c,R = infΛc(X).
(i) Suppose that c ∈ (0, 1) and let X ∈ L0P. Note that ∥X∥R = ∞ if
and only if Λ1(X) = ∅, which implies Λc(X) = ∅ or equivalently
∥X∥c,R = ∞. Now assume ∥X∥R < ∞, and pick λ ∈ Λ1(X). As
ρ∗R ≥ 0, we have
ρ(c|X |/λ) = sup
µ∈dom(ρ∗R)
∫
c
λ
|X | dµ− ρ∗R(µ) ≤ cρ(|X |/λ) ≤ c,
which implies ∥X∥R ≥ c∥X∥c,R. Trivially, Λc(X) ⊆ Λ1(X) and
therefore ∥X∥c,R ≥ ∥X∥R. Hence, we may choose Ac = c and
Bc = 1. The case c > 1 is treated similarly.
Monotonicity implies thatρ(|X |/∥X∥∞) ≤ ρR(1) for allX ∈ L∞P ,
which yields ∥X∥∞ ≥ ∥X∥ρR(1),R ≥ B−1ρR(1)∥X∥R and L∞P ⊆ LR.∥·∥c,R is indeed a norm: The verification of the triangle inequal-
ity and homogeneity are straightforward. For the definiteness of
∥ · ∥c,R, let µ ∈ dom(ρ∗R) be arbitrary. As for all λ ∈ Λc(X) we
obtain the estimate ∥λ−1X∥L1µ − ρ∗R(µ) ≤ ρ(λ−1|X |) ≤ c , we can
infer
1
c + ρ∗R(µ)
∥X∥L1µ ≤ ∥X∥c,R. (4.2)
Choosing µ ∈ dom(ρ∗R) such that µ = γP yields definiteness of∥ · ∥c,R.
(ii) It follows from (4.2) that for all X ∈ LR and all µ ∈ dom(ρ∗R)
the integrability condition
∫ |X | dµ < ∞ holds. For the converse
implication, let X ∈ L0P \LR be arbitrary, the latter being equivalent
to ρ(t|X |) = ∞ for all t > 0. As before, we set Ec := {µ ∈
caP | ρ∗R(µ) ≤ c}, c ∈ R, and will show that there is a ν ∈ E1
such that
∫ |X | dν = ∞. First assume that supµ∈E1 ∫ |X | dµ = ∞.
Choose a sequence (µn)n∈N ⊆ E1 such that
∫ |X | dµn ≥ 22n, n ∈ N,
and set ν = ∑∞n=12−nµn, which is itself an element of E1 by (3.8).
Moreover,∫
|X | dν =
∞∑
n=1
2−n
∫
|X | dµn ≥
∞∑
n=1
2n = ∞.
Hence, X is not ν-integrable. In a second step, we show that the
case supµ∈E1
∫ |X | dµ <∞ cannot occur. Assume for contradiction
that supµ∈E1
∫ |X | dµ < ∞. If there were a constant κ > 0 such
that for all µ ∈ dom(ρ∗R) \ E1 the estimate∫
|X | dµ ≤ κρ∗R(µ)
holds, one could estimate
ρ(κ−1|X |) ≤ 1
κ
sup
µ∈E1
∫
|X | dµ <∞,
and thus X ∈ LR. Thus, there must be a sequence (µn)n∈N ⊆
dom(ρ∗R) such that ρ∗R(µn) > 1 and
∫ |X | dµn ≥ 22nρ∗R(µn), n ∈ N.
We set C :=∑∞n=1 12nρ∗R(µn) ∈ (0, 1), and
ζ :=
∞∑
n=1
1
2nρ∗R(µn)C
µn.
As µn(Ω) ≤ ρR(1) + ρ∗R(µn), ζ (Ω) is finite. Moreover, by
σ (caP, L∞P )-lower semicontinuity of ρ∗R, ρ∗R(ζ ) ≤ 1C
∑∞
n=12
−n = 1C .
Note that∫
|X | dζ ≥
∞∑
n=1
22nρ∗R(µn)
2nρ∗R(µn)C
= 1
C
∞∑
n=1
2n = ∞,
Hence, for ν := Cζ + (1 − C)µ0 ∈ E1, where µ0 ∈ E0 is
chosen arbitrarily, we also obtain
∫ |X | dν = ∞. This is the desired
contradiction.
(iii) follows from Owari (2014, Proposition 4.10), and (iv) is an
immediate consequence of the monotonicity of ρ(|·|). □
The proof of Proposition 4.6 will clarify the reason for introducing
the norms ∥ · ∥c,R instead of just ∥ · ∥R.
Remark 4.3.
(i) In the coherent case, we can infer from Proposition 4.2(ii)
that ∥ · ∥c,R = c−1ρ(|X |) = c−1supµ∈dom(ρ∗R)∥X∥L1µ .
(ii) The Minkowski norm ∥ · ∥c,R can be interpreted as a gen-
eralisation of the so-called Aumann–Serrano economic index
of riskiness (see Aumann and Serrano, 2008 and Drapeau and
Kupper, 2013, Example 3).
(iii) The Minkowski domain and similar spaces have appeared in
Kupper and Svindland (2011), Owari (2014) and Svindland
(2010b). The definition of LR depends on the null sets of the
probability measure P only, and thus is invariant under any
choice of the underlying probability measure P ≈ dom(ρ∗R),
in particular under changes of weak and strong reference
probability models.
The main purpose for introducing the Minkowski domain LR is
to extend ρR to a larger domain than L∞P in a robustway in terms of
the fundamentals, i.e. the risk measurement regimeR = (A, S, p).
There is a canonical candidate for this given by R˜ := (A˜, S, p)
where
A˜ := {X ∈ LR | ∀µ ∈ dom(ρ∗R) :
∫
X dµ ≤ ρ∗R(µ)}, (4.3)
so A˜ is given by lifting – and thus also preserving – the acceptability
criteria
∫
X dµ ≤ ρ∗R(µ),µ ∈ dom(ρ∗R), from L∞P to LR. Indeed the
following Theorem4.4 shows that R˜ is a riskmeasurement regime,
and that the corresponding risk measure ρR˜ preserves the dual
representation of ρR. Dual approaches to extending convex func-
tions are commonly used in the literature; see, e.g., Filipovic and
Svindland (2012) and Owari (2014). Note that ρR˜ also preserves
any functional form ρR may have, as for instance in the case of the
entropic risk measure in Example 5.4.
Theorem 4.4. R˜ := (A˜, S, p) is a risk measurement regime on the
Banach lattice (LR, ∥ · ∥R). ρR˜ can be expressed as
ρR˜(X) = sup
µ∈dom(ρ∗R)
∫
X dµ− ρ∗R(µ), X ∈ LR, (4.4)
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where ρ∗R is defined as in (3.10). Moreover, for every µ ∈ dom(ρ∗R),
the linear functional
∫ · dµ is bounded on (LR, ∥ · ∥R). A fortiori,
ρR˜|L∞P = ρR. Moreover, ρR˜ is l.s.c. on (LR, ∥ · ∥R), and satisfies
ρR˜(X) = sup
m∈N
ρR˜(X ∧m). (4.5)
Proof. Note that for arbitrary µ ∈ dom(ρ∗R) and all X ̸= 0, we
have∫ |X |
∥X∥R dµ = supε>0
∫ |X |
∥X∥R + ε dµ
≤ sup
ε>0
ρ
( |X |
∥X∥R + ε
)
+ ρ∗R(µ) ≤ 1+ ρ∗R(µ),
hence
∫ · dµ is a bounded linear functional on LR. For arbitrary
X ∈ LR and µ ∈ E0 we have
sup{p(Z) | Z ∈ S, X + Z ∈ A˜} ≤ sup
{
p(Z) | Z ∈ S, p(Z) ≤ −
∫
Xdµ
}
= −
∫
Xdµ <∞,
where the finiteness of the bound is due to Proposition 4.2(ii). Thus,
R˜ satisfies (2.1) and is indeed a risk measurement regime, because
A˜ is monotone by dom(ρ∗R) ⊆ (caP)+, and convex as intersection
of convex subsets of LR. It is straightforward to show (4.4), so ρR˜
is l.s.c. as pointwise supremum of a family of continuous functions.
In order to prove (4.5), letµ ∈ dom(ρ∗R) be arbitrary and note that
by the Monotone Convergence Theorem and monotonicity of ρR˜,
we have∫
X dµ− ρ∗R(µ) = sup
m∈N
∫
(X ∧m)dµ− ρ∗R(µ)
≤ sup
m∈N
ρR˜(X ∧m) ≤ ρR˜(X).
Now take the supremum over µ ∈ dom(ρ∗R) on the left-hand
side. □
Another way to extend ρR could be considering
A := cl∥·∥R (A). (4.6)
and R = (A, S, p). We will discuss this approach in Remark 4.11
where we show that R is no risk measurement regime on LR in
general, and that, where ρR makes sense, it indeed equals ρR˜.
As announced in the introduction, we also consider the following
extensions of ρR given by monotone approximation procedures:
ξ (X) := sup
m∈N
inf
n∈N ρR((−n) ∨ X ∧m), X ∈ L
R,
and
η(X) := inf
n∈N supm∈N
ρR((−n) ∨ X ∧m), X ∈ LR.
The question is under which conditions we have
ρR˜(X) = ξ (X) = η(X) = limn→∞ ρR((−n) ∨ X ∧ n). (4.7)
Note that as a byproduct of (4.5), we obtain the estimate
ρR˜ ≤ ξ ≤ η and
∀X ∈ LR : ρR˜(|X |) = ξ (|X |) = η(|X |) = ρ(|X |).
(4.8)
The following Theorem 4.5 shows that ρR˜ possesses some regular-
ity in terms of monotone approximation in that always ρR˜ = ξ .
Theorem 4.5. For all X ∈ LR and all U ∈ L∞P we have
ρR˜(X + U) = sup
m∈N
inf
n∈N ρR((−n) ∨ X ∧m+ U). (4.9)
A fortiori, the equality ρR˜ = ξ holds, and ρR˜ can equivalently be
interpreted as the risk measure associated to the risk measurement
regimeRξ := (Aξ , S, p) on (LR, ∥ · ∥R), where
Aξ := {X ∈ LR | ξ (X) ≤ 0}
= {X ∈ LR | sup
m∈N
inf
n∈N ρR((−n) ∨ X ∧m) ≤ 0}.
For the sake of brevity, we shall in the remainder of our in-
vestigations often use the following piece of notation: for random
variables U, V ∈ (L∞P )+ and X ∈ LR, we set XU := X ∨ (−U) and
XV := X ∧ V .
Proof. We show first that ρR˜ = ξ holds. Let X ∈ LR, m ∈ N be
fixed and n ∈ N be arbitrary. Let µ ∈ dom(ρ∗R) be such that
ρR˜(−X−)− 1 ≤ ρR(Xmn )− 1 ≤
∫
Xmn dµ− ρ∗R(µ)
≤
∫
(X+)mdµ− ρ∗R(µ).
Of course, the first and last inequalities in the latter estimate
always hold by monotonicity. For ε > 0 arbitrary we can thus
estimate
ρ∗R(µ)− 1 ≤
∫
(X+)mdµ− ρR˜(−X−)
= 1
1+ ε
∫
(1+ ε)(X+)mdµ− ρR˜(−X−)
≤ 1
1+ ε ρR((1+ ε)(X
+)m)
+ 1
1+ ε ρ
∗
R(µ)− ρR˜(−X−).
Rearranging this inequality, we obtain
ρ∗R(µ) ≤
1
ε
ρR((1+ ε)(X+)m)+ 1+ ε
ε
(
1− ρR˜(−X−)
) =: c,
a bound which is independent of n ∈ N. Since Ec = {µ ∈ caP |
ρ∗R(µ) ≤ c} is σ (caP, L∞P )-compact by Lemma 3.6, we conclude for
all n ∈ N that ρR(Xmn ) = maxµ∈Ec f (µ, n), where the function f is
given by
f : Ec × N→ R, f (µ, n) :=
∫
Xmn dµ− ρ∗R(µ),
Our aim is to apply Fan’sMinimax Theorem Fan (1953, Theorem 2)
to the function f in order to infer
ξ (Xm) = inf
n
max
µ∈Ec
f (µ, n) = max
µ∈Ec
inf
n∈N f (µ, n)
= max
µ∈Ec
inf
n∈N
∫
Xmn dµ− ρ∗R(µ). (4.10)
To this end we have to check the following conditions:
• Ec is a compact Hausdorff space when endowed with the
relative σ (caP, L∞P )-topology. This follows from continuity
from above.
• f is convex-like onN in that for all n1, n2 ∈ N and all 0 ≤ t ≤
1 there is a n0 ∈ N such that
∀µ ∈ Ec : f (µ, n0) ≤ tf (µ, n1)+ (1− t)f (µ, n2).
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Indeed, choose n0 := max{n1, n2} and note that
tf (µ, n1)+ (1− t)f (µ, n2) = t
∫
Xmn1dµ+ (1− t)
×
∫
Xmn2dµ− ρ∗R(µ)
≥ (t + 1− t)
∫
Xmn0dµ− ρ∗R(µ)
= f (µ, n0).
• f is concave-like on Ec , which is defined analogous to convex-
like. Indeed, let µ1, µ2 ∈ Ec and define µ0 = tµ1 + (1 −
t)µ2 ∈ Ec (by convexity of Ec). Then for all n ∈ N, convexity
of ρ∗R implies
tf (µ1, n)+ (1− t)f (µ2, n) =
∫
Xmn dµ0 − tρ∗R(µ1)
− (1− t)ρ∗R(µ2)
≤
∫
Xmn dµ0 − ρ∗R(µ0) = f (µ0, n).
• For all n ∈ N, themappingµ ↦→ f (µ, n) is upper semicontin-
uous. This follows from the continuity of µ ↦→ ∫ Xmn dµ and
the lower semicontinuity of ρ∗R.
From (4.10), by the positivity of µ and, e.g., dominated conver-
gence,
ξ (Xm) = max
µ∈Ec
∫
Xmdµ− ρ∗R(µ) ≤ ρR˜(Xm),
and ρR˜(X
m) = ξ (Xm) holds by (4.8). Taking the limit m →∞, we
obtain from the definition of ξ and (4.5) that ρR˜(X) = ξ (X).
Now, let X ∈ LR and U ∈ L∞P be arbitrary and assume m, n ≥
u := ∥U∥∞. We obtain
(X + U)n = (X + U)1{X≥−U−n} − n1{X<−U−n}
= X1{X≥−U−n} − (n+ U)1{X<−U−n} + U
= XU+n + U,
(4.11)
and in addition
(X + U)m = (X + U)1{X≤m−U} +m1{X>m−U}
= X1{X≤m−U} + (m− U)1{X>m−U} + U
= Xm−U + U .
(4.12)
From these two equations (4.11) and (4.12) we infer
ξ (X + U) = sup
m≥u
inf
n≥u ρR((XU+n + U)
m) = sup
m≥u
inf
n≥u ρR(X
m−U
U+n + U).
This implies that
sup
m∈N
inf
n∈N ρR(X
m
n + U) = sup
m≥u
inf
n≥u ρR(X
m−U
U+n + U)
= sup
m≥u
inf
n≥u ρR((X + U)
m
n )
= ξ (X + U) = ρR˜(X + U).
(4.9) is proved. ξ = ρR˜ being S-additive, monotone, and proper,
directly implies Rξ is a risk measurement regime. The equality
ρR˜ = ξ = ρRξ obviously holds true. □
Theorem 4.5 appeared as Svindland (2010b, Lemma 2.8) in the
context of law-invariant monetary risk measures. Our proof not
only serves as an alternative to the one given in Svindland (2010b),
relying irreducibly on law-invariance, but also generalises the re-
sult to a much wider class of risk measures.
In contrast to Theorem 4.5, we demonstrate in Example 5.2 that
ρR˜ ̸= η may happen. Before we study conditions under which
ρR˜ displays regularity in the sense of (4.7), we show the following
properties of η:
Proposition 4.6. Define the acceptance set
Aη := {X ∈ LR | inf
n∈N ρR˜((−n) ∨ X) ≤ 0} ⊊ L
R.
Then η is the risk measure associated to the risk measurement regime
Rη := (Aη, S, p). Moreover,
∀ X ∈ LR : η(X) = inf
n∈N ρR˜((−n) ∨ X), (4.13)
and
Γ := {X ∈ LR | ∃ ε > 0 : ρ((1+ ε)X+) <∞}
= int dom(η) ⊆ int dom(ρR˜).
Proof. From (4.5) and η|L∞P = ρR = ρR˜|L∞P , we immediately
obtain that for all X ∈ LR the equality η(X) = infn∈NρR˜((−n) ∨ X)
holds. (4.8) shows that Aη ⊊ LR and that η is a proper function.
In order to prove the theorem, it suffices to check S-additivity,
convexity and monotonicity. Let Z ∈ S and X ∈ LR. From
the S-additivity of ρR˜ and (4.11) we obtain, using the notational
conventions introduced before the proof of Theorem 4.5, that
η(X) = inf
n≥∥Z∥∞
ρR˜(XZ+n + Z) = infn≥∥Z∥∞ ρR˜(XZ+n)+ p(Z)
= η(X)+ p(Z).
For each n ∈ N, fn(x) := (−n) ∨ x is convex and monotone, thus
η = limnρR˜ ◦ fn is convex and monotone. Next we show that Γ ⊆
int dom(η). To this end we first show that B := ⋃c>0{Y ∈ LR |∥Y∥c,R < 1} ⊆ int dom(η). Indeed for any X with ∥X∥c,R < 1,
there is λ < 1 such that ρ(|X |/λ) ≤ c , and thus
η(X) ≤ η(|X |) = ρ(|X |) ≤ λρ(|X |/λ) ≤ λc <∞,
so B ⊆ dom(η). Moreover, by definition B is open in (LR, ∥ · ∥R).
Now, let X ∈ Γ , and thus X+ ∈ B. Hence, there is δ > 0 and a ball
Bδ(0) := {Y ∈ LR | ∥Y∥R < δ} such that {X+} + Bδ(0) ⊆ dom(η).
Bymonotonicity of η it now follows that also {X}+Bδ(0) = {X+}+
Bδ(0)− {X−} ⊆ dom(η), so X ∈ int dom(η).
In order to show Γ ⊇ int dom(η) let X ∈ int dom(η). Then
there is ε > 0 such that (1 + 2ε)X ∈ dom(η) and thus also
(1 + ε)X ∈ dom(η), and by (4.13) there must be n ∈ N such that
(1+ 2ε)((−n)∨ X) ∈ dom(ρR˜) and (1+ ε)((−n)∨ X) ∈ dom(ρR˜).
Let Xn := (−n) ∨ X and Y = (1 + ε)(X− ∧ n) ∈ L∞P , so we have
(1+ε)X+ = (1+ε)Xn+Y . If δ > 0 satisfies (1+δ)(1+ε) = 1+2ε,
convexity implies
ρ((1+ ε)X+) = ρR˜((1+ ε)Xn + Y )
= ρR˜
(
1+ δ
1+ δ (1+ ε)Xn +
δ(1+ δ)
δ(1+ δ)Y
)
≤ 1
1+ δ ρR˜((1+ 2ε)Xn)
+ δ
(1+ δ)ρR˜
(
(1+ δ)
δ
Y
)
<∞. (4.14)
Hence, X ∈ Γ . int dom(η) ⊆ int dom(ρR˜) follows from ρR˜ ≤ η,
see (4.8). □
The following Theorem 4.7 states conditions under which (4.7)
holds.
Theorem 4.7. Let X ∈ Γ . Consider the following conditions:
(i) there is s > 0 such that for all n ∈ N we have
ρR˜((−n) ∨ X) = limm→∞ ρR˜((−n) ∨ X + sX
+1{X+≥m});
(ii) there is s > 0 such that η(X) = limm→∞η(X + sX+1{X+≥m});
(iii) for all n ∈ N we have limm→∞ρ(nX1{X≥m}) = 0.
Any of the conditions (i)–(iii) implies (4.7).
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The setΓ appears to be a set of reasonable risks in that they can
at least be leveraged by a small amount and still remain hedgeable.
Risks outside Γ should probably not be considered by any sound
agent. Note that the conditions (i)–(iii) are satisfied whenever
monotone or dominated convergence results can be applied to ρR˜,
as is the case for many risk measures used in practice like the
entropic risk measure in Example 5.4 or Average Value at Risk
based risk measures in Example 5.5. The proof of Theorem 4.7 is
based on a study of subgradients of ρR˜ and η, respectively, and
therefore postponed to the end of Section 4.4. It turns out that
the regularity condition (4.7) is closely related to the existence of
regular subgradients for η and ρR˜.
4.2. The structure of the Minkowski domain
In this section, we will decompose LR into parts with clear
operational meanings.
Definition 4.8. We denote the closure of L∞P in LR by MR :=
cl∥·∥R (L∞P ), and define the heart of the Minkowski domain to be
HR := {X ∈ LR | ρ(k|X |) <∞ for all k > 0}.
HR, a concept which clearly adapts the idea of an Orlicz heart,6
is the set of risky positions which can be hedged at any quantity
with finite cost.
Proposition 4.9. MR and HR are solid Banach sublattices of LR and
MR ⊆ HR. Moreover, HR ⊆ Γ , and both ρR˜|HR and η|HR are
continuous.
Proof. The first assertions are easily verified. Recall the set B from
the proof of Proposition 4.6 for whichwe know that B ⊆ Γ . For the
inclusionHR ⊆ B, let 0 ̸= X ∈ HR and note that ρ(2|X |) <∞. The
latter means ∥X∥c,R ≤ 12 < 1 for some c > 0, and thus HR ⊆ B.
Finally, as (HR, ∥ · ∥R) is a Banach lattice and both η and ρR˜ are
convex, monotone and finite-valued on (HR, ∥ · ∥R), ρR˜|HR and
η|HR are continuous according to Remark 2.4(v). □
From Proposition 4.9 we can derive the following characterisa-
tion of MR, a result which can also be found as Owari (2014,
Lemma 3.3).
Corollary 4.10. MR = {X ∈ LR | ∀λ > 0 : limk→∞ρ(λ|X |1{|X |≥k})
= 0}.
Proof. Let X ∈ MR and λ, ε > 0 be arbitrary. Let δ > 0 be
such that ∥Y∥R ≤ δ, Y ∈ HR, implies ρ(|Y |) = ρR˜(|Y |) ≤ ε.
This is possible due to Proposition 4.9. Choose now Y ∈ L∞P such
that ∥λ(X − Y )∥R ≤ δ2 and k ∈ N such that ∥λY1{|X |≥k}∥R ≤ δ2 ,
the latter being due to continuity from above. Then Z := |X −
Y |1{|X |≥k} + |Y |1{|X |≥k} satisfies ∥λZ∥R ≤ δ, and by monotonicity
ρ(λ|X |1{|X |≥k}) ≤ ρR˜(λZ) ≤ ε. The converse inclusion above is
obvious. □
As HR is closed, the set of directions along whose absolute value
ρR˜ attains the value infinity is thus norm-open. In particular,
we can only approximate such vectors with sequences of vectors
along which ρR˜ behaves equally discontinuous, and limits of well-
behaved financial positions are equally well-behaved. Hence shift-
ing to LR yields a structure which conveniently separates regimes
of ‘‘good’’ and ‘‘bad’’ risk behaviour. In that respect consider the set
CR := dom(ρR˜) \ HR ⊆ LR. CR is the set of ‘‘less bad’’ positions,
and shields HR from the financial positions that carry infinite risk.
It has a nice interpretation in terms of liquidity risk in the sense
6 For an introduction to Orlicz space theory we refer to Rao and Ren (1991).
of Lacker (2015). In that paper the author considers liquidity risk
profiles, i.e. curves of the form ρR˜(tX)t≥0 capturing how risk scales
when increasing the leverage. CR consists of financial positions X
such that the liquidity risk profiles of X+ or X− breach the infinite
risk regimes.Whereas an agent could at least hypothetically hedge
any position in HR at finite cost, no matter what the leverage, she
has to be very careful in the case of elements in CR that have finite
risk themselves but which produce potentially completely non-
hedgeable losses under incautious scaling.
Recalling that for any X ∈ LR there is λ > 0 such that
ρ(|X |/λ) < ∞, we obtain that CR = ∅ if and only if HR = LR,
and ρR˜ is continuous. Moreover, if H
R ⊊ LR, both HR and MR
are nowhere dense (as true subspaces of LR) and – by Baire’s
Theorem – CR ∪ {ρR˜ = ∞} is a dense open set.
Note that the inclusionsMR ⊆ HR ⊆ LR can all be strict, as is
illustrated by Example 5.3.
Remark 4.11. Having introduced MR we can now discuss the
extension given by the norm closure operation (4.6). Seen as a
subset of LR,A is unfortunately not an acceptance set in the sense
of Definition 2.1, since X ≤ Y and Y ∈ A does not necessarily
imply X ∈ A, so the monotonicity property is violated. However,
one can show thatR := (A, S, p) is a risk measurement regime on
the Banach lattice MR. By Proposition 4.9 it follows that ρA(X) =
ρR˜(X) = η(X) for all X ∈ MR, and ρA is continuous onMR.
4.3. The dual of the Minkowski domain
In this short interlude we discuss a few properties of the norm
dual (LR∗, ∥ · ∥R∗) of (LR, ∥ · ∥R), the space of continuous linear
functionals on the Minkowski domain, which will be essential
when we study subgradients in Section 4.4.
Theorem 4.12. LR∗ is the direct sum of two subspaces CA and PA, i.e.
LR∗ = CA⊕ PA.
Elements in CA have the shape X ↦→ ∫ X dµ for a unique µ ∈ caP.
λ ∈ PA are characterised by λ|MR = 0. For ℓ = µ ⊕ λ,7 µ is the
regular part of ℓ and λ the singular part. Moreover, L∞P can be
identified with a subspace of LR∗.
Proof. Let ℓ ∈ LR∗ and consider the additive set functionµ = µℓ :
F → R, µ(A) := ℓ(1A). It is straightforward to prove that µ ∈ baP
and that it is unique, given ℓ. Let now (An)n∈N ⊆ F be a vanishing
sequence of sets. For all λ > 0 continuity from above implies
lim
n→∞ ρ(λ
−11An ) = ρ(0) = 0,
which reads as limn∥1An∥R = 0 and thus limnµ(An) =
limnℓ(1An ) = 0. Hence µ ∈ caP.
We will now show that the linear functional X ↦→ ∫ X dµ
is bounded. To this end, note first that by its definition, ℓ(X) =∫
X dµℓ holds for all X ∈ L∞P . Moreover, by Aliprantis and Border
(1999, Theorem 7.46), LR∗ is a Banach lattice in its own right, and
the mapping ℓ ↦→ µℓ is positive and linear in ℓ, hence it suffices
to show X ↦→ ∫ X dµ ∈ LR∗ is bounded for µ = µℓ ∈ (caP)+,
ℓ ∈ LR∗+ . Let X ∈ LR+ be arbitrary.∫
(X ∧ n)dµ = |ℓ(X ∧ n)| ≤ ∥ℓ∥R∗∥(X ∧ n)∥R ≤ ∥ℓ∥R∗∥X∥R,
7 We shall stick to the abuse of notation of identifying functionals in CAwith the
unique measure µ ∈ caP in their integral representation.
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where the last inequality follows from Proposition 4.2(iv). We
apply the Monotone Convergence Theorem and obtain
∫
X dµ ≤
∥ℓ∥R∗∥X∥R. For a general X ∈ LR, we get⏐⏐⏐⏐∫ X dµ⏐⏐⏐⏐ ≤ ∫ |X |dµ ≤ ∥ℓ∥R∗∥|X |∥R = ∥ℓ∥R∗∥X∥R.
X ↦→ ∫ X dµ ∈ LR∗ follows, and from L∞P being dense in MR,
ℓ|MR =
∫ · dµ|MR has to hold. Let CA := {∫ · dµℓ | ℓ ∈ LR∗},
which is a subspace of LR∗. For ℓ ∈ LR∗, let λ := ℓ− ∫ · dµ ∈ LR∗,
which satisfies λ|MR = 0. Clearly, ℓ =
∫ · dµ + λ is a unique
decomposition of ℓ as a sum of elements in CA and PA.
If Z ∈ L∞P , the inclusion LR ⊆ L1P, Hölder’s inequality and
(4.2) yield LR ∋ X ↦→ EP[ZX] is well-defined and continuous,
i.e. EP[Z ·] ∈ LR∗. □
CA stands for ‘‘countably additive’’, PA for ‘‘purely additive’’. One
can show that CA is a closed subspace of LR∗. The following corol-
lary is a direct consequence of Theorem 4.12.
Corollary 4.13. For all λ ∈ PA, X ∈ LR and r > 0, we have the
identity
λ(X) = λ(X1{|X |≥r}).
Moreover, if ℓ = µ⊕ λ ∈ LR∗, limr→∞ℓ(X1{|X |≥r}) = λ(X) holds for
all X ∈ LR.
Theorem 4.12 implies another characterisation of ρR˜.
Corollary 4.14. Consider the following two classes of extensions of
ρR to LR:
E1 = {g : LR → (−∞,∞] | g convex, σ (LR, CA)-l.s.c.,
g|L∞P = ρR},
E2 := {g : LR → (−∞,∞] | g monotone,
g = sup
m∈N
g(· ∧m), g|L∞P = ρR}.
Then ρR˜ is maximal both in E1 and E2, i.e. g ∈ Ei implies g ≤ ρR˜.
Proof. First assume g ∈ E1. By the Fenchel–Moreau Theorem
(cf. Ekeland and Témam, 1999, Proposition 4.1) g has a dual
representation
g(X) = sup
µ∈CA
∫
X dµ− g∗(µ), X ∈ LR,
where g∗(µ) = supX∈LR
∫
X dµ − g(X). By g|L∞P = ρR, we have
dom(g∗) ⊆ dom(ρ∗R) and g∗(µ) ≥ ρ∗R(µ) for all µ ∈ dom(ρ∗R).
Hence, for X ∈ LR arbitrary, we have
g(X) ≤ sup
µ∈dom(ρ∗R)
∫
X dµ− g∗(µ)
≤ sup
µ∈dom(ρ∗R)
∫
X dµ− ρ∗R(µ) = ρR˜(X).
For the second claim, let g ∈ E2 and let X ∈ LR be arbitrary.
Monotonicity of g allows for the following estimate:
g(X) = sup
m∈N
g(X ∧m) ≤ sup
m∈N
inf
n∈N g((−n) ∨ X ∧m)  
=ρR((−n)∨X∧m)
= ξ (X) = ρR˜(X). □
4.4. Subgradients over the Minkowski domain
In this section wewill study subgradients of ρR˜ and η, and how
to ensure that subgradients correspond to measures on (Ω,F).
Given Theorem 4.12, it does not seem surprising that this is not
always the case. The reason for also considering subgradients of
η is that existence of regular subgradients of η and ρR˜ is closely
related to the question (4.7), and the developed results pave the
way for the proof of Theorem 4.7.
Definition 4.15. Let (X , τ ) be a topological vector space with dual
space X ∗. Given a proper convex function f : X → (−∞,∞], the
subgradient of f at X ∈ X is the set
∂ f (X) := {ℓ ∈ X ∗ | ∀Y ∈ X : f (Y ) ≥ f (X)+ ℓ(Y − X)}
= {ℓ ∈ X ∗ | f (X) = ℓ(X)− f ∗(ℓ)},
where f ∗(ℓ) := supX∈X ℓ(X)− f (X), ℓ ∈ X ∗.
Note that if a convex function f : LR → (−∞,∞] is addi-
tionally monotone and S-additive, its subgradients will be positive
functionals in LR∗+ that agree with p on S.
In the study of risk measures subgradients play an important
role, for instance as pricing rules in equilibria. The following easy
example serves as an economic motivation.
Example 4.16 (Optimal Investment). For some capital constraint
c > 0 and some linear pricing rule ℓ ∈ LR∗+ consider the following
optimisation problem:
(∗) ρR˜(Y )→ min, over all Y ∈ LR with ℓ(−Y ) ≤ c.
In order to solve this, by monotonicity, we can without loss of
generality focus on Y satisfying ℓ(−Y ) = c . If X ∈ LR satisfies
ℓ ∈ ∂ρR˜(X) and ℓ(−X) = c , then X solves (∗). Indeed for all
Y ∈ ℓ−1({−c}), we have
ρR˜(X) = ρR˜(X)+ ℓ(Y − X)− ℓ(Y )− c
≤ ρR˜(Y )+ ℓ(−Y )− c = ρR˜(Y ).
An important feature of the space (LR, ∥ · ∥R) is that dom(ρR˜)
possesses a particularly rich interior, see Proposition 4.6. Thus we
have the following result:
Theorem 4.17. Suppose X ∈ int dom(ρR˜), so in particular if X ∈ Γ ,
then ∂ρR˜(X) ̸= ∅. Also ∂η(Y ) ̸= ∅ whenever Y ∈ Γ .
Proof. It is well-known that a convex, proper and monotone
function f on a Banach lattice is subdifferentiable at every point
in int dom(f ), see Ruszczyński and Shapiro (2006, Proposition 1).
The claim thus follows from Theorem 4.4 and Proposition 4.6. □
We devote the remainder of this subsection to the question under
which conditions ∂ρR˜(X) will contain regular (that is σ -additive)
elements.8 To this end, note that by (4.8) we have that η∗ ≤ ρ∗R˜,
which implies dom(ρ∗R˜) ⊆ dom(η∗). Moreover, CA ∩ dom(ρ∗R˜) ⊆
CA∩dom(η∗) ⊆ dom(ρ∗R), so regular subgradients of ρR˜ and η are
necessarily in dom(ρ∗R). Indeed, if µ ∈ CA ∩ dom(η∗), then
ρ∗R(µ) = sup
Y∈L∞P
∫
Y dµ− η(Y )
≤ sup
Y∈LR
∫
Y dµ− η(Y ) = η∗(µ) <∞.
Conversely, for all Y ∈ dom(η) the definition of η and CA ⊆ caP
shows for µ ∈ CA∫
Y dµ− η(Y ) = lim
n→∞ limm→∞
∫
Ymn dµ− ρR(Ymn )
≤ sup
U∈L∞P
∫
U dµ− ρR(U) = ρ∗R(µ).
(4.15)
8 There are immediate – however very strong – sufficient conditions for this to
happen, e.g. LR∗ ⊆ caP , which is the case if and only ifMR = LR , or continuity of
ρR˜ with respect to the σ (L
R, CA)-topology.
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This shows that η∗(µ) = ρ∗R(µ), which provides a first step
towards the proof of Theorem 4.7:
Lemma 4.18. Let X ∈ dom(η) and suppose that µ ⊕ λ ∈ ∂η(X),
where µ ∈ CA and λ ∈ PA. Then λ(X−) = 0. If, moreover, λ = 0,
i.e. µ ∈ ∂η(X), then η(X) = ρR˜(X).
Proof. Let µ⊕ λ ∈ ∂η(X). Define λ˜ by λ˜(Y ) = λ(Y1{X≥0}), Y ∈ LR.
One verifies that λ˜ ∈ (LR)∗. Also we have
η∗(µ⊕ λ˜) = sup
Y∈LR
∫
Y dµ+ λ(Y1{X≥0})− η(Y )
≤ sup
Y∈LR
lim
n→∞
∫
(−n) ∨ Y dµ+ λ(Y+)− η((−n) ∨ Y )
≤ lim sup
n→∞
sup
Y∈LR
∫
(−n) ∨ Y dµ+ λ((−n) ∨ Y )
− η((−n) ∨ Y )
≤ η∗(µ⊕ λ),
where we used monotonicity of λ. Hence,
η(X) =
∫
X dµ+ λ(X)− η∗(µ⊕ λ)
≤
∫
X dµ+ λ˜(X)− η∗(µ⊕ λ˜) ≤ η(X),
and the first inequality would be strict if λ(X−) > 0. Thus λ(X−) =
0 follows. For the last assertion, suppose that µ ∈ ∂η(X) ∩ CA. The
observations preceding the lemma and (4.8) show
η(X) =
∫
X dµ− ρ∗R(µ) ≤ ρR˜(X) ≤ η(X). □
Consequently, if ∂η(X) ̸= ∅, so for instance for X ∈ Γ , then η
may display a ‘‘jump’’ λ(X+) produced by the unbounded risk X+.
If that jump is not present, then η(X) = ρR˜(X). In the following we
will introduce a weak local continuity assumption, tail continuity,
which quantifies which tails are not too fat to lead to such jumps.
In Svindland (2010b), a version of it is studied for law-invariant
monetary risk measures.
Definition 4.19. Let f : LR → (−∞,∞] bemonotone and proper,
and let X ∈ dom(f ). We call f tail continuous at X along Y ∈ LR
if X + Y+ ∈ dom(f ) and
f (X) = lim
r→∞ f
(
X + Y1{Y≥r}
)
holds. T fX denotes the set of tails Y along which f is tail continuous
at X . With a slight abuse of language, we call f tail continuous at X
if T fX = {Y ∈ LR | X + Y+ ∈ dom(f )}.
Note that T fX is monotone in that Y1 ≤ Y2 P-a.s. and Y2 ∈ T fX
implies Y1 ∈ T fX . The next proposition shows that sufficient tail
continuity can eliminate non-σ -additive elements in the subgradi-
ent.We prove this for generalmonotone functions f , butwe clearly
have f = ρR˜ or f = η in mind.
Proposition 4.20. Let f : LR → (−∞,∞] be proper, monotone,
and convex, and let X ∈ dom(f ). Suppose that {sY | s ≥ 0, Y ∈ T fX }
is norm-dense (or equivalently T fX separates the points of LR∗). Then
∂ f (X) ⊆ CA. In particular, if f is tail continuous at X ∈ int dom(f ),
then ∂ f (X) ⊆ CA.
Proof. Let ℓ = µ ⊕ λ ∈ ∂ f (X). Assume λ ̸= 0. The density
assumption and monotonicity allows to pick Y ∈ T fX , Y ≥ 0, such
that λ(Y ) > 0. Corollary 4.13 and ℓ being a subgradient together
with tail continuity along Y yield the contradiction
f (X) < f (X)+ λ(Y ) = lim
r→∞ f (X)+ λ(Y1{Y≥r})
= lim
r→∞ f (X)+ ℓ(Y1{Y≥r}) = limr→∞ ℓ(X)− f
∗(ℓ)+ ℓ(Y1{Y≥r})
= lim
r→∞ ℓ(X + Y1{Y≥r})− f
∗(ℓ)
≤ lim inf
r→∞ f (X + Y1{Y≥r}) = f (X). □
Unfortunately, in general we only have tail continuity along MR,
as is shown in the following Lemma 4.21. As we have already
observed, if LR = MR, then LR∗ = CA and therefore trivially
∂ρR˜(X) ⊆ CA, so just knowing tail continuity along MR is not
sufficient for the existence of countably additive subgradients in
non-trivial cases.
Lemma 4.21. Let f : LR → (−∞,∞] be proper, monotone, and
convex such that L∞P ⊆ dom(f ). If X ∈ int dom(f ), then MR+ − LR+ ⊆
T fX .
Proof. T fX is monotone, hence it suffices to consider Y ∈ MR+ .
The condition X ∈ int dom(f ) guarantees X + Y ∈ dom(f ) as
in (4.14). From Corollary 4.10 we obtain limn∥Y1{Y≥n}∥R = 0,
hence X + Y1{Y≥n} ∈ int dom(f ) for all n large enough. The
desired tail continuity follows from the continuity of f |int dom(f ) (see
Remark 2.4(v)). □
While in Proposition 4.20 we gave a condition under which the
subgradient contains regular dual elements only, wewill now turn
to conditions guaranteeing the existence of at least one regular
element in the subgradient, namely by means of projection.
Proposition 4.22. Let X ∈ dom(ρR˜) and ℓ = µ⊕λ ∈ ∂ρR˜(X). Then
also µ ∈ ∂ρR˜(X) whenever µ satisfies
∫
X dµ ≥ ℓ(X). Similarly, if
X ∈ dom(η) and ℓ = µ ⊕ λ ∈ ∂η(X), then µ ∈ ∂η(X) whenever µ
satisfies
∫
X dµ ≥ ℓ(X). In particular, the assumption ∫ X dµ ≥ ℓ(X)
is met if X ∈ MR+ − LR+ .
Proof. By the same argument employed in (4.15) and the equality
ρR˜ = ξ , we obtain that η∗(µ) = ρ∗R˜(µ) = supU∈L∞P
∫
U dµ −
ρR(U) = ρ∗R(µ) holds for all µ ∈ CA. From this and ℓ|MR =
∫ · dµ
we infer ρ∗R˜(µ) ≤ ρ∗R˜(ℓ), and η∗(µ) ≤ η∗(ℓ). The assumption∫
X dµ ≥ ℓ(X) and ℓ ∈ ∂ρR˜(X) imply
ρR˜(X) ≥
∫
X dµ− ρ∗R˜(µ) ≥ ℓ(X)− ρ∗R˜(ℓ) = ρR˜(X).
The assertion for η follows in the same way. □
Remark 4.23. In the situation of Proposition 4.22, as
∫
X dµ −
ρ∗R˜(µ) = ℓ(X) − ρ∗R˜(ℓ), ρ∗R˜(µ) ≤ ρ∗R˜(ℓ), and
∫
X dµ ≥ ℓ(X), we
in fact obtain
∫
X dµ = ℓ(X) and ρ∗R˜(ℓ) = ρ∗R˜(µ). In other words,
singularities in the subgradient cannot be excluded, but they are
redundant for X .
The following proposition establishes a handy criterion for∫
X dµ ≥ ℓ(X).
Proposition 4.24. Suppose that f : LR → (−∞,∞] is monotone,
proper and convex, and that ℓ = µ⊕λ ∈ ∂ f (X). Then ∫ X dµ ≥ ℓ(X)
whenever sX+ ∈ T fX for some s > 0.
Proof. Suppose that λ(X+) =: δ > 0. By monotonicity one obtains
for all n ∈ N
δ = λ(X+) = λ(X+1{X+≥n}) ≤ ℓ(X+1{X+≥n}).
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Define Xn = X + sX+1{X+≥n} ≥ X , n ∈ N, where s > 0 is chosen
like in the assumption of the proposition. We estimate
ℓ(X)− f (X) = f ∗(ℓ) ≥ ℓ(Xn)− f (Xn)
= ℓ(X)+ sℓ(X+1{X+≥n})− f (Xn)
≥ ℓ(X)+ sδ − f (Xn).
Consequently, we arrive at the contradiction 0 = limn→∞f (Xn)−
f (X) ≥ sδ. Hence, λ(X+) = 0, and thus ∫ X dµ ≥ ℓ(X). □
Wenowhave the tools at hand to provide the proof of Theorem4.7.
Proof of Theorem 4.7. Note that condition (i) implies (ii), and
suppose that one of them holds. X ∈ Γ implies that ∂η(X) ̸= ∅
(Theorem4.17), and Propositions 4.22 and 4.24 in conjunctionwith
the second part of Lemma 4.18 do the rest.
Condition (iii) is equivalent to X+ ∈ MR by Corollary 4.10.
Hence Proposition 4.22 applies, and Lemma 4.18 yields the
assertion. □
5. Examples
Example 5.1. Consider (Ω,F) to be the natural numbers endowed
with their power set. Let ζ ∈ ca+ be defined by the discrete density
(2−ω)ω∈N and let ν ∈ ba+ be the purely finitely additive measure
on (Ω,F) arising from the Banach–Mazur limit (cf. Aliprantis and
Border, 1999, Definition 15.46); the reader should keep in mind
that ν(F ) = 0 for all finite sets F ⊆ N. Moreover, for λ ∈ [0, 1] we
set µλ = (1− λ)ζ + λν and define the closed acceptance set
A :=
{
X ∈ L∞
⏐⏐⏐∀λ ∈ [0, 1] : ∫ X dµλ ≤ λ} .
Clearly, B(A) \ ca ̸= ∅. Now let ∅ ̸= A ⊂ N be any finite subset,
S = {U(α, β) := α1A + β | α, β ∈ R}, p(U(α, β)) =
∫
U(α, β) dζ .
We first show that R := (A, S, p) is a risk measurement regime
and ρR is finite. To this end, note first that, for arbitrary X ∈ L∞,
X + U(α, β) ∈ A implies
0 ≥
∫
(X + U(α, β))dµ0 =
∫
X dζ + p(U(α, β)),
hence p(U(α, β)) ≤ − ∫ X dζ < ∞, and R is a risk measurement
regime. Moreover, for any k ∈ N we have that k − U(0, k) ∈ A,
which means that ρR(k) ≤ k. By monotonicity, ρR does not attain
the value+∞.
Next we prove that ρR is continuous from above even though
B(A) \ ca ̸= ∅. We proceed in three steps.
Step 1: σA(µλ) = λ. Indeed, let An := {n, n+ 1, . . .} and note that
µλ(An) = (1− λ)
∞∑
i=n
2−i + λ.
Hence Yn := 1An −
∑∞
i=n2
−i ∈ A, and
σA(µλ) ≥ lim
n→∞
∫
Yn dµλ = lim
n→∞−λ
∞∑
i=n
2−i + λ = λ.
The converse inequality σA(µλ) ≤ λ is due to the definition of A.
Step 2: B(A) = cone({ζ , ν}), where cone(E) refers to the smallest
convex and pointed cone containing E ⊆ ba and 0. The inclusion
B(A) ⊇ cone({ζ , ν}) is clear, for the other one note that B(A) =
cone(B(A)1) always holds, where B(A)1 := { 1µ(Ω)µ | 0 ̸= µ ∈
B(A)}. Assumewe can findµ ∈ B(A)1 \co({ζ , ν}), where co({ζ , ν})
denotes the convex hull of ζ and ν. As co({ζ , ν}) is σ (ba,L∞)-
compact and convex, bymeans of separationwe can find a Y ∈ L∞
such that
max
λ∈[0,1]
(∫
Y dµλ − λ
)
≤ max
λ∈[0,1]
∫
Y dµλ = 0 <
∫
Y dµ.
The same holds true when Y is replaced by tY , t > 0. Thus {tY |
t > 0} ⊆ A, and
σA(µ) ≥ sup
t>0
∫
tY dµ = ∞.
We conclude that B(A)1 = co({ζ , ν}) and thus B(A) =
cone({ζ , ν}).
Step 3: Ep ∩ B(A) = {ζ } and therefore ρR(X) =
∫
X dζ by
Proposition 3.1(i), which is continuous from above. Indeed, µ ∈
Ep ∩ B(A) only if µ ∈ B(A)1, therefore by Step 2 we can assume
µλ ∈ Ep ∩ B(A) for some λ ∈ [0, 1]. We reformulate the condition
as for all α, β ∈ R it has to hold
αζ (A)+ β = (1− λ)(αζ (A)+ β)+ λβ = (1− λ)αζ (A)+ β,
which is the case if and only if λ = 0.
Example 5.2 (ρR˜ ̸= η). Let (Ω,F,P) be the integers Z endowed
with their power set and a probabilitymeasure specified below. Let
Qk := 12k (δk + δ−k)+
(
1− 1
k
)
δ0, k ∈ N,
and define P :=∑k∈N2−kQk. It is straightforward to check that
A := {X ∈ L∞P | ∀k ∈ N : EQk [X] ≤ 0}, S = R, p = idR,
is a risk measurement regime on L∞P such that ρR(X) :=
supk∈NEQk [X], X ∈ L∞P , is a coherent monetary risk measure which
is continuous from above and sensitive with respect to the strong
reference model P. We consider X := idZ. We first observe that for
all k ∈ N it holds that EQk [|X |] = 1, which is sufficient for X ∈ LR.
Using the notational conventions of Theorem 4.5, for all n ∈ N
ρR˜(Xn) ≥ ρR(Xn2n ) ≥ EQn2 [Xn
2
n ] =
1
2
(
1− 1
n
)
.
Hence η(X) ≥ 12 . However, form ∈ N fixed, we obtain for all n > m
that
EQk [Xmn ] =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
0, if k ≤ m,
m
2k
− 1
2
, ifm < k ≤ n,
m− n
2k
, if k > n.
This implies
ρR˜(X
m) = ξ (Xm) = lim
n→∞ ρR(X
m
n ) = 0,
and therefore
ρR˜(X) = limm→∞ ρR˜(X
m) = 0 < 1
2
≤ η(X).
Example 5.3 (MR ⊊ HR ⊊ LR). Let (Ω,F) be the real numbers
endowed with their Borel sets B(R). Let P0 be the probability
measure P from Example 5.2 extended to B(R), and define P1 by
its Lebesgue density dP1 = e1−x1(1,∞)dx. Let P := 12 (P0 + P1), and
consider the risk measurement regime
A := {X ∈ L∞P | ∀k ∈ N : EQk [X] ≤ 0, and EP1 [eX ] ≤ 1},
S = R, p = idR,
where the probability measures (Qk)k∈N are chosen as in Exam-
ple 5.2 and extended to B(R). One can easily show that ρR(X) =
ρ0(X) ∨ ρ1(X), where
ρ0(V ) = sup
k∈N
EQk [V ], ρ1(U) = log
(
EP1 [eU ]
)
, U, V ∈ L∞P .
ρR is a sensitive finite risk measure on L∞P being continuous from
above, and P is a strong reference probability model.
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Consider first X ∈ L0P be generated by idZ. We have already
shown in Example 5.2 that ρ(t|X |) = ρ0(t|X |) = t for all t ≥ 0,
hence X ∈ HR. Nevertheless, it holds for all k ∈ N that
1 ≥ ρ(|X |1{|X |>k}) ≥ EQk+1 [|X |1{|X |>k}] = 1.
Hence limkρ(|X |1{|X |≥k}) = 1, which is sufficient for X ∈ HR \MR
by Corollary 4.10.
Let now λ > 0 and define Y ∈ L0P generated by
ω ↦→
⎧⎨⎩
1
λ
(ω − 1), ω ∈ (1,∞) \ Z,
0 otherwise.
Y is exponentially distributed under P1 with parameter λ. More-
over, Y ∈ LR and satisfies ρR˜(Y ) < ∞. However, for every t > λ,
ρ(t|Y |) = log(EP1 [etY ]) = ∞, hence Y ∈ CR.
Example 5.4 (Entropic Risk Measure). On a probability space
(Ω,F,P) consider for β > 0 fixed the entropic risk measure
ρR(X) := 1β log
(
EP[eβX ]
)
, X ∈ L∞P . One can easily show
LR = {X ∈ L0P | ∃k > 0 : ek|X | ∈ L1P},
ρR˜(X) =
1
β
log
(
EP[eβX ]
)
, X ∈ LR.
ρR˜ is tail continuous. Indeed, choose X ∈ dom(ρR˜) arbitrary and
Y ∈ LR such that X + Y+ ∈ dom(ρR˜), i.e. eβX+βY+ ∈ L1P. By
continuity of log and dominated convergence, we obtain
lim
r
ρR˜(X + Y1{Y≥r})
= lim
r
1
β
log
(
EP[eβ(X+Y+)1{Y≥r}] + EP[eβX1{Y<r}]
)
= ρR˜(X).
Example 5.5 (AVaR-based Risk Measures). Consider the Average
Value at Risk AVaRα for some α ∈ (0, 1] on L∞P , which is known
to have the minimal dual representation
AVaRα(X) = max
Q∈Qα
EQ[X], X ∈ L∞P ,
where
Qα :=
{
Q≪ P | dQ
dP
≤ 1
1− α
}
,
see Föllmer and Schied (2011, Theorem4.52). Given the acceptance
set A := {X ∈ L∞P | AVaRα(X) ≤ 0} we define the risk
measurement regimeR = (A, S, p) by S = R ·U for some U ∈ L∞P
with P(U > 0) = 1, and p(mU) := m,m ∈ R. By Farkas et al. (2013,
Proposition 4.4) and Proposition 3.1 the resulting risk measure ρR
is finite, continuous fromabovewith strong referencemodelP, and
LR = HR = MR. Hence, Theorem 4.7 applies for all X ∈ LR.
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Appendix A. Proofs of Proposition 3.1 and Corollary 3.2
Proof of Proposition 3.1. (i) Suppose ρR(0) is a real number and
letX = Y+N for some Y ∈ A and someN ∈ ker(p). ByS-additivity,
ρR(X) = ρR(Y ) ≤ 0 holds. ρR being l.s.c. implies ρR(X) ≤ 0 for
all X ∈ cl|·|∞ (A+ ker(p)). Again, S-additivity of ρR allows to infer
p(Z) = ρR(Z)− ρR(0) ≤ −ρR(0) for all Z ∈ cl|·|∞ (A+ ker(p))∩S ,
and p is bounded from above on the latter set. By virtue of Farkas
et al. (2015, Theorems 2 and 3), B(A) ∩ Ep ̸= ∅ and
ρR(X) = sup
µ∈B(A)∩Ep
∫
X dµ− σA(µ), X ∈ L∞,
fromwhich the claimed eqs. (3.3) and (3.4) are derived easily. If ρR
is coherent, its positive homogeneity implies that ρ∗R|dom(ρ∗R) ≡ 0.
As furthermore dom(ρ∗R) = B(A) ∩ Ep, (3.5) and (3.6) are special
cases of (3.3) and (3.4).
(ii) ρ∗R is by definition a σ (ba,L∞)-l.s.c. function, hence its lower
level sets are closed in this topology. Let c ∈ R and supposeµ ∈ Ec ,
thus a fortiori µ ∈ ba+. (3.4) implies
∀µ ∈ Ec : µ(Ω) ≤ ρ∗R(µ)+ ρR(1) ≤ c + ρR(1) <∞.
Thus being a closed subset of a dilation of the closed unit ball of ba,
Ec is weakly* compact by virtue of the Banach–Alaoglu Theorem
Aliprantis and Border (1999, Theorem 6.25).
(iii) Assume first a riskmeasureρR associated to the acceptance set
A is finite and continuous from above. ρR is in particular norm-
continuous by Remark 2.4(v) and statements (i) and (ii) apply.
Continuity from above implies ρR(k1An ) ↓ ρR(0) for all k > 0
whenever (An)n∈N ⊆ F is a sequence of events decreasing to ∅. For
µ ∈ dom(ρ∗R),
− ρR(0) ≤ sup
k>0
k lim
n→∞µ(An)− ρR(0)
= sup
k>0
lim
n→∞ kµ(An)− ρR(k1An ) ≤ ρ
∗
R(µ) <∞.
This can only hold if limnµ(An) = 0, i.e. µ ∈ ca+. By (ii), this
is equivalent to all level sets Ec of ρ∗R, c ∈ R, being σ (ca,L∞)-
compact.
For the converse, assume that dom(ρ∗R) ⊆ ca+. Let (Xn)n∈N
be any sequence in L∞ such that Xn ↓ X for some X ∈ L∞.
Let Y ∈ {X, X1, X2, . . .} and suppose that µ ∈ dom(ρ∗R) satisfies
ρR(Y )− 1 ≤
∫
Y dµ− ρ∗R(µ).We can thus use the monotonicity
of ρR and the positivity of µ to estimate
ρ∗R(µ) ≤
∫
Y dµ− ρR(Y )+ 1 ≤
∫
X1dµ− ρR(X)+ 1
≤ 1
2
ρR(2X1)+ 12ρ
∗
R(µ)− ρR(X)+ 1.
Rearranging this inequality yields that
ρ∗R(µ) ≤ 2+ ρR(2X1)− 2ρR(X) =: c,
a bound which is independent of Y . Therefore, for all Y ∈
{X, X1, X2, . . .} it holds that
ρR(Y ) = sup
µ∈Ec
∫
Y dµ− ρ∗R(µ) = max
µ∈Ec
∫
Y dµ− ρ∗R(µ),
where in the last equality we used the σ (ca,L∞)-continuity of
µ ↦→ ∫ Y dµ − ρ∗R(µ) and the compactness of Ec . For each n ∈ N
choose µn ∈ Ec such that
ρR(Xn) =
∫
Xn dµn − ρ∗R(µn).
Note that Ec is σ (ca, ca∗)-compact by virtue of Bogachev (2007,
Theorem 4.7.25). The Eberlein–Smulian Theorem (see e.g. Alipran-
tis and Border, 1999, Theorem 6.38) now implies that we may
select a σ (ca, ca∗)-convergent subsequence (µnk )k∈N with limit
µ¯ ∈ Ec . Choose a measure ν, for instance
ν := µ¯+
∑
k∈N
1
2k
µnk ,
such that for all µ ∈ K := {µ¯, µn1 , µn2 , . . .} we have µ ≪ ν. As
ν(A) ≤ ε implies µ(A) ≤ ε for all A ∈ F and the set of Radon–
Nikodym derivatives { dµdν | µ ∈ K} is ∥ · ∥L1ν -bounded as a subset of
L1(ν), we conclude that they form a ν-uniformly integrable family
by Bogachev (2007, Proposition 4.5.3). Abbreviating Zk := dµnkdν , we
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obtain for all constants L > 0
lim sup
k→∞
⏐⏐⏐⏐∫ X dµ¯− ∫ Xnk dµnk ⏐⏐⏐⏐
≤ lim sup
k→∞
⏐⏐⏐⏐∫ X dµ¯− ∫ X dµnk ⏐⏐⏐⏐+ ⏐⏐⏐⏐∫ (X − Xnk ) dµnk ⏐⏐⏐⏐
≤ lim sup
k→∞
∫
{Zk≥L}
|X1 − X |Zk dν +
∫
{Zk<L}
|Xnk − X |L dν
= lim sup
k→∞
∫
{Zk≥L}
|X1 − X |Zk dν = 0,
where we applied monotone convergence for the second but last
equality and where the last equality follows from the uniform ν-
integrability of the densities Zk and the fact that |X1−X | is bounded
by a constant. Hence limk
∫
Xnk dµnk =
∫
X dµ¯, and from lower
semicontinuity of ρ∗R, we arrive at
lim
k→∞
ρR(Xnk ) = lim sup
k→∞
∫
Xnk dµnk − ρ∗R(µnk )
≤
∫
X dµ¯− ρ∗R(µ¯) ≤ ρR(X).
ρR(X) ≤ infn∈NρR(Xn) = limk→∞ρR(Xnk ) holds a priori, however.
We infer ρR(X) = limnρR(Xn).
SupposeB(A) ⊆ ca+. By (3.3) and statement (ii), the lower level
sets of the dual conjugate of any finite risk measure ρR associated
to A are σ (ca,L∞)-compact, and continuity from above follows
from the equivalence proved just before.
(iv) Suppose that the risk measurement regime R = (A, S, p) is
such that S = R · U for some U ∈ L∞++ and such that the resulting
risk measure is finite. Assume for contradiction the existence of a
0 ̸= µ ∈ B(A) such that ∫ U dµ = 0. Recall that µ is necessarily
positive, and let k > σA(µ)
µ(Ω) . For any r ∈ R∫
(k− rU)dµ = kµ(Ω) > σA(µ),
which would imply that k − rU ̸∈ A for any r ∈ R, and thus
ρR(k) = ∞ in contradiction to the finiteness of ρR. As hence∫
U dµ > 0 has to hold for all 0 ̸= µ ∈ B(A), we can identify with
(3.3)
dom(ρ∗R) = Ep ∩ B(A) =
{
p(U)∫
U dµ
µ
⏐⏐⏐0 ̸= µ ∈ B(A)} ,
and by (3.4),
ρR(X) = sup
0̸=µ
p(U)∫
U dµ
(∫
X dµ− σA(µ)
)
, X ∈ L∞,
is theminimal dual representation of ρR. From this representation
and (iii), we infer that ρR is continuous from above if and only if
B(A) ⊆ ca. □
Proof of Corollary 3.2. As ρR(X) ≤ 0 for all X ∈ A + ker(p),
finiteness and S-additivity of ρR together with Farkas et al. (2015,
Remark 6) show that A + ker(p) is proper and thus an acceptance
set. Fix U ∈ S ∩ L∞++ and recall from Farkas et al. (2015, Lemma 3)
the identity
ρR(X) = inf{p(rU) | r ∈ R, X − rU ∈ A+ ker(p)}, X ∈ L∞.
A fortiori, R′ := (A + ker(p),R · U, p|R·U ) is a risk measurement
regime and the associated risk measure ρR′ is continuous from
above if and only if ρR is continuous from above. As the identity
B(A + ker(p)) = B(A) ∩ ker(p)⊥ is easily verified, the claimed
equivalence follows from Proposition 3.1(iv). □
Appendix B. Proof of Theorem 3.10
The proof heavily relies on the following result.
Lemma B.1 (Grothendieck; see Exercise 1, Chapter 5, part 4
of Grothendieck, 1973). A convex subset C of L∞P is closed in the
σ (L∞P , caP)-topology if and only if for arbitrary r > 0 the set Cr :={X ∈ C | ∥X∥∞ ≤ r} is closed with respect to convergence in
probability, i.e. with respect to the metric
dP(X, Y ) := EP[|X − Y | ∧ 1].
(i) For a set Γ ⊆ L∞P we define Γ ⋄ := {µ ∈ caP | ∀X ∈
Γ : ∫ X dµ ≤ 1}, the one-sided polar of Γ . Moreover, Γ ⋄ =
(clσ (L∞P ,caP)(Γ ))
⋄. Having this information at hand, one can easily
identify9
{cµ | c ≥ 0, µ ∈ E0} =
(⋃
{tA+ ker(p) | t ≥ 0}
)⋄ = C⋄.
From the Bipolar Theorem Aliprantis and Border (1999, Theo-
rem 5.91) we deduce
C = {X ∈ L∞P | ∀µ ∈ E0 :
∫
X dµ ≤ 0}.
Hence C is an acceptance set. Consider the following risk measure-
ment regime and its implied risk measure:
Rˇ := (C, S, p) , ρRˇ(X) = sup
µ∈E0
∫
X dµ, X ∈ L∞P .
ρRˇ is finite, coherent, and continuous from above by Lemma 3.6.
Hence, by Lemma 3.8, P ̸= ∅ is equivalent to ρRˇ being sensitive,
i.e. C does not contain any element in (L∞P )++.
(ii) Suppose that C∩ (L∞P )++ is non-empty. Using themonotonicity
and conicity of C, we can find some B ∈ F+ such that 1B ∈ C. Let us
define the sets
D := {Y = dP- lim
n
tnWn | tn ≥ 0,Wn ∈ A+ ker(p)},
Dr = {Y ∈ D | ∥Y∥∞ ≤ r}, r > 0.
D is a convex cone. It is straightforward to check that Dr is dP-
closed. We apply Grothendieck’s Lemma B.1 to infer that D is a
σ (L∞P , caP)-closed cone. Thus the inclusion C ⊆ D holds and we
must be able to find sequences (Xn)n∈N ⊆ A, (Zn)n∈N ⊆ ker(p)
and (tn)n∈N ⊆ (0,∞) such that 1B = dP-limntn(Xn + Zn). Define
Vn := tn(Xn + Zn), n ∈ N. Without loss of generality we can
assume that ∥Xn+Zn∥∞ ≤ 1. Otherwise, note that by normalisation
0 ∈ A := cl∥·∥∞ (A+ ker(p)), and C is also the smallest σ (L∞P , caP)-
closed cone that contains A; thus we can shift to
Xn + Zn
∥Xn + Zn∥∞ ∈ A, t˜n = ∥Xn + Zn∥∞tn.
As A is convex, (tn)n∈N cannot be bounded. If there is someM > 0
such that supn∈Ntn ≤ M , we can define the sequence (tn(Xn +
Zn)/2M)n ⊆ A which converges in probability and with respect
to σ (L∞P , caP) to 1B/2M ∈ A. As A = {Y | ρR(Y ) ≤ 0}, we would
9 The only difficult part is the following: Recall fromRemark 2.4(iv) thatρR(Y ) ≤
0 if and only if Y ∈ cl∥·∥∞ (A + ker(p)). Assume ν ∈ C⋄ , then ν ∈ (caP)+ by
normalisation and monotonicity ofA. Also, C being a cone shows
C⋄ = {ν ∈ caP | ∀Y ∈ C :
∫
Y dν ≤ 0}.
Let U ∈ S ∩ (L∞P )++ and X ∈ L∞P . Since ρR(X − ρR(X)p(U) U) = 0, we obtain that either
c := ∫ 1
p(U)U dν = 0, which implies ν(Ω) = 0 and ν = 0, or
c sup
X∈L∞P
(∫
X d
( ν
c
)
− ρR(X)
)
≤ 0 H⇒ ν
c
∈ E0.
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obtain a contradiction to the sensitivity of ρR and can therefore
assume tn ↑ ∞. dP(Vn, 1B)→ 0 for n→∞ implies
V−n
dP−→ 0, V+n dP−→ 1B, n→∞,
and this means that
lim sup
n→∞
P
({
V+n ≥
1
2
}
∩ B
)
= P(B).
The rule of equal speed of convergence is violated.
(iii) Let (Xn)n∈N ⊆ A, (Zn)n∈N ⊆ ker(p) and (tn)n∈N be sequences
violating the rule of equal speed of convergence such that the
rescaled sequence (Vn)n∈N is bounded in the ∥ · ∥∞-norm. Let B be
a measurable set with positive probability such that
lim sup
n→∞
P({Vn ≥ ε} ∩ B) = P(B).
Let µ ≈ P be a finite measure with ∫ Z dµ = p(Z) for all
Z ∈ S , and let η > 0 be an arbitrary positive number. Note
that due to the Dominated Convergence Theorem and the bounded
vanishing in probability of V−n , we obtain for n → ∞ the behav-
ior limn
∫
Vn1{Vn≤−η} dµ → 0. For all n large enough such that|∫ Vn1{Vn≤−η} dµ| < η we can estimate∫
Vn dµ ≥ εµ({Vn ≥ ε} ∩ B)− ηµ(Vn ∈ (−η, ε))− η.
Thus for all η > 0 our assumption yields the estimate
lim sup
n→∞
∫
Vn dµ ≥ εµ(B)− η(µ(Ω)+ 1).
Sending η ↓ 0, we obtain from µ ≈ P that lim supn→∞
∫
Vn dµ ≥
εµ(B) > 0. After choosing n suitably we have found a vector in
A+ ker(p) such that ∫ (Xn + Zn) dµ > 0, hence µ ̸∈ E0.
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21. Introduction
In this paper we consider the risk sharing problem for capital requirements. Optimal cap-
ital and risk allocation among economic agents, or business units, has for decades been a
predominant subject in the respective academic and industrial research areas. Measuring
financial risks with capital requirements goes back to the seminal paper by Artzner et al. [6].
There, risk measures are by definition capital requirements determined by two primitives:
the acceptance set and the security market.
The acceptance set, a subset of an ambient space of losses, corresponds to a capital adequacy
test. A loss is deemed adequately capitalised if it belongs to the acceptance set, and inad-
equately capitalised otherwise. If a loss does not pass the capital adequacy test, the agent
has to take prespecified remedial actions: she can raise capital in order to buy a portfolio
of securities in the security market which, when combined with the loss profile in question,
results in an adequately capitalised secured loss.
Suppose the security market only consists of one nume´raire asset, liquidly traded at arbi-
trary quantities. After discounting, one obtains a so-called monetary risk measure, which is
characterised by satisfying the cash-additivity property, that is ρ(X + a) = ρ(X) + a. Here,
ρ denotes the monetary risk measure, X is a loss, and a ∈ R is a capital amount which is
added to or withdrawn from the loss. Monetary risk measures have been widely studied,
see Fo¨llmer & Schied [27, Chap. 4] and the references therein. As observed in Farkas et
al. [22, 23, 24] and Munari [35, Chap. 1], there are good reasons for revisiting the original
approach to risk measures of Artzner et al. [6]:
(1) Typically, more than one asset is available in the security market. It is also less costly
for the agent to invest in a portfolio of securities designed to secure a specific loss
rather than restricting the remedial action to investing in a single asset independent
of the loss profile.
(2) Even if securitisation is constrained to buying a single asset, discounting with this
asset may be impossible because it is not a nume´raire; cf. Farkas et al. [23]. Also, as
risk is measured after discounting, the discounting procedure is implicitly assumed not
to add additional risk, which is questionable in view of risk factors such as uncertain
future interest rates. For a thorough discussion of this issue see El Karoui & Ravenelli
[21]. Often, risk is determined purely in terms of the distribution of a risky position,
a paradigm we discuss in detail below. Therefore, instability of this crucial law-
invariance property of a risk measure under discounting is another objection. If
the security is not riskless (i.e., is an amount of cash added or withdrawn), losses
which originally were identically distributed may not share the same distribution any
longer after discounting, while losses that originally display different laws may become
identically distributed.
(3) Without discounting, if only a single asset is available in the security market, cash-
additivity requires the security to be riskless, and it is questionable whether such a
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security is realistically available, at least for longer time horizons. This is a particu-
larly nagging issue in the insurance context.
In this paper we will follow the original ideas in [6] and study the risk sharing problem for
risk measures induced by acceptance sets and possibly multidimensional security spaces. We
consider a one-period market populated by a finite number n ≥ 2 of agents who seek to
secure losses occurring at a fixed future date, say tomorrow. We attribute to each agent
i ∈ {1, . . . , n} an ordered vector space Xi of losses net of gains she may incur, an acceptance
set Ai ⊆ Xi as capital adequacy test, and a security market consisting of a subspace Si ⊆ Xi
of security portfolios as well as observable prices of these securities given by a linear functional
pi : Si → R. As the securities in Si are deemed suited for hedging, the linearity assumptions
on Si and pi reflect that they are liquidly traded and their bid-ask spread is zero. The risk
attitudes of agent i are fully captured by the resulting risk measure
ρi(X) := inf{pi(Z) : Z ∈ Si, X − Z ∈ Ai}, X ∈ Xi, (1.1)
that is the minimal capital required to secure X with securities in Si.
The problem we consider is how to reduce the aggregated risk in the system by means of
redistribution. Formally, we assume that each individual space Xi of losses net of gains is
a subspace of a larger ambient ordered vector space X . This space models the losses the
system in total incurs if X = ∑ni=1Xi, which we shall assume a priori. Given such a market
loss X ∈ X , we need to solve the optimisation problem
n∑
i=1
ρi(Xi)→ min subject to Xi ∈ Xi and X1 + · · ·+Xn = X. (1.2)
A vector X = (X1, . . . , Xn), a so-called allocation of X, which solves the optimisation prob-
lem and yields a finite optimal value is Pareto-optimal. However, this resembles centralised
redistribution which attributes to each agent a certain portion of the aggregate loss in an
overall optimal way without considering individual well-being. Redistribution by agents trad-
ing portions of losses at a certain price while adhering to individual rationality constraints
leads to the notion of equilibrium allocations and equilibrium prices, a variant of the risk
sharing problem above.
Special instances of this general problem have been extensively studied in the literature.
Borch [10], Arrow [5] and Wilson [44] consider the problem for expected utilities. More
recent are studies for convex monetary risk measures, starting with Barrieu & El Karoui [8]
and Filipovic´ & Kupper [25]. A key assumption which allows to prove existence of optimal
risk sharing for convex monetary risk measures is law-invariance, i.e., the measured risk is
the same for all losses which share the same distribution under a benchmark probability
model, see Jouini et al. [31], Filipovic´ & Svindland [26], Acciaio [1], and Acciaio & Svindland
[2]. For a thorough discussion of the existing literature on risk sharing with monetary risk
measures we refer to Embrechts et al. [19].
Another related line of literature is General Equilibrium Theory in economics. For a survey
we refer to Mas Colell & Zame [34] and Aliprantis & Burkinshaw [4, Chap. 8]. A major
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difference though is that the agents we consider have risk preferences over a vector space
of losses net of gains, whereas [34] considers agents with preferences over consumption sets
which are bounded from below. Hence, our methods to tackle the problem are very different
from the classical ones presented in [34]. More closely related are the contributions of Dana
& Le Van [15] and Dana et al. [16], even though they consider different classes of preferences.
In [16] consumption sets are unbounded from below like in our work, however the authors
assume a finite-dimensional economy. Dana & Le Van [15] allow an infinite dimensional
economy, but assume the consumption sets to be bounded from below. As the unbounded
infinite-dimensional case is the most relevant in finance and insurance applications, we do
not ask for any of those restrictions.
In the following we summarise our main contributions.
Representative agent formulation. We prove a representative agent formulation of the
risk sharing problem: the behaviour of the interacting agents in the market is, under mild
assumptions, captured by a market capital requirement of type (1.1), namely
Λ(X) = inf{pi(Z) : Z ∈M, X − Z ∈ A+},
where Λ(X) is the infimal level of aggregated risk realised by a redistribution of X as in (1.2),
A+ is a market acceptance set, and (M, pi) is a global security market. This allows deriving
useful conditions ensuring the existence of optimal risk allocations.
Existence of optimal risk allocations in two case studies. Based on the representa-
tive agent formulation, we study two prominent cases, mostly characterised by the involved
notions of acceptability, for which we prove that the risk sharing problem (1.2), including
the quest for equilibria, admits solutions. In the first instance, individual losses are — in
the widest sense — contingent on scenarios of the future state of the economy. A loss is
deemed acceptable if certain capital thresholds are not exceeded under a fixed finite set of
linear aggregation rules which may vary from agent to agent. The reader may think of a
combination of finitely many valuation and stress test rules as studied in Carr et al. [11], see
also [27, Sect. 4.8]. The resulting acceptance sets will thus be polyhedral.
In the second class of acceptance sets under consideration, whether or not a given loss is
deemed adequately capitalised only depends on its distributional properties under a fixed
reference probability measure, not on scenariowise considerations: acceptability is a sta-
tistical notion. More precisely, losses are modelled as random variables on a probability
space (Ω,F ,P), and the respective individual acceptance sets Ai, i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, will be
law-invariant : whether or not a loss X belongs to Ai only depends on its distribution under
the probabilistic reference model P. However, we will not assume that the security spaces
Si are law-invariant. Hence, securitisation depends on the potentially varying joint distribu-
tion of the loss and the security and is thus statewise rather than distributional. This both
reflects the practitioner’s reality and is mathematically interesting as the resulting capital
requirements ρi are far from law-invariant. In fact, for non-trivial law-invariant Ai, ρi is law-
invariant only if the security space is trivial in the sense of being spanned by the cash asset,
i.e., Si = R. For such risk measures, the risk sharing problem has been solved, cf. [26, 31].
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We utilise these results, but should like to emphasise that reducing the general problem for
non-trivial Si to the law-invariant cash-additive case is impossible.
Robustness of optimal allocations. As a third contribution, we carefully study continuity
properties of the set-valued map assigning to an aggregated loss its optimal risk allocations in
the mentioned polyhedral and law-invariant acceptability frameworks. These reflect different
types of robustness under misspecification of the input. If the map is upper hemicontinuous,
approximating a complex loss with simpler losses and calculating optimal risk allocations
for these will yield an optimal risk allocation for the complex loss as a limit point. It is
therefore a useful property from a numerical point of view. Lower hemicontinuity, on the
other hand, guarantees that any given optimal risk allocation stays close to optimal under a
slight perturbation of the underlying aggregated loss.
Existence of optimal portfolio splits. At last, we study optimal splitting problems in
the spirit of Tsanakas [42] and Wang [43]. The question here is whether, under the presence
of market frictions such as transaction costs, a financial institution can split an aggregated
loss optimally by introducing subsidiaries subject to potentially varying regulatory regimes
having access to potentially varying security markets. Applying our previous results, we will
show that this problem admits solutions in our framework.
Structure of the paper. In Sect. 2 we rigorously introduce risk measurement in terms of
capital requirements, agent systems, optimal allocations, and equilibria. Sect. 3 presents the
representative agent formulation of the risk sharing problem and proves useful meta results.
These are key to the discussion of risk sharing involving polyhedral acceptance sets in Sect. 4
and law-invariant acceptance sets in Sect. 5, as well as optimal portfolio splits in Sect. 6.
For the convenience of the reader and better accessibility, Sects. 3–5 first present their main
results and the discussion thereof. Ancillary results and the proofs of the main results follow
in a separate subsection. Technical supplements are relegated to the appendix.
2. Agent systems and optimal allocations
2.1. Risk measurement regimes. In a first step of modelling, we assume that the attitude
of individual agents towards risk is given by a risk measurement regime and corresponding
risk measure.
Definition 2.1. Let (X ,) be an ordered vector space, X+ be its positive cone, i.e., X+ :=
{X ∈ X : 0  X}, and X++ := X+\{0}.
• An acceptance set is a nonempty proper and convex subset A of X which is monotone,
i.e. A−X+ ⊆ A.1
• A security market is a pair (S, p) consisting of a finite-dimensional linear subspace
S ⊆ X and a positive linear functional p : S → R such that there is U ∈ S∩X++ with
1 Here and in the following, given subsets A and B of a vector space X , A + B denotes their Minkowski
sum {a+ b : a ∈ A, b ∈ B}, and A−B := A+ (−B).
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p(U) = 1. The elements Z ∈ S are called security portfolios or simply securities, and
S is the security space, whereas p is called pricing functional.
• A triple R := (A,S, p) is a risk measurement regime if A is an acceptance set and
(S, p) is a security market such that the following no-arbitrage condition holds:
∀X ∈ X : sup{p(Z) : Z ∈ S, X + Z ∈ A} <∞. (2.1)
• The risk measure associated to a risk measurement regime R is the functional
ρR : X → (−∞,∞], X 7→ inf {p(Z) : Z ∈ S, X − Z ∈ A} . (2.2)
Risk measure ρR is normalised if ρR(0) = 0, or equivalently supZ∈A∩S p(Z) = 0. It is lower
semicontinuous (l.s.c.) with respect to some vector space topology τ on X provided every
lower level set {X ∈ X : ρR(X) ≤ c}, c ∈ R, is τ -closed.
Immediate consequences of the definition of ρR are the following properties:
• ρR is a proper function2 by (2.1) and ρR(Y ) ≤ 0 for any choice of Y ∈ A. Moreover,
it is convex, i.e., ρR(λX + (1− λ)Y ) ≤ λρR(X) + (1− λ)ρR(Y ) holds for all choices
of λ ∈ [0, 1] and X,Y ∈ X ;
• -monotonicity, i.e., X  Y implies ρR(X) ≤ ρR(Y );
• S-additivity, i.e., ρR(X + Z) = ρR(X) + p(Z) for all X ∈ X and all Z ∈ S.
Note that risk measures as in (2.2) evaluate the risk of losses net of gains X ∈ X . The
positive cone X+ corresponds to pure losses. Therefore, ρR is nondecreasing with respect to
, not nonincreasing as in most of the literature on risk measures where the risk of gains net
of losses is measured. The appropriate generalisation of convex risk measures in the usual
monotonicity would therefore be the functional ρ˜ defined by ρ˜(X) = ρR(−X), X ∈ X . In
the same vein, the functional U defined by U(X) = −ρR(−X), X ∈ X , generalises monetary
utility functions; cf. Delbaen [18].
In the security market, however, we consider the usual monotonicity, i.e., a security Z∗ ∈ S is
better than Z ∈ S if Z  Z∗. This also explains positivity of the pricing functional p : S → R.
Combining these two viewpoints, the impact of a security Z ∈ S on a loss profile X ∈ S is
given by X − Z, and ρR(X) is the infimal price that has to be paid for a security Z in the
security market with loss profile −Z in order to reduce the risk of X to an acceptable level.
The no-arbitrage condition (2.1) means that one cannot short arbitrarily valuable securities
and stay acceptable.
There is a close connection between capital requirements defined by (2.2) and superhedging.
Given a risk measurement regime R = (A,S, p) on an ordered vector space (X ,), let
ker(p) := {N ∈ S : p(N) = 0} denote the kernel of the pricing functional, i.e. the set of fully
leveraged security portfolios available at zero cost. Moreover, fix an arbitrary U ∈ S ∩ X+
whose price is given by p(U) = 1. Each Z ∈ S can be written as Z = p(Z)U + (Z − p(Z)U),
and Z − p(Z)U ∈ ker(p). Hence, X ∈ X and Z ∈ S satisfy X − Z ∈ A if and only if for
2 Given a nonempty set M , a function f : M → [−∞,∞] is proper if f−1({−∞}) = ∅ and f 6≡ ∞.
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r := p(Z) ∈ R we can find N ∈ ker(p) such that
rU +N + (−X) ∈ −A.
The risk ρR(X) may thus be expressed as
ρR(X) = inf{p(Z) : Z ∈ S, X − Z ∈ A}
= inf{r ∈ R : ∃N ∈ ker(p) such that N + rU + (−X) ∈ −A)},
The set −A is the set of acceptable gains net of losses, and −X is the payoff associated
to the loss profile X. The elements in ker(p) are zero cost investment opportunities. If we
conservatively choose the acceptance set A = −X+,
ρR(X) = inf{r ∈ R : ∃N ∈ ker(p) s.t. N + rU + (−X)  0},
that is we recover by ρR(X) the superhedging price of the payoff −X. A general risk mea-
surement regime thus leads to a superhedging functional involving the relaxed notion of
superhedging N + rU + (−X) ∈ −A. In the terminology of superhedging theory, ρR(X) is
the infimal amount of cash that needs to be invested in the security U such that X can be
superhedged when combined with a suitable zero cost trade in the (security) market. Such
relaxed superhedging functionals have been recently studied by, e.g., Cheridito et al. [13].
The separation between U and ker(p) introduced above will be useful throughout the paper.
Let us give a classical example for a risk measurement regime:
Example 2.2. Consider risky future monetary losses net of gains modelled by (equivalence
classes) of integrable random variables on an atomless probability space (Ω,F ,P). In other
words, X := L1 := L1(Ω,F ,P). A classical capital adequacy test is given by the Average
Value at Risk at some level β ∈ (0, 1); that is, X ∈ L1 belongs to the acceptance set A and
thus passes the capital adequacy test if and only if
sup
Q∈Q
E[QX] ≤ 0,
where Q is the set of all densities Q ∈ L∞+ such that E[Q] = 1 and Q ≤ 11−β P-almost surely.
For the sake of simplicity we will assume that interest rates are trivial. The security market
may consist of a defaultable bond, i.e. 1A for some A ∈ F with 0 < P(A) < 1, a finite number
of assets X and a finite number of call and put options on these assets. For the latter, we
assume for each X ∈ X a set of strike prices KX to be given, and each of the calls (X − k)+,
and puts (k −X)−, k ∈ KX , lies in S. Suppose now that Q∗ ∈ L∞+ satisfies
0 < δ ≤ Q∗ ≤ 1−δ1−β + δ
for some δ ∈ (0, 1) and E[Q∗] = 1. We will then see in Sect. 5 that if securities in S are priced
by p(Z) = E[Q∗Z], then (A,S, p) is a risk measurement regime.
We also refer to [24] for more examples of risk measurement regimes in our sense.
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2.2. Agent systems. In order to introduce the risk sharing problem in precise terms, a
notion of the interplay of the individual agents and their respective capital requirements is
required; for terminology concerning ordered vector spaces, we refer to [3, Chaps. 8–9]. We
consider an abstract one-period market which incurs aggregated losses net of gains modelled
by a Riesz space (X ,). The market comprises n ≥ 2 agents, and throughout the paper we
identify each individual agent with a natural number i in the set {1, . . . , n}, which we shall
denote by [n] for the sake of brevity. The agents might have rather heterogeneous assessments
of risks. This is firstly reflected by the assumption that each agent operates on an (order)
ideal3 Xi ⊆ X , i ∈ [n], which may be a proper subset of X . Without loss of generality we
shall impose X = X1 + · · · + Xn. Within each ideal, and thus for each agent, adequately
capitalised losses are encoded by an acceptance set Ai ⊆ Xi. Agent i ∈ [n] is allowed to
secure losses she may incur with securities from a security market (Si, pi), where Si ( Xi.
We shall impose that each Ri := (Ai,Si, pi) is a risk measurement regime on (Xi, |Xi×Xi),
i ∈ [n]. In sum, the individual risk assessments are fully captured by the n-tuple of risk
measurement regimes (R1, . . . ,Rn).
Definition 2.3. An n-tuple (R1, . . . ,Rn), where, for each i ∈ [n], Ri is a risk measurement
regime on Xi, is called an agent system if
(?) For all i, j ∈ [n], the pricing functionals pi and pj agree on Si ∩ Sj . Moreover, if we
set i ∼ j if i 6= j and pi is non-trivial on Si ∩ Sj , the resulting graph
G = ([n], {{i, j} ⊆ [n] : i ∼ j})
is connected.4
Axiom (?) clarifies the nature of the interaction of the involved agents: prices for securities
accepted by more than one agent have to agree, and any two agents may interact and exchange
securities by potentially invoking other agents as intermediaries. Throughout this paper we
will assume that the agents [n] form an agent system. Such a situation is not too far-fetched:
Definition 2.4. The space of jointly accepted securities is Sˇ := ⋂ni=1 Si. The global security
space is M := S1 + · · ·+ Sn.
If, besides agreement of prices, Sˇ 6= {0} and pi|Sˇ 6= 0 for some and thus all i ∈ [n], then
assumption (?) is met. The resulting graph is the complete graph on n vertices. Moreover,
if all agents operate on one and the same space Xi = X , i ∈ [n], and the available security
markets are identical and given by Si = R · U , i ∈ [n], for some U ∈ X++ and pi(rU) = r,
r ∈ R, (R1, . . . ,Rn) is an agent system. If we further specify X to be a sufficiently rich space
of random variables and U = 1 is the constant random variable with value 1, the results for
3 An ideal Y of a Riesz space (X ,) is a subspace in which the inclusion {Z ∈ X : |Z|  |Y |} ⊆ Y holds
for all Y ∈ Y.
4 That is, between any two vertices i, j ∈ [n], i 6= j, we can find a connecting path over edges of the graph,
meaning that either i ∼ j or we can find i1, . . . , im ∈ [n] for a suitable m ∈ N such that i ∼ i1, i1 ∼ i2, . . . ,
im−1 ∼ im, and im ∼ j. This will for instance be needed in the proof of Proposition 3.6.
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risk sharing with convex monetary risk measures can be embedded in our setting of agent
systems; cf. [1, 2, 26, 31].
In the following we write ρi instead of ρRi for the sake of brevity. Aggregated losses in X
will be denoted by X, Y or W , securities by Z, U or N throughout the paper.
2.3. The risk sharing problem and its solutions. In order to introduce the risk sharing
associated to an agent system (R1, . . . ,Rn), we need the notion of attainable and security
allocations:
Definition 2.5. A vector X = (X1, . . . , Xn) ∈
∏n
i=1Xi is an attainable allocation of an
aggregated loss W ∈ X if W = X1 + · · ·+Xn. We denote the set of all attainable allocations
of W by AW .
Given a global security Z ∈M, we denote by AsZ := AZ∩
∏n
i=1 Si the set of security allocations
of Z.
Given a set S 6= ∅ and a function f : S → [−∞,∞], we set
dom(f) := {s ∈ S : f(s) <∞}
to be the effective domain of f . We will also abbreviate its lower level sets by Lc(f) := {s ∈
S : f(s) ≤ c}, c ∈ R.
We are now prepared to introduce the risk sharing problem. Its objective is to minimise the
aggregated risk within the system. The allowed remedial action is reallocating an aggregated
loss W ∈ X among the agents involved; so we study
n∑
i=1
ρi(Xi)→ min subject to X ∈ AW . (2.3)
The optimal value in (2.3) is less than +∞ if and only if W ∈∑ni=1 dom(ρi). It is furthermore
well known that (2.3) is closely related to certain notions of economically optimal allocations
which we define in the following.
Definition 2.6. Let (R1, . . . ,Rn) be an agent system on an ordered vector space (X ,), let
W ∈ X be an aggregated loss, and let W ∈∏ni=1Xi be a vector of initial loss endowments.
(1) An attainable allocation X ∈ AW is Pareto-optimal if ρi(Xi) < ∞, i ∈ [n], and for any
Y ∈ AW with the property ρi(Yi) ≤ ρi(Xi), i ∈ [n], in fact ρi(Xi) = ρi(Yi) has to hold
for all i ∈ [n].
(2) Suppose (X ,, τ) is a topological Riesz space, i.e. X carries a vector space topology τ . A
tuple (X, φ) is an equilibrium of W if
• X ∈ AW1+···+Wn ,
• φ ∈ X ∗ is positive with φ|Si = pi, i ∈ [n],
• the budget constraints φ(−Xi) ≤ φ(−Wi), i ∈ [n], hold,5
• and ρi(Xi) = inf{ρi(Y ) : Y ∈ Xi, φ(−Y ) ≤ φ(−Wi)} for all i ∈ [n].
5 Note that the minus sign in the budget constraints is due to the fact that the elements in Xi model losses,
whereas φ prices payoffs.
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In that case, X is called equilibrium allocation and φ equilibrium price.
Now that all pieces are in place, we close this section by commenting on the static nature
of the model introduced here. Indeed, we study risk sharing in a generalised one-period
framework. The very general notion of market spaces underlying our definitions provide the
possibility that loss profiles capture dynamics themselves, being, for instance, trajectories of
the evolution of the value of a good over time. However, extending capital requirements to a
dynamic multi-period framework poses some difficulties. For instance, in such an extension
finite-dimensionality of security spaces might be lost. As we will see, the finite-dimensionality
of the security spaces is crucial for important results in this paper. Generalising capital
requirements to a multi-period framework will therefore be an interesting topic for future
research.
3. Infimal convolutions and the representative agent
This section comprises the formal mathematical treatment of the risk sharing problem on
ideals of a Riesz space as introduced in Sect. 2. We shall link risk sharing to the infimal
convolution of the individual risk measures, prove its representation as a capital requirement
for the market, i.e., for a representative agent, and find powerful sufficient conditions for the
existence of optimal payoffs, Pareto-optimal allocations, and equilibria. Similar approaches
have been undertaken by, e.g., [1, 2, 8, 25, 26, 31, 32].
Beforehand, however, we need to introduce further axioms that an agent system may satisfy
in addition to (?). We shall refer to them at various stages of the paper, they are however
not assumed to be met throughout. For n ≥ 2 let (R1, . . . ,Rn) be an agent system.
(A1) No security arbitrage. For some j ∈ [n] it holds that(∑
i 6=j ker(pi)
)
∩ Sj ⊆ ker(pj);
(A2) Non-redundance of the joint security market. There is Z ∈ Sˇ and Z ∈ AsZ such that∑n
i=1 pi(Zi) 6= 0.
(A3) Supportability. The underlying space X carries a locally convex Hausdorff topology
τ with dual space X ∗. Moreover, there is some φ0 ∈ X ∗+ and a constant γ ∈ R such
that
(i) for all Z ∈∏ni=1 Si with ∑ni=1 pi(Zi) = 0 we have
φ0(Z1 + · · ·+ Zn) = 0,
and for some Z˜ ∈∏ni=1 Si with ∑ni=1 pi(Z˜i) 6= 0 we have
φ0(Z˜1 + · · ·+ Z˜n) 6= 0;
(ii) for all Y ∈∏ni=1Ai we have φ0(Y1 + · · ·+ Yn) ≤ γ.
(A4) Infinite supportability. (Ri)i∈N is a sequence of risk measurement regimes on a com-
mon locally convex Hausdorff topological Riesz space (X ,, τ) such that (R1, . . . ,Rn)
satisfies (?) for all n ∈ N and such that there is some φ0 ∈ X ∗ with∑
i∈N supY ∈Ai φ0(Y ) <∞ and φ0|Si = pi, i ∈ N.
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Condition (A1) is violated if each agent would be able to obtain arbitrarily valuable secu-
ritisation from the other agents, who can provide it at zero individual cost. That would
reveal a mismatch of security markets leading to hypothetical infinite wealth for all agents.
Non-redundance of the joint security market is in particular satisfied if there is Z ∈ Sˇ such
that pi(Z) 6= 0 for some i ∈ [n] and thus for all i ∈ [n] by the defining property (?) of an
agent system and the agreement of prices. Hence, under (A2) there is a jointly accepted se-
curity valuable for the market. Regarding condition (A3), think of φ0 as a pricing functional.
(i) is a consistency requirement between φ0 and the individual prices pi. (ii) reads as the
impossibility to decompose a loss X acceptably for all agents if X is sufficiently poor, that is
the value φ0(−X) of the corresponding payoff −X under φ0 is less than a certain level −γ.
Condition (A4) is a strengthening of (A3) for all finite subsystems of (Ri)i∈N.
3.1. Main results. According to Proposition 3.6 below, an allocation X ∈ AX of X ∈ X is
Pareto-optimal if and only if the risk sharing functional
Λ : X → [−∞,∞], Y 7→ inf
Y∈AY
n∑
i=1
ρi(Yi),
is exact at X, that is, Λ(X) =
∑n
i=1 ρi(Xi) ∈ R. Λ corresponds to the so-called infimal
convolution of the risk measures ρ1, . . . , ρn, and thus inherits properties like -monotonicity
and convexity. We refer to Appendix A.2, in particular Lemma A.3, for a brief summary of
these facts.
Our next result implies that, if proper, Λ is again a risk measure of type (2.2): the shared risk
level is the minimal price the market has to pay for a cumulated security that ensures market
acceptability. Thus, market behaviour may be seen as the behaviour of a representative agent
operating on X . Recall from Definition 2.5 that AsZ denotes the set of security allocations of
Z ∈M.
Theorem 3.1. Define pi(Z) := infZ∈AsZ
∑n
i=1 pi(Zi), Z ∈M.
(1) For any Z ∈M and arbitrary Z ∈ AsZ , pi(Z) may be represented as
pi(Z) =
n∑
i=1
pi(Zi) + pi(0).
Either pi(0) = 0 or pi(0) = −∞. pi(0) = 0 is equivalent to (A1), and in that case pi is
real-valued, linear, and satisfies pi|Si = pi, i ∈ [n]. Otherwise pi ≡ −∞.
(2) Λ can be represented as
Λ(X) = inf {pi(Z) : Z ∈M, X − Z ∈ B} , X ∈ X ,
for any monotone and convex set B ⊆ X satisfying A+ ⊆ B ⊆ L0(Λ). Here,
A+ :=
n∑
i=1
Ai
denotes the market acceptance set.
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(3) If (A1) and (A3) hold, Λ is proper.
(4) If Λ is proper, then (A1) holds, i.e., pi(0) = 0, and pi is positive. In that case,
(A+,M, pi) is a risk measurement regime on X and Λ is the associated risk measure.
In the situation of Theorem 3.1(4), the behaviour of the representative agent is given by
the risk measurement regime (A+,M, pi). The risk sharing functional is the market capital
requirement associated to the market acceptance set A+ and the global security market
(M, pi).
The preceding theorem also offers a more geometric perspective on the assumption (A3).
Suppose the agent system operates on a locally convex Hausdorff topological Riesz space
(X ,, τ) and satisfies (A1). Moreover, assume we can find a security Z∗ ∈M such that
Z∗ /∈ clτ (A+ + ker(pi)), (3.1)
where here and in the the following clτ (·) denotes the closure of a set with respect to the
topology τ . Then (A3) means Z∗ is a security which comes at a true cost for the market;
it can be strictly separated from A+ + ker(pi) using a linear functional φ0 ∈ X ∗+, and this
functional is exactly as described in (A3).
We now turn our attention to Pareto-optimal allocations of a loss W ∈ X . We will see that
their existence is closely related to the existence of a market security ZW ∈M which renders
market acceptability W − ZW ∈ A+ at the minimal price pi(ZW ) = Λ(W ). Such optimal
payoffs have recently been studied by Baes et al. [7].
Definition 3.2. W ∈ X admits an optimal payoff ZW ∈M if W −ZW ∈ A+ and pi(ZW ) =
Λ(W ).
Theorem 3.3. Suppose that Λ is proper. If X ∈ X admits an optimal payoff ZX ∈ M,
then X ∈ dom(Λ) and Λ is exact at X. In particular, for any Yi ∈ Ai, i ∈ [n], such that∑n
i=1 Yi = X − ZX , and any Z ∈ AsZX , the allocation (Yi + Zi)i∈[n] ∈ AX is Pareto-optimal.
If moreover L0(ρi) = Ai + ker(pi), i ∈ [n], then Λ is exact at X ∈ dom(Λ) if, and only if X
admits an optimal payoff.
In a topological setting, the existence of optimal payoffs is intimately connected to the
Minkowski sum A+ + ker(pi) being closed:
Proposition 3.4. Suppose (X ,, τ) is a topological Riesz space and Λ is proper. Then the
following are equivalent:
(1) A+ + ker(pi) is closed.
(2) Λ is l.s.c. and every X ∈ dom(Λ) admits an optimal payoff.
Proposition 3.4 is related to [7, Proposition 4.1]. Together with Theorem 3.3, it is a powerful
sufficient condition for the existence of Pareto optima which we shall apply in Sects. 4 and 5.
The only non-trivial steps will be to verify the properness of Λ and closedness of A+ +ker(pi).
We proceed with the discussion of equilibria in the very general case when market losses
are modelled by a Fre´chet lattice (X ,, τ). As this notion is ambiguous in the literature,
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we emphasise that a Fre´chet lattice is a locally convex-solid6 topological Riesz space whose
topology is completely metrisable.
In particular, Banach lattices are Fre´chet lattices. As a more general example, one may
consider the Wiener space C([0,∞)) of all continuous functions on the non-negative half-line
with the pointwise oder ≤ and the topology τD arising from the metric
D(f, g) :=
∞∑
k=1
2−k
max0≤r≤k |f(r)− g(r)|
1 + max0≤r≤k |f(r)− g(r)| , f, g ∈ C([0,∞)).
Clearly, (C([0,∞)),≤, τD) is not a Banach lattice, but a Fre´chet lattice. Its choice as model
space is justified if the primitives in question are continuous trajectories of, e.g., the net value
of some good over time.
Recall the definition of the jointly accepted securities, Sˇ := ⋂ni=1 Si. Moreover, we set here
and in the following int dom(Λ) to be the τ -interior of the effective domain of the risk sharing
functional Λ.
Theorem 3.5. Suppose X is a Fre´chet lattice and that Λ is l.s.c. and proper. Moreover,
let (A2) be satisfied, i.e., there is a Z˜ ∈ Sˇ with pi(Z˜) 6= 0. If a vector of loss endowments
W ∈ ∏ni=1Xi satisfies W := W1 + · · ·+Wn ∈ int dom(Λ) and there exists a Pareto-optimal
allocation of W , there is an equilibrium (X, φ) of W.
3.2. Ancillary results and proofs. Our first result links Pareto optima, equilibria, and
solutions to the risk sharing problem (2.3). Proposition 3.6(2) is indeed the first fundamental
theorem of welfare economics adapted to our setting.
Proposition 3.6. Let (R1, . . . ,Rn) be an agent system on an ordered vector space (X ,),
let W ∈ X be an aggregated loss, and let W ∈∏ni=1Xi be a vector of initial loss endowments.
The following statements hold true:
(1) If W ∈ ∑ni=1 dom(ρi), then X ∈ AW is a Pareto-optimal attainable allocation of W
if and only if
n∑
i=1
ρi(Xi) = inf
Y∈AW
n∑
i=1
ρi(Yi). (3.2)
(2) If (X ,, τ) is a topological Riesz space and W satisfies W1+· · ·+Wn ∈
∑n
i=1 dom(ρi),
any equilibrium allocation of W is Pareto-optimal.
The proof requires the following well-known characterisation of Pareto optima; see, e.g., [37,
Proposition 3.2].
Lemma 3.7. Let W ∈∑ni=1 dom(ρi). If X is a Pareto-optimal attainable allocation of W ,
there are so-called Negishi weights λi ≥ 0, i ∈ [n], not all equal to zero, such that
n∑
i=1
λiρi(Xi) = inf
Y∈AW
n∑
i=1
λiρi(Yi). (3.3)
6 This means that the topology has a neighbourhood base at 0 consisting of convex and solid sets; cf. [4,
Sect. 2.3].
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Conversely, if X ∈ AX satisfies (3.3) for a set of strictly positive weights λi > 0, i ∈ [n], then
X is a Pareto-optimal attainable allocation.
The proof of Proposition 3.6 shows that the agent system property (?) dictates the values of
the Negishi weights.
Proof of Proposition 3.6. (1) By Lemma 3.7 any solution to (3.2) is Pareto-optimal. Con-
versely, let W ∈ ∑ni=1 dom(ρi) and let X ∈ AW be a Pareto-optimal attainable allocation.
Let λ ∈ Rn++ be any vector of Negishi weights such that X is a solution to (3.3). Recall the
symmetric relation ∼ in (?) and consider j, k ∈ [n] such that j ∼ k. By definition, we find
Z ∈ Sj ∩ Sk such that p := pj(Z) = pk(Z) 6= 0. For t ∈ R let
Xt := X + tpZej − tpZek ∈ AX .
Here, Zej is the vector whose jth entry is Z, whereas all other entries are 0. Analogously,
we define Zek. By the Si-additivity of all the ρi, we infer
−∞ <
n∑
i=1
λiρi(Xi) ≤ inf
t∈R
n∑
i=1
λiρi(X
t
i ) =
n∑
i=1
λiρi(Xi) + inf
t∈R
t(λj − λk).
This is only possible if λj = λk. Using that the graph G in (?) is connected, one inductively
shows λ1 = · · · = λn. As not all the λi equal 0, this implies that they all have to be positive.
Dividing both sides of (3.3) by λ1 yields
n∑
i=1
ρi(Xi) = inf
Y∈AX
n∑
i=1
ρi(Yi).
(2) Suppose that W is an initial loss endowment with associated equilibrium (X, φ). The
equality φ(Xi) = φ(Wi) holds for all i ∈ [n] because
∑n
i=1Xi =
∑n
i=1Wi, φ is linear, and
φ(−Xi) ≤ φ(−Wi) holds for all i ∈ [n]. Given Zi ∈ Si such that pi(Zi) = 1 and arbitrary
Yi ∈ Xi,
φ(Yi + (φ(Xi)− φ(Yi))Zi) = φ(Xi) = φ(Wi)
holds as φ = pi on Si. Thus the budget constraint is satisfied, and hence
ρi(Xi) ≤ ρi(Yi + φ(Xi − Yi)Zi) = ρi(Yi) + φ(Xi)− φ(Yi).
If we set W := W1 + · · ·+Wn, for any other allocation Y ∈ AW we obtain
n∑
i=1
ρi(Xi) ≤
n∑
i=1
ρi(Yi) + φ(Xi)− φ(Yi) =
n∑
i=1
ρi(Yi)
since
∑n
i=1 φ(Xi) =
∑n
i=1 φ(Yi) = φ(W ). By (1), X is Pareto-optimal. 
Proof of Theorem 3.1. (1) Let Z ∈ M and let Z ∈ AsZ be arbitrary, but fixed. The identity
AsZ = Z + A
s
0 implies
pi(Z) =
n∑
i=1
pi(Zi) + inf
N∈As0
n∑
i=1
pi(Ni) =
n∑
i=1
pi(Zi) + pi(0).
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Consider V := {(pi(Ni))i∈[n] : N ∈ As0}, which is a subspace of Rn. In the following, we
denote by el the lth unit vector of Rn. We claim pi(0) = 0 if and only if dim(V) < n.
Indeed, let 1 = (1, 1, . . . , 1) ∈ Rn and observe that pi(0) = infx∈V〈1, x〉 which is −∞ in case
dim(V) = n. Suppose that dim(V) < n, i.e. V⊥ 6= {0}, and let 0 6= λ ∈ V⊥. As in the
proof of Proposition 3.6(1), ej − ek ∈ V holds for all j, k ∈ [n] such that j ∼ k, which implies
λj = λk. As the relation ∼ induces a connected graph, λ ∈ span{1} = V⊥. Hence, we
obtain that 〈1, x〉 = 0 for all x ∈ V which implies pi(0) = 0, so we have proved equivalence
of pi(0) = 0 and dim(V) < n. But dim(V) < n is equivalent to the fact that there is a j ∈ [n]
such that ej /∈ V, which in turn is equivalent to (A1): whenever Z ∈ Sj lies in the Minkowski
sum
∑
i 6=j ker(pi), pj(Z) = 0 has to hold.
(2) We first note that A+ is convex and monotone. Indeed, let X,Y ∈ X such that Y ∈ A+
and X  Y . Fix Y ∈ AY such that Yi ∈ Ai, i ∈ [n], and X ∈ AX arbitrary. By the
Riesz Decomposition Property (cf. [3, Sect. 8.5]), there are W1, . . . ,Wn ∈ X+ such that
Y −X = ∑ni=1Wi and Wi  |Yi −Xi|, which means W ∈ AY−X . Hence, for all i ∈ [n], we
obtain Yi−Wi ∈ Ai by the monotonicity of Ai, and thus X =
∑n
i=1 Yi−Wi ∈ A+. Moreover,
L0(Λ) is monotone and convex as well, which follows from the corresponding properties of Λ.
For B ⊆ B′, we have
inf {pi(Z) : Z ∈M, X − Z ∈ B} ≥ inf {pi(Z) : Z ∈M, X − Z ∈ B′} .
As A+ ⊆ L0(Λ), (2) is proved if for arbitrary X ∈ X we can show the two estimates
Λ(X) ≥ inf {pi(Z) : Z ∈M, X − Z ∈ A+} , (3.4)
and
Λ(X) ≤ inf {pi(Z) : Z ∈M, X − Z ∈ L0(Λ)} . (3.5)
The first assertion trivially holds if Λ(X) = ∞. If X ∈ dom(Λ) = ∑ni=1 dom(ρi), choose
X ∈ AX such that ρi(Xi) < ∞, i ∈ [n], and ε > 0 arbitrary. Suppose Z ∈
∏n
i=1 Si is such
that pi(Zi) ≤ ρi(Xi) + εn and Xi − Zi ∈ Ai, i ∈ [n]. Set Z∗ := Z1 + · · · + Zn and observe
X − Z∗ ∈ A+ as well as
n∑
i=1
ρi(Xi) + ε ≥
n∑
i=1
pi(Zi) ≥ pi(Z∗) ≥ inf{pi(Z) : Z ∈M, X − Z ∈ A+}.
This proves (3.4). We now turn to (3.5). If Λ(X) = ∞, assume for contradiction there is
some Z ∈ M such that X − Z ∈ L0(Λ) ⊆
∑n
i=1 dom(ρi). Choose Y ∈ AX−Z such that
Yi ∈ dom(ρi) for all i, and let Z ∈ AsZ be arbitrary. Then
Λ(X) ≤
n∑
i=1
ρi(Yi + Zi) =
n∑
i=1
ρi(Yi) +
n∑
i=1
pi(Zi) <∞.
This is a contradiction and no such Z ∈ M can exist. (3.5) holds in this case. Now assume
X ∈ dom(Λ) and suppose Z ∈ M satisfies X − Z ∈ L0(Λ). Hence, for arbitrary ε > 0 there
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is Y ∈ AX−Z such that
∑n
i=1 ρi(Yi) ≤ ε. As Y + Z ∈ AX for all Z ∈ AsZ ,
Λ(X) ≤ inf
Z∈AsZ
n∑
i=1
ρi(Yi + Zi) =
n∑
i=1
ρi(Yi) + pi(Z) ≤ ε+ pi(Z).
As ε > 0 was chosen arbitrarily, we obtain (3.5).
(3) Assume (A1) and (A3) are fulfilled, let φ0 ∈ X ∗+ as described in (A3), and note that pi
is linear by (1). We shall prove that φ0|M = κpi for some κ > 0, so by rescaling φ0|M = pi
may be assumed without loss of generality. To this end, we restate requirement (A3)(ii) as
supY ∈A+ φ0(Y ) < ∞. Condition (A3)(i) means in particular that φ0|ker(pi) ≡ 0. For each
i ∈ [n] fix Ui ∈ Si ∩ X++ such that U :=
∑n
i=1 Ui satisfies
pi(U) =
n∑
i=1
pi(Ui) = 1.
As Z − pi(Z)U ∈ ker(pi) holds for all Z ∈ M we infer φ0(Z − pi(Z)U) = 0, or equivalently
φ0 = φ0(U)pi on M. By the second part of (A3)(i), φ0(Z˜) 6= 0 for some Z˜ ∈ M with
pi(Z˜) 6= 0. Using positivity of φ0, we obtain
0 <
φ0(Z˜)
pi(Z˜)
= φ0(U),
hence we may set κ := φ0(U). Finally, if κ = 1, X ∈ X is arbitrary, and Z ∈M is such that
X − Z ∈ A+,
pi(Z) = φ0(Z) = φ0(X)− φ0(X − Z) ≥ φ0(X)− sup
Y ∈A+
φ0(Y ) > −∞.
The bound on the right-hand side is independent of Z. Using the representation of Λ in (2),
properness follows.
(4) Note that Λ is M-additive by (2). Since Λ is proper, we cannot have pi ≡ −∞, hence
pi(0) = 0, i.e., (A1) holds by (1). As regards the positivity of pi, choose Y ∈ X with Λ(Y ) ∈ R.
For Z ∈M∩X+, the monotonicity of Λ then shows Λ(Y ) ≤ Λ(Y +Z) = Λ(Y )+pi(Z), which
entails pi(Z) ≥ 0. It follows that (A+,M, pi) is a risk measurement regime. 
Proof of Theorem 3.3. As Λ is proper, we have that pi is linear, finite valued, and pi|Si = pi,
i ∈ [n], by Theorem 3.1. Assume X ∈ X and Z = ZX ∈M are such that Λ(X) = pi(Z) and
X − Z ∈ A+. As pi(Z) ∈ R and Λ|A+ ≤ 0, X ∈ dom(Λ). Choose Yi ∈ Ai, i ∈ [n], such that
X − Z = ∑ni=1 Yi. For any Z ∈ AsZ we thus have X = ∑ni=1 Yi + Zi and
Λ(X) ≤
n∑
i=1
ρi(Yi + Zi) =
n∑
i=1
ρi(Yi) +
n∑
i=1
pi(Zi) ≤ pi(Z) = Λ(X),
where we have used ρi(Yi) ≤ 0 and pi(Z) =
∑n
i=1 pi(Zi) (Theorem 3.1). This shows the
exactness of Λ at X.
Now assume L0(ρi) = Ai + ker(pi), i ∈ [n]. Let X ∈ dom(Λ) and X ∈ AX such that Λ(X) =∑n
i=1 ρi(Xi). Further, let Ui ∈ Si with pi(Ui) = 1. As Xi − ρi(Xi)Ui ∈ Ai + ker(pi), i ∈ [n],
by assumption, we may find a vector N ∈ ∏ni=1 ker(pi) such that Xi − ρi(Xi)Ui + Ni ∈ Ai
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for every i ∈ [n]. The fact that ∑ni=1 ρi(Xi)Ui−Ni is an optimal payoff for X is immediately
verified. 
Proof of Proposition 3.4. Suppose first that A+ + ker(pi) is closed. For lower semicontinuity,
we have to establish that Lc(Λ) is closed for every c ∈ R. To this end, let Ui ∈ Si ∩X++ such
that pi(Ui) > 0 and set U :=
∑n
i=1 Ui. Without loss of generality, we may assume pi(U) = 1.
We will show that
Lc(Λ) = {cU}+A+ + ker(pi), (3.6)
which is closed whenever A+ + ker(pi) is closed. The right-hand set in (3.6) is included in
the left-hand set by the M-additivity of Λ. For the converse inclusion, let X ∈ Lc(Λ). For
every s > c, there is a Zs ∈ M such that c ≤ pi(Zs) ≤ s and X − Zs ∈ A+. Consider the
decomposition
X − sU = X − Zs + (pi(Zs)− s)U + Zs − pi(Zs)U.
As X − Zs + (pi(Zs)− s)U  X − Zs ∈ A+ and Zs − pi(Zs)U ∈ ker(pi), the monotonicity of
A+ shows X − sU ∈ A+ + ker(pi). Thus,
X − cU = lim
s↓c
X − sU ∈ clτ (A+ + ker(pi)) = A+ + ker(pi),
and (3.6) is proved. Setting c = 0 in (3.6) shows L0(Λ) = A+ +ker(pi). Hence, X−Λ(X)U ∈
A+ + ker(pi) for all X ∈ dom(Λ), and for a suitable N ∈ ker(pi) depending on X we have
X − Λ(X)U + N ∈ A+ and pi(Λ(X)U −N) = Λ(X). Therefore, an optimal payoff for X is
given by Λ(X)U −N ∈M.
Assume now that Λ is l.s.c. and that every X ∈ dom(Λ) allows for an optimal payoff. Let
(Xi)i∈I be a net in A+ + ker(pi) converging to X ∈ X . Then Λ(X) ≤ 0 by the lower
semicontinuity of Λ. Let ZX ∈ M be an optimal payoff for X, so that pi(ZX) = Λ(X) ≤ 0.
For U as above and Y := X − ZX ∈ A+ we obtain Y + pi(ZX)U ∈ A+ by the monotonicity
of A+. Also ZX − pi(ZX)U ∈ ker(pi). Thus X =
(
Y + pi(ZX)U
)
+
(
ZX − pi(ZX)U) ∈
A+ + ker(pi). 
For the proof of Theorem 3.5, we need the notion of the convex conjugate of a proper function
f : X → (−∞,∞] on a locally convex Hausdorff topological vector space, which is the
function f∗ : X ∗ → (−∞,∞] defined by
f∗(φ) = sup
X∈X
φ(X)− f(X).
Given X ∈ dom(f), φ ∈ X ∗ is a subgradient of f at X if f(X) = φ(X)− f∗(φ).
Proof of Theorem 3.5. Fix a vector W ∈∏ni=1Wi with the property
W := W1 + · · ·+Wn ∈ int dom(Λ).
As a Fre´chet lattice is a barrelled space, Λ is subdifferentiable at W by [20, Corollary 2.5 &
Proposition 5.2], i.e. there is a subgradient φ ∈ X ∗ of Λ at W satisfying Λ(W ) = φ(W ) −
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Λ∗(φ). As Λ is monotone, φ ∈ X ∗+ , and by Lemma A.4
Λ∗(φ) =
n∑
i=1
ρ∗i (φ|Xi).
Let Y be any Pareto-optimal allocation of W . As Λ(W ) =
∑n
i=1 ρi(Yi) ∈ R, Λ(W ), Λ∗(φ)
and ρ∗i (φ|Xi), i ∈ [n], are all real numbers. Also, as
∞ > ρ∗i (φ|Xi) ≥ sup
Z∈Si
φ(Yi + Z)− ρi(Yi + Z) = φ(Yi)− ρi(Yi) + sup
Z∈Si
φ(Z)− pi(Z),
φ|Si = pi, i ∈ [n], has to hold. This in turn implies φ|M = pi by the linearity of pi and
Theorem 3.1. By (A2), we may fix Z˜ ∈ Sˇ such that pi(Z˜) = 1 = pi(Z˜), i ∈ [n]. Let
Xi := Yi + φ(Wi − Yi)Z˜, i ∈ [n].
As
∑n
i=1Wi =
∑n
i=1 Yi = W ,
∑n
i=1Xi = W holds and X ∈ AW . Moreover, X is Pareto-
optimal:
n∑
i=1
ρi(Xi) =
n∑
i=1
ρi(Yi) + φ(Wi − Yi)pi(Z˜) =
n∑
i=1
ρi(Yi) + φ(W −W )
=
n∑
i=1
ρi(Yi) = Λ(W ).
Also, as φ(Xi)− ρ∗i (φ|Xi) ≤ ρi(Xi) for all i ∈ [n] and
n∑
i=1
ρi(Xi) = Λ(W ) = φ(W )− Λ∗(W ) =
n∑
i=1
φ(Xi)− ρ∗i (φ|Xi),
ρi(Xi) = φ(Xi)− ρ∗i (φ|Xi) has to hold for all i ∈ [n]. We claim that (X, φ) is an equilibrium.
Indeed, as φ(−Xi) = φ(−Wi) holds for all i ∈ [n], the budget constraints are satisfied.
Moreover, if i ∈ [n] and Y ∈ Xi satisfies φ(−Y ) ≤ φ(−Wi) = φ(−Xi), we obtain
ρi(Y ) ≥ φ(Y )− ρ∗i (φ|Xi) ≥ φ(Xi)− ρ∗i (φ|Xi) = ρi(Xi).

4. Polyhedral agent systems
In the next two sections, we will study two instances of the model introduced in Sect. 2
and employ the methodology discussed in Sect. 3 to find optimal payoffs for the market,
Pareto-optimal allocations, and equilibria. Additionally, we will study their robustness. In
this section, we shall focus on polyhedral agent systems.
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4.1. The setting. Throughout this section we assume that the agent system (R1, . . . ,Rn)
operates on a market space X given by a Fre´chet lattice. Each agent i ∈ [n] operates on a
closed ideal Xi ⊆ X , and X1 + · · · + Xn = X . The assumption of closedness implies that
(Xi,, τ ∩ Xi) is a Fre´chet lattice in its own right. We will assume that each acceptance set
Ai ⊆ Xi is polyhedral.
Definition 4.1. Let (X , τ) be a locally convex topological vector space. A convex set C ⊆ X
is called polyhedral if there is a finite set J ⊆ X ∗ and β ∈ RJ such that
A = {X ∈ X : φ(X) ≤ β(φ), ∀φ ∈ J }.
If (X ,, τ) is a Fre´chet lattice, an agent system (R1, . . . ,Rn) on X is polyhedral if it has
properties (A1) and (A3), and each acceptance set Ai, i ∈ [n], is polyhedral. That is, for
each i ∈ [n] there is a finite set Ji ⊆ X ∗i and βi ∈ RJi such that
Ai = {X ∈ Xi : ∀φ ∈ Ji (φ(X) ≤ βi(φ))}.
The polyhedrality of a set C is equivalent to the existence of some m ∈ N, a continuous linear
operator T : X → Rm, and β ∈ Rm such that
C = {X ∈ X : T (X) ≤ β},
where the defining inequality is understood coordinatewise. In case of an acceptance set, the
representing linear operator can be chosen to be positive. Risk measures with polyhedral
acceptance sets play a prominent role in Baes et al. [7], where the set of optimal payoffs for
a single such risk measure is studied.
Example 4.2. Suppose Ω 6= ∅ is a nonempty set of scenarios for the future state of the econ-
omy, either suggested by the internal risk management or a regulatory authority. Moreover,
suppose ∅ 6= Ωi ( Ω, i ∈ [n], are such that Ω =
⋃n
i=1 Ωi. Ωi denotes the set of scenarios
relevant for agent i ∈ [n], whereas Ωi ∩ Ωj is the (possibly empty) set of jointly relevant
scenarios for agents i and j. Note that we do not assume the Ωi to be pairwise disjoint.
While Ω collects the scenarios relevant to the whole system, it is both individually and sys-
temically rational of an agent to demand that her stake in the sharing of a market loss is
neutral in scenarios ω ∈ Ω\Ωi. The canonical choice of the model spaces is in consequence
X := {X ∈ RΩ : supω∈Ω |X(ω)| <∞} endowed with the supremum norm and
Xi := {X ∈ X : X(ω) = 0, ω /∈ Ωi}, i ∈ [n].
Consider individual capital adequacy tests defined in terms of scenariowise loss constraints
on a prespecified finite set of test scenarios Ω∗ ⊆ Ω. We need to assume Ω∗ ∩ Ωi ∩ Ωj 6= ∅
whenever Ωi ∩ Ωj 6= ∅, and that Ω∗i := Ω∗ ∩ Ωi, i ∈ [n], is not empty either. The polyhedral
acceptance set of agent i ∈ [n] is then defined by
Ai := {X ∈ Xi : ∀ω ∈ Ω∗i (X(ω) ≤ βi(ω))}, i ∈ [n],
where βi ∈ RΩ∗i is an arbitrary, but fixed vector of individual loss constraints.
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Concerning the individual security spaces, let Π be the set of all subsets A ⊆ Ω which have
the shape A = Ωi ∩ Ωj or A = Ωi\Ωj for some i 6= j and are nonempty. The security space
of agent i ∈ [n] is then set to be
Si := span{1A : A ∈ Π, A ⊆ Ωi}.
At last, for a collection (σω)ω∈Ω∗ of positive weights we define the linear functional
pi :M→ R, Z 7→
∑
ω∈Ω∗
σωZ(ω),
and the individual prices pi := pi|Si , i ∈ [n]. We additionally assume that the family of
intersections Ωi ∩ Ωj , i, j ∈ [n], i 6= j, which are nonempty is rich enough such that the
family (Ri)i∈[n] := ((Ai,Si, pi))i∈[n] of risk measurement regimes satisfies (?).
In total, if the situation is as described, (Ri)i∈[n] is a polyhedral agent system.
4.2. Main results. We first turn to the existence of optimal risk allocations in polyhedral
agent systems. By definition, such an agent system satisfies (A1) and (A3). The resulting
risk sharing functional Λ is proper by Theorem 3.1(3). By Theorem 3.3 and Proposition 3.4,
the existence of Pareto-optimal allocations would be proved if the closedness of A+ + ker(pi)
can be established.
The two main results on optimal risk allocations are the following:
Theorem 4.3. Let (R1, . . . ,Rn) be a polyhedral agent system on a Fre´chet lattice X . Then
the set A++ker(pi) is proper, polyhedral, and closed, Λ is l.s.c., and every X ∈ dom(Λ) admits
an optimal payoff ZX ∈M, and can thus be allocated Pareto-optimally as in Theorem 3.3.
Theorem 4.3 is illustrated by an example in Sect. 4.4.
Remark 4.4. The proof of the preceding theorem shows that for each agent i ∈ [n], the
Minkowski sum Ai+ker(pi) is proper, polyhedral, and closed. Moreover, for all Xi ∈ dom(ρi)
we can find an optimal payoff ZXi ∈ Si, i.e., pi(ZXi) = ρi(Xi) and Xi − ZXi ∈ Ai.
Corollary 4.5. If a polyhedral agent system (R1, . . . ,Rn) on a Fre´chet lattice X satisfies
(A2), for every W ∈ ∏ni=1Xi such that W1 + · · ·+Wn ∈ int dom(Λ) there is an equilibrium
(X, φ).
By Theorem 4.3, the correspondence P mapping X ∈ dom(Λ) to the set of its Pareto-optimal
allocations X ∈ AX takes nonempty subsets of AX as values. Invoking Proposition 3.6, we
can represent
P(X) =
{
X ∈ AX : Λ(X) =
n∑
i=1
ρi(Xi)
}
. (4.1)
For a brief summary of the terminology concerning correspondences (or set-valued maps) and
their properties, we refer to Appendix A.3. Theorem 4.9, the main result on the robustness
of P in the case of a polyhedral agent system, asserts that P can be shown to be lower
hemicontinuous. This requires some technical assumptions though.
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Suppose (Ri)i∈[n] is a polyhedral agent system on a market space X . Then for each i ∈ [n],
there is a positive continuous linear operator Ti : Xi → Rmi for suitable mi ∈ R and a vector
βi ∈ Rmi such that
Ai := {Y ∈ Xi : Ti(Y ) ≤ βi}.
In case X is infinite-dimensional, we will need the following assumptions:
Assumption 4.6. For each i ∈ [n], Xi is complemented in X by a closed subspace Yi, that
is X = Xi ⊕ Yi, where ⊕ denotes the direct sum of two vector spaces.
Hence, for each X ∈ X there is a unique decomposition X = X˜ + Y˜ , where X˜ ∈ Xi and
Y˜ ∈ Yi. Moreover, by the closed graph theorem [30, Chap. 3, Theorem 5], the projection
δi : X 7→ X˜ is continuous and Yi = ker(δi).
Let us define T˜i := Ti ◦ δi and Y :=
⋂n
i=1 ker(T˜i). Hence, Y is complemented in X by a
finite-dimensional closed subspace Z, i.e., X = Y ⊕ Z. The projections γ1 : X → Y and
γ2 : X → Z are continuous.
Assumption 4.7. For each i ∈ [n], we have γ1(Xi) ⊆ Xi.
At last, we will assume
Assumption 4.8. For each i ∈ [n] there is a continuous linear Pi : Y → γ1(Xi) such that∑n
i=1 Pi = idY .
Theorem 4.9. Consider a polyhedral agent system (Ri)i∈[n] on a market space X . Suppose
that Assumptions 4.6–4.8 hold in case X is infinite-dimensional. Then the correspondence
P is lower hemicontinuous on dom(Λ) and admits a continuous selection on dom(Λ).
Example 4.10. (1) Assumptions 4.6–4.8 are automatically satisfied if all individual ideals
Xi agree with the market space X . Indeed, Yi = {0} can be chosen in Assumption 4.6,
γ1(Xi) = γ1(X ) ⊆ X = Xi gives Assumption 4.7, and Pi := 1n idX is possible in Assump-
tion 4.8.
(2) In the situation described by Example 4.2 Assumptions 4.6–4.8 are satisfied. Indeed, the
complementing subspaces Yi of Xi in Assumption 4.6 are given by
Yi := {X ∈ X : X(ω) = 0, ∀ω ∈ Ωi}.
Recall that Ω∗ is the set of scenarios relevant for market acceptability and note that
Y = {X ∈ X : X(ω) = 0, ∀ω ∈ Ω∗},
Z = {X ∈ X : X(ω) = 0, ∀ω ∈ Ω\Ω∗}.
As γ1(X) := X1Ω\Ω∗ and γ2(X) = X1Ω∗ , X ∈ X , we verify easily that γ1(Xi) ⊆ Xi,
i ∈ [n], i.e., Assumption 4.7 is met. Regarding the existence of the mappings (Pi)i∈[n]
satisfying Assumption 4.8, we can define them consecutively by
P1(X) := X1Ω1 , Pi+1(X) := X1Ωi+1\
⋃i
j=1 Ωj
, i ∈ [n− 1], X ∈ Y.
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Similar examples can be constructed for other function spaces such as the Hilbert space
L2(Ω,F ,P), the space of all equivalence classes with respect to almost sure equality of
square-integrable random variables on a probability space (Ω,F ,P).
One may wonder whether the correspondence E : ∏ni=1Xi ∏ni=1Xi×X ∗ mapping an initial
loss endowment W to all its equilibrium allocations such that X ∈ P(W1 + · · · + Wn) and
φ is a subgradient of Λ at W1 + · · · + Wn — as in the proof of Theorem 3.5 — is lower
hemicontinuous under suitable conditions. This, however, is not the case. Suppose X admits
two positive functionals φ, ψ ∈ X ∗+ such that ker(φ)\ ker(ψ) 6= ∅. We assume n = 1 and
consider an agent system R = (A,S, p) such that ρR(X) = max{φ(X), ψ(X)}, X ∈ X . Let
W ∈ X such that φ(W ) = 0 < ψ(W ). Thus, for all n ∈ N, the equilibrium price at 1nW
would be ψ, whereas any element of the convex hull of {φ, ψ} could be chosen as equilibrium
price at 0. E is not lower hemicontinuous in this case.
4.3. Ancillary results and proofs. For the following lemma, recall that a Fre´chet space is
a completely metrisable locally convex topological vector space. In particular, every Fre´chet
lattice is a Fre´chet space.
Lemma 4.11. Let X be a Fre´chet space.
(1) A subset C ⊆ X is polyhedral if and only if there are closed subspaces X 1,X 2 ⊆ X
such that X = X 1 ⊕ X 2, dim(X 2) < ∞, and C = X 1 + C′ for a polyhedral subset
C′ ⊆ X 2.
(2) Suppose Y and X are Fre´chet spaces, C ⊆ Y is polyhedral, and T : Y → X is a
surjective linear operator. Then T (C) is polyhedral in X .
Proof. (1) Combine the proof of [46, Corollary 2.1] with the closed graph theorem [30, Chap.
3, Theorem 5].
(2) By (1), there are two closed subspaces Y1,Y2 ⊆ Y such that dim(Y2) is finite, Y = Y1⊕Y2,
and C = Y1 + C′ for a polyhedral subset C′ of Y2. Define X 2 := T (Y2), which is finite-
dimensional. Every finite-dimensional subspace of a Fre´chet space is complemented by a
closed subspace. Thus X = X 1 ⊕ X 2 for a closed subspace X 1. Clearly, T (C′) ⊆ X 2 is
polyhedral; see [38, Theorem 19.3]. Moreover, denoting by γi : X → X i the projection in X
onto the linear subspaces X i, surjectivity of T implies X 1 = γ1(X ) = γ1(T (Y1))+γ1(T (Y2) =
γ1(T (Y1)). Moreover,
T (C) = T (Y1) + T (C′) = X 1 + γ2(T (Y1)) + T (C′).
γ2(T (Y1)) is polyhedral as subspace of the finite-dimensional space X 2, and so is the sum
γ2(T (Y1)) + T (C′) of two polyhedral sets. Conclude with (1). 
The preceding lemma enables us to prove Theorem 4.3.
Proof of Theorem 4.3. The set A+ + ker(pi) is proper by assumption (A3). Moreover, it is
polyhedral: consider the Fre´chet space Y := (∏ni=1Xi)×ker(pi).7 By assumption, the set C :=
7 Space Y is not a Fre´chet lattice, hence the necessity for the above formulation of Lemma 4.11.
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(
∏n
i=1Ai)×ker(pi) is polyhedral, and T : Y → X defined by T (X1, . . . , Xn, N) =
∑n
i=1Xi+N
is surjective and linear. As X is a Fre´chet space, Lemma 4.11(2) yields the polyhedrality of
T (C) = A+ + ker(pi). Being a polyhedral set, it is automatically closed. Since Λ is proper, it
is l.s.c. and optimal payoffs exist for every X ∈ dom(Λ) by Proposition 3.4. 
Proof of Corollary 4.5. Combine Theorems 3.5 and 4.3. 
We now turn our attention to the lower hemicontinuity of the correspondence P as stated in
Theorem 4.9. Its proof requires the following highly technical Lemmas 4.12 and 4.13 whose
proofs imitate in parts a technique from Baes et al. [7]. Note that in analogy with Theorem
4.3, A+ is closed.
Lemma 4.12. Suppose X is a finite-dimensional locally convex Hausdorff topological vector
space, Xi ⊆ X , i ∈ [n], are finite-dimensional subspaces such that
∑n
i=1Xi = X , and Ai ⊆ Xi,
i ∈ [n], are polyhedral sets. Set A+ :=
∑n
i=1Ai and define the correspondence
Γ : A+ 3 X →
{
X ∈
n∏
i=1
Ai : X1 + · · ·+Xn = X
}
.
Then Γ is lower hemicontinuous.
Proof. As in Definition 4.1, for each i ∈ [n] we fix mi ∈ N, a linear and continuous operator
Ti : X → Rmi , and vectors βi ∈ Rmi , such that
Ai = {Y ∈ Xi : Ti(Y ) ≤ βi}.
Step 1. For fixed X ∈ A+ we decompose Γ(X) as the sum of a universal and an X-dependent
component. Recall from Appendix A.1 that the recession cone of Γ(X) is given by
0+Γ(X) := {Y ∈∏ni=1Xi : X + kY ∈ Γ(X), ∀X ∈ Γ(X), ∀ k > 0}.
The lineality space of Γ(X) is
0+Γ(X) ∩ (−0+Γ(X)) = {Y ∈ A0 : Ti(Yi) = 0, ∀ i ∈ [n]},
a subspace independent of X. By virtue of Lemma A.2, there is a X-independent subspace
V ⊆∏ni=1Xi such that
Γ(X) = α(X) + 0+Γ(X), α(X) := co(ext(Γ(X) ∩ V)),
where co(·) denotes the convex hull operator and ext(Γ(X)∩ V) the set of extreme points of
Γ(X) ∩ V.
Step 2. In this step, we prove that the correspondence α : A+ →
∏n
i=1Ai maps sets which
are bounded with respect to some norm on X to sets which are bounded with respect to
some norm on V. To this end, let D := dim(X ) = dim(X ∗) and choose a basis ψ1, . . . , ψD of
X ∗. Note that X ∈ Γ(X) ∩ V if and only if
• X is an allocation of X, i.e. ψj(X1 + · · ·+Xn) = ψj(X) for all j ∈ [D], or equivalently
ψj(X1 + · · ·+Xn) ≤ ψj(X) and (−ψj)(X1 + · · ·+Xn) ≤ (−ψj)(X);
• each Xi lies in Ai, i.e. Ti(Xi) ≤ βi;
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• X ∈ V.
Clearly, the properties listed above describe a polyhedral subset of V; more precisely, for
m :=
∑n
i=1mi+2D, mi defined above, we may find a continuous linear operator S : V → Rm
and an affine function f : X → Rm such that
Γ(X) ∩ V = {X ∈ V : S(X) ≤ f(X)}.
Every “row” Si of S corresponds to an element of V∗. By [9, Theorem II.4.2], for every
extreme point X ∈ Γ(X) ∩ V the set
I(X) = {i ∈ [m] : Si(X) = fi(X)},
whose cardinality is at least dim(V), satisfies span{Si : i ∈ I(X)} = V∗. Let F(X) :=
{I(X) : X ∈ ext(Γ(X) ∩ V)} be the collection of all such I(X) corresponding to an extreme
point. Its cardinality is bounded by the number of subsets of [m] with cardinality at least
dim(V). Moreover, for each I ∈ F(X), the linear operator SI : V 3 Y 7→ (Si(Y))i∈I is
injective and thus invertible on its image. We have shown that (SI)I∈F(X) is a finite family
of operators with full rank whose cardinality depends on dim(V) and m only. Let B ⊆ A+
be a bounded set. For each X ∈ B and I ∈ F(X), fI is affine and thus maps B to a bounded
set. Also, S−1I is continuous by the closed graph theorem [30, Chap. 3, Theorem 5], whence
boundedness of {S−1I (fI(Y )) : Y ∈ B, I ∈ F(Y )} follows. Recall that
⋃
X∈B F(X) is finite.
Using Carathe´odory’s theorem [38, Theorem 17.1], co{S−1I (fI(X)) : X ∈ B, I ∈ F(X)} is
bounded. As ⋃
X∈B
α(X) =
⋃
X∈B
co{S−1I (fI(X)) : I ∈ F(X)}
⊆ co{S−1I (fI(X)) : X ∈ B, I ∈ F(X)},
it has to be bounded as well and Step 2 is proved.
Step 3. Γ is lower hemicontinuous. Let (Xk)k∈N ⊆ A+ be convergent to X ∈ A+ and let
X ∈ Γ(X). We have to show that there is a subsequence (kλ)λ∈N and Xλ ∈ Γ(Xkλ) such
that Xλ → X; cf. Appendix A.3. To this end, let first Yk ∈ α(Xk), k ∈ N, which is
a bounded sequence by Step 2. After passing to a subsequence (kλ)λ∈N, we may assume
Ykλ → Y ∈ Γ(X) (as Ai is closed, i ∈ [n]). If Γ(X) is a singleton, Y = X has to hold and
we may choose Xλ := Ykλ . Otherwise, suppose first that X lies in the relative interior of
Γ(X), i.e., there is an ε > 0 such that X + ε(X−Y) ∈ Γ(X), as well. Recall the definition
of the linear operators Ti, i ∈ [n], above and fix i ∈ [n]. Let 1 ≤ j ≤ mi be arbitrary. We
denote by T ji (W ) the jth entry of Ti(W ).
Case 1. T ji (Xi) = βj . From Yi ∈ Ai, we infer
0 ≥ T ji (Xi + ε(Xi − Yi))− βj = ε(βj − T ji (Yi)) ≥ 0,
which means T ji (Yi) = βj , as well. Set λ(i, j) = 1.
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Case 2. T ji (Xi) < βj . As Y
kλ
i → Yi for λ→∞, there must be a λ(i, j) ∈ N such that for all
λ ≥ λ(i, j)
T ji (Y
kλ
i − Yi +Xi) ≤ βj .
Hence for all λ ≥ maxi∈[n],1≤j≤mi λ(i, j), one obtains
Xλ := Ykλ −Y + X ∈
n∏
i=1
Ai ∩ AXkλ = Γ(Xkλ),
and Xλ → X. It remains to notice that each X ∈ Γ(X) may be approximated with a sequence
in the relative interior of Γ(X), cf. [38, Theorem 6.3]. The assertion is proved. 
Lemma 4.13. Suppose the polyhedral agent system (Ri)i∈[n] and the infinite-dimensional
market space X conform to Assumptions 4.6–4.8. Then the correspondence Γ : A+ 3 X 7→
AX ∩
∏n
i=1Ai is lower hemicontinuous.
Proof. We will use the terminology introduced in Assumptions 4.6–4.8. In particular,
Y :=
n⋂
i=1
ker(Ti ◦ δi),
which is complemented in X by a finite-dimensional closed subspace Z, and the projections
γ1 : X → Y and γ2 : X → Z are continuous.
We now consider the ambient space Z which may be written as
Z = γ2(X ) =
n∑
i=1
γ2(Xi).
We will apply Lemma 4.12 to the sets
Bi := {Y ∈ γ2(Xi) : T˜i(Y ) ≤ βi}, i ∈ [n].
Suppose (Xk)k∈N ⊆ A+ is a sequence which converges to X ∈ A+. Let X ∈ Γ(X). We
need to find a subsequence (kλ)λ∈N and a sequence of allocations Xkλ ∈ Γ(Xkλ) such that
Xkλ → X.
To this end note that γ2(X
k) → γ2(X) in Z as k → ∞. Moreover, (γ2(Xi))i∈[n] satisfies
γ2(Xi) ∈ γ2(Xi), i ∈ [n],
∑n
i=1 γ2(Xi) = γ2(X), and by construction of Z, T˜i(γ2(Xi)) =
T˜i(Xi) ≤ βi. Hence, we may apply Lemma 4.12 to obtain a subsequence (kλ)λ∈N and
Ykλ ∈ ∏ni=1 Bi such that the identity ∑ni=1 Y kλi = γ2(Xkλ) holds for all λ ∈ N and Ykλ →
(γ2(Xi))i∈[n], λ→∞.
Note that by Assumption 4.7, γ1(Xi) ∈ Xi for each i ∈ [n]. Let Pi be the continuous linear
operators defined in Assumption 4.8. Consider
Xkλi := γ1(Xi) + Pi
(
γ1(X
kλ −X)
)
+ Y kλi ∈ γ1(Xi) + γ2(Xi) = Xi, i ∈ [n], λ ∈ N.
Then
n∑
i=1
Xkλi = γ1(X
kλ) + γ2(X
kλ) = Xkλ .
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Moreover, for each i ∈ [n], we have
Ti(X
kλ
i ) = Ti(γ2(X
kλ
i )) = Ti(Y
kλ
i ) ≤ βi.
Hence, Xkλi ∈ Ai for each i ∈ [n]. These observations combined yield that Xkλ ∈ Γ(Xkλ).
By the continuity of Pi and γ1, we obtain
∀ i ∈ [n] : Xkλi → γ1(Xi) + γ2(Xi) = Xi.
This finishes the proof. 
At last we can prove Theorem 4.9.
Proof of Theorem 4.9. In addition to the correspondence P defined by (4.1) consider the
following three correspondences:
• Γ1 : dom(Λ)  A+ ×M, X 7→ {(X −Z,Z) : Z ∈M, X −Z ∈ A+, Λ(X) = pi(Z)},
which is lower hemicontinuous on dom(Λ) by virtue of the polyhedrality of A+ and
[7, Theorem 5.11].
• Γ2 : A+ 
∏n
i=1Ai, X 7→ AX∩
∏n
i=1Ai, which is lower hemicontinuous by Lemma 4.12,
if X is finite-dimensional, or Lemma 4.13, in case X is infinite-dimensional.
• Γ3 :M
∏n
i=1 Si, Z 7→ AsZ , which is lower hemicontinuous by Lemma A.5.
Applying [3, Theorem 17.23],
Γ : dom(Λ) 3 X 7→
⋃
(X−Z,Z)∈Γ1(X)
(Γ2(X − Z) + Γ3(Z))
is lower hemicontinuous as well.
In fact, Γ = P holds. To see this, let X ∈ dom(Λ) be arbitrary. From the proof of The-
orem 3.3, Γ(X) ⊆ P(X) follows. For the converse inclusion, let X ∈ P(X) be arbitrary.
Choose Zi ∈ Si, i ∈ [n], such that Xi − Zi ∈ Ai and ρi(Xi) = pi(Zi), which is possible by
Theorem 4.3 in the case n = 1; see Remark 4.4. Let Z = Z1 + · · ·+ Zn and note that
pi(Z) =
∑n
i=1 pi(Zi) =
∑n
i=1 ρi(Xi) = Λ(X),
i.e. (X − Z,Z) ∈ Γ1(X). Moreover, as X − Z ∈ Γ2(X − Z), it only remains to note that
X = (X− Z) + Z ∈ Γ2(X − Z) + Γ3(Z). Equality of sets is established.
Finally, dom(Λ) is metrisable and therefore paracompact; cf. [39]. Moreover,
∏n
i=1Xi is
a Fre´chet space, and as P : dom(Λ)  ∏ni=1Xi has nonempty closed convex values, a
continuous selection for P exists by the Michael selection theorem [3, Theorem 17.66]. 
4.4. An example. We close this section by showing how Pareto optima can be computed
in the situation of Example 4.2. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that n = 2, Ω is
a finite set, and A := Ω1\Ω2, B := Ω1 ∩ Ω2 and C := Ω2\Ω1 are all nonempty. The
specifications of Example 4.2 lead to the individual security spaces S1 = span{1A,1B} and
S2 = span{1B,1C}. Let us assume that Ω∗ = Ω. Hence, the individual acceptance sets are
of the shape
Ai := {X ∈ Xi : ∀ω ∈ Ωi (X(ω) ≤ βi(ω))}, i = 1, 2,
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where βi ∈ RΩi is arbitrary, but fixed. For convenience, we assume the set of weights
(σω)ω∈Ω∗ appearing in the definition of the pricing functionals pi and pi, i ∈ [n], to be such
that pi(1A) = pi(1B) = pi(1C) = 1.
Note that for x, y ∈ R, we have
X − x1A − y1B ∈ A1 ⇐⇒ max
a∈A
X(a)− β1(a) ≤ x and max
b∈B
X(b)− β1(b) ≤ y.
Consequently,
ρ1(X) := ρR1(X) = max
a∈A
X(a)− β1(a) + max
b∈B
X(b)− β1(b), X ∈ X1,
and it only takes finite values. An analogous computation shows
ρ2(X) := ρR2(X) = max
b∈B
X(b)− β2(b) + max
c∈C
X(c)− β2(c), X ∈ X2.
which also takes only finite values. Set β˜ := β11A + (β1 + β2)1B + β21C . The representative
agent of this polyhedral agent system is given by
A+ = A1 +A2 = {X ∈ X : X ≤ β˜}, M = span{1A,1B,1C},
pi(x1A + y1B + z1C) = x+ y + z, x, y, z ∈ R.
Furthermore
ker(pi) = {Nx,y := x1A − (x+ y)1B + y1C : x, y ∈ R}.
We now aim to compute the associated risk sharing functional Λ and Pareto-optimal alloca-
tions. To this end, for X ∈ X , we introduce the notation
ρA(X) := max
a∈A
X(a)− β1(a), ρB(X) := max
b∈B
X(b)− β˜(b),
ρC(X) := max
c∈C
X(c)− β2(c).
Using the characterisation of A+, one obtains
A+ + ker(pi) = {X ∈ X : ρB(X) ≤ −ρA(X)− ρC(X)}.
A straightforward computation yields
Λ(X) = inf{r ∈ R : X − r1B ∈ A+ + ker(pi)} = ρA(X) + ρB(X) + ρC(X).
Note that X − Λ(X)1B −NρA(X), ρC(X) ∈ A+, since(
(X − ρA(X))1A + β11B, (X − ρB(X)− β1)1B + (X − ρC(X))1C
)
is an allocation of X − Λ(X)1B −NρA(X), ρC(X) which lies in A1 ×A2. For every ζ ∈ R, the
allocation (X1(ζ), X2(ζ)) given by
X1(ζ) = X1A + (β1 − ρA(X) + ζΛ(X))1B,
X2(ζ) = (X − ρB(X)− ρC(X)− β1 − (ζ − 1)Λ(X))1B +X1C ,
is Pareto-optimal. Last, we note that an optimal payoff for X is given by ρA(X)1A+(Λ(X)−
ρA(X)− ρC(X))1B + ρC(X)1C ∈M.
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5. Law-invariant acceptance sets
In this section we discuss the risk sharing problem for agent systems with law-invariant
acceptance sets, the second case study exemplifying the results in Sects. 2 and 3.
5.1. The setting. Throughout we fix an atomless probability space (Ω,F ,P), i.e., there is a
random variable U : Ω→ R such that the cumulative distribution function R 3 x 7→ P(U ≤ x)
of U under P is continuous. By L1 := L1(Ω,F ,P) and L∞ := L∞(Ω,F ,P) we denote the
spaces of (equivalence classes of) P-integrable and bounded random variables, respectively.
They are Banach lattices when equipped with the usual P-almost sure (a.s.) order and the
topologies arising from their natural norms ‖ · ‖1 : X 7→ E[|X|] and
‖ · ‖∞ : X 7→ inf{m > 0 : P(|X| ≤ m) = 1}.
All appearing (in)equalities between random variables are understood in the a.s. sense.
Definition 5.1. A subset C ⊆ L1 is P-law-invariant if X ∈ C whenever there is Y ∈ C which
is equal to X in law under P, i.e. the two Borel probability measures P ◦X−1 and P ◦ Y −1
on (R,B(R)) agree. Given a P-law-invariant set ∅ 6= C ⊆ L1 and some other set S 6= ∅, a
function f : C → S is called P-law-invariant if P ◦X−1 = P ◦ Y −1 implies f(X) = f(Y ).
Let us first specify the setting in the case of the ambient market space X agreeing with
the space L1 of all integrable random variables. This allows a better grasp of its respective
aspects. We will consider a more general setting later.
Model space assumptions. Throughout this section, all agents i ∈ [n] operate on the same
model space Xi = X = L1 consisting of equivalence classes of integrable random variables. In
Sect. 5.2, the results will be generalised to a wide class of model spaces L∞ ⊆ X ⊆ L1, always
under the assumption that the model spaces coincide, i.e., Xi = X , i ∈ [n]. The reason for
this is that, in principle, the individual model spaces Xi should be law-invariant and closed
ideals in X . This has strong implications however. In fact, if X is a law-invariant Banach
lattice of random variables which carries a law-invariant lattice norm like we assume below,
and Xi is supposed to be a non-trivial closed and law-invariant ideal in X , then Xi = X .
Acceptance sets. Each agent i ∈ [n] deems a loss profile adequately capitalised if it belongs
to a closed P-law-invariant acceptance set Ai ⊆ L1 which contains a riskless payoff, i.e.,
R ∩ Ai 6= ∅. (5.1)
As the dual space of L1 may be identified with L∞, we may see the respective support
functions σAi , i ∈ [n], as law-invariant mappings
σAi : L
∞ → (−∞,∞], Q 7→ sup
Y ∈Ai
E[QY ];
cf. Appendix A.1. Due to monotonicity of the sets Ai, dom(σAi) ⊆ L∞+ holds. The reader
may think of acceptance sets arising, for instance, from the Average Value at Risk (Expected
Shortfall) or distortion risk measures.
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Security markets. Regarding the security markets, we require there is a linear functional
pi :M→ R on the global security space M such that the individual pricing functionals are
given by pi = pi|Si , i ∈ [n]; the agents operate on different sub-markets (Si, pi|Si) of (M, pi).
In particular, conditions (?) and (A1) are satisfied. Moreover, we assume
Assumption 5.2. pi is of the shape pi(Z) = E[(Q+ δ)Z], Z ∈M, where δ > 0 is a constant
and Q ∈ ⋂i∈[n] dom(σAi) ⊆ L∞+ .
Our assumption on the pricing functionals is very flexible as illustrated by Example 5.14
below; the pricing functional given in Example 2.2 also conforms to Assumption 5.2. Note
that the constant function 1 = 1Ω is an element of dom(σAi), i ∈ [n]; cf. (5.4) below. As the
intersection
⋂
i∈[n] dom(σAi) is a cone, Q+δ ∈
⋂
i∈[n] dom(σAi) for every Q ∈
⋂
i∈[n] dom(σAi)
and every δ > 0. In particular, any jointly relevant density with arbitrarily small constant
perturbation can be used for pricing.
Recall from the introduction that assuming the individual acceptance sets Ai to be law-
invariant means that being acceptable or not is merely a statistical property of the loss profile.
Mathematically, this intuition necessitates introducing the hypothetical physical measure P.
Prices in the security market can, e.g., be determined by a suitable equivalent martingale
measure Q though. For the remainder of this section we assume that Assumption 5.2 is
satisfied.
Let us at last introduce the notion of comonotone partitions of the identity, or comonotone
functions, i.e., functions in the set
C := {f = (f1, . . . , fn) : R→ Rn : fi nondecreasing,
∑n
i=1 fi = idR}.
5.2. Main results. We will first formulate the main results concerning the existence of
Pareto-optimal allocations in the case of X = Xi = L1, i ∈ [n].
Theorem 5.3. Suppose the assumptions of this section are met.
(1) The set A+ + ker(pi) is a closed and proper subset of L1, and Λ is proper and l.s.c.
(2) All X ∈ dom(Λ) admit an optimal payoff ZX ∈ M. In particular, for any X ∈
dom(Λ), there exists a Pareto-optimal allocation X of the shape
Xi = Ai −Ni + Λ(X)Ui, Ai := fi(X − Λ(X)U +N) ∈ Ai, i ∈ [n], (5.2)
where N ∈ ker(pi) is an X-dependent zero cost global security and f ∈ C is X-
dependent, whereas N ∈ AsN is arbitrary and Ui ∈ Si ∩ L1++, i ∈ [n], are chosen such
that U :=
∑n
i=1 Ui satisfies pi(U) = 1.
Remark 5.4. If n = 1, Λ = ρR and Theorem 5.3 in fact solves the optimal payoff problem
studied in [7]. The proof of Theorem 5.3(1) shows that for every single agent i ∈ [n], the
Minkowski sum Ai + ker(pi) is a closed and proper subset of L1, and ρi is l.s.c.
Corollary 5.5. In the situation of Theorem 5.3, suppose that the agent system checks (A2).
Then for every W ∈ (L1)n such that W = ∑ni=1Wi ∈ int dom(Λ) there is an equilibrium
(X, φ).
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Remark 5.6. Finding elements in the interior of dom(Λ) usually requires stronger continuity
properties of the involved risk measures and is an important motivation for studying the risk
sharing problem on general model spaces endowed with a stronger topology than ‖ · ‖1. We
will do this shortly in Theorem 5.8 and Lemma 5.12. Given a loss W ∈ L1, the trick is to
find a suitable model space (X , ‖ · ‖) such that W ∈ int‖·‖dom(Λ|X ); see, e.g., [17, 33, 36, 41].
By Lemma A.5 there is a continuous selection Ψ : M → ∏ni=1 Si of M 3 Z 7→ AsZ . Hence,
the correspondence P̂ : L1  (L1)n mapping X to Pareto-optimal allocations of shape (5.2)
such that, additionally, the security allocation of N ∈ ker(pi) is given by N = Ψ(N)8 has
nonempty values on dom(Λ) by Theorem 5.3. Although it might be the case that not all
Pareto-optimal allocations of X ∈ dom(Λ) are elements of P̂(X), P̂ has the advantage of
being upper hemicontinuous on the interior of the domain of Λ.
Theorem 5.7. In the situation of Theorem 5.3 suppose A+ does not agree with one of the
level sets {X ∈ L1 : E[X] ≤ c}, c ∈ R. Then P̂ is upper hemicontinuous at every continuity
point X ∈ dom(Λ) of Λ and, a fortiori, on int dom(Λ).
We already advertised that the assumption that all agents operate on the space X = L1 does
not restrict the generality of Theorems 5.3 and 5.7 and Corollary 5.5. Indeed, the market
space X may be chosen to be any law-invariant ideal within L1 with respect to the P-a.s.
order falling in one of the following two categories:
(BC) Bounded case: X = L∞ equipped with the supremum norm ‖ · ‖∞.
(UC) Unbounded case: L∞ ⊆ X ⊆ L1 is a P-law invariant Banach lattice endowed with an
order continuous law-invariant lattice norm ‖ · ‖.9
In the unbounded case, one can show that the identity embeddings
L∞ ↪→ X ↪→ L1
are continuous, i.e. there are constants κ,K > 0 such that
∀X ∈ L∞ ∀Y ∈ X : ‖X‖ ≤ κ‖X‖∞ and ‖Y ‖1 ≤ K‖Y ‖. (5.3)
Moreover, for all φ ∈ X ∗ there is a unique Q ∈ L1 such that QX ∈ L1 and φ(X) = E[QX]
hold for all X ∈ X . The reader may think here of Lp-spaces with 1 < p < ∞, or more
generally Orlicz hearts equipped with a Luxemburg norm as for instance in [14, 17, 28].
In view of Lemma 5.12 we will assume that
• each individual acceptance set Ai ⊆ X is closed, law-invariant and satisfies Ai∩R 6= ∅;
• the security markets (Si, pi) agree with Assumption 5.2.
Our main result is
Theorem 5.8. Let X be a Banach lattice satisfying (BC) or (UC). Assume the agent system
(R1, . . . ,Rn) is such that each individual acceptance set Ai ⊆ X is closed, law-invariant and
8 Recall that N in (5.2) can be chosen arbitrarily.
9 As X will be a super Dedekind complete Riesz space, this translates as the fact that whenever Xn ↓ 0 in
order, ‖Xn‖ ↓ 0 holds as well; cf. [4, Definition 1.43] and [27, Theorem A.33].
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satisfies Ai ∩ R 6= ∅, and the security markets (Si, pi) agree with Assumption 5.2. Then
Theorems 5.3 and 5.7 and Corollary 5.5 hold verbatim when X replaces L1 and ‖ · ‖ replaces
‖ · ‖1.
For the final result on upper hemicontinuity of the equilibrium correspondence, recall that
the finite risk measure ρR : L∞ → R resulting from a risk measurement regime R on L∞ is
continuous from above if ρR(Xn) ↓ ρR(X) whenever (Xn)n∈N ⊆ L∞ and X ∈ L∞ are such
that Xn ↓ X a.s.
Theorem 5.9. Assume that (A2) is satisfied and that in case (BC) ρ1 is continuous from
above, whereas in case (UC) X is reflexive. Suppose furthermore that A+ does not agree
with a level set Lc (E[·]) and consider the correspondence E : X n  X n ×X ∗ mapping W to
equilibrium allocations (X, φ) of shape
Xi = Yi +
φ(Wi − Yi)
φ(Z˜)
Z˜, i ∈ [n],
where Y ∈ P̂(W1 + · · · + Wn), Z˜ ∈ Sˇ with pi(Z˜) 6= 0, and φ is a subgradient of Λ at
W1 + · · ·+Wn. Then E is upper hemicontinuous in the following sense: whenever (Wk)k∈N ⊆∏n
i=1 int dom(ρi) and W
k →W ∈∏ni=1 int dom(ρi) as k →∞ and (Xk, φk) ∈ E(Wk) is cho-
sen arbitrarily, k ∈ N, there is a subsequence (kλ)λ∈N such that (X, φ) := limλ→∞(Xkλ , φkλ) ∈
E(W).
5.3. Ancillary results and proofs. We begin with the existence of optimal payoffs and
Pareto-optimal allocations. This is a direct consequence of Proposition 3.4 in the case X =
L1, provided we can prove the properness of Λ and closedness of A+ + ker(pi). First, we
characterise the recession cone 0+A of a convex law-invariant acceptance set A, a result
of independent interest. For the definition of a recession cone and of the support function
σA, we refer to Appendix A.1. With slight modifications, Proposition 5.10 also holds true
for general closed, convex and law-invariant sets C which do not agree with one of the sets
{X ∈ L1 : c− ≤ E[X] ≤ c+}, where −∞ ≤ c− ≤ c+ ≤ ∞.
Proposition 5.10. Suppose ∅ 6= A ( L1 is a law-invariant and closed acceptance set.
(1) 0+A is law-invariant.
(2) Suppose furthermore that A does not agree with one of the level sets Lc(E[·]) for some
c ∈ R. Let Q ∈ dom(σA) and δ > 0 be arbitrary. If U ∈ 0+A satisfies E[(Q+δ)U ] = 0,
then U = 0.
Proof. (1) As A is norm closed and convex, we may apply the Hahn-Banach separation
theorem to obtain the representation
A = {X ∈ L1 : E[QX] ≤ σA(Q), ∀Q ∈ dom(σA)},
where σA is the support function of A. It is well-known that dom(σA) is a law-invariant and
convex cone in L∞+ . The law-invariance of dom(σA) combined with Lemma A.1 shows that
the recession cone 0+A is law-invariant and closed as well.
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(2) By (1) and [40, Lemma 1.3], for any U ∈ 0+A, Q ∈ dom(σA), and sub-σ-algebra H ⊆ F ,
we have
E[U |H] ∈ 0+A and E[Q|H] ∈ dom(σA). (5.4)
Choosing H = {∅,Ω}, we obtain that E[Q] ∈ dom(σA) for all Q ∈ dom(σA). Moreover, by
choosing Q ∈ dom(σA) ⊆ L∞+ appropriately, we obtain that 1 ∈ dom(σA).
Now suppose there is no c ∈ R such that A = Lc(E[·]), and assume a direction U ∈ 0+A is
not constant. In a first step, we will exclude the possibility that E[U ] = 0. To this end let
Q ∈ dom(σA) be non-constant. Such a Q exists because A does not agree with one of the
lower level sets of E[·]. As (Ω,F ,P) is non-atomic, for k ≥ 2 large enough there is a finite
measurable partition10 Π := (A1, . . . , Ak) of Ω such that P(Aj) =
1
k , j ∈ [k], and
Û = E[U |σ(Π)] = ∑ki=1 ui1Ai and Q̂ = E[Q|σ(Π)] = ∑ki=1 qi1Ai
are both non-constant. For any permutation τ : [k] → [k] the random variable given by
Ûτ :=
∑k
i=1 uτ(i)1Ai has the same distribution under P as Û . Hence, by (5.4) and (1),
Ûτ ∈ 0+A follows. Similarly, Q̂τ :=
∑k
i=1 qτ(i)1Ai ∈ dom(σA). For our argument we will
hence assume without loss of generality that the vectors u and q satisfy u1 ≤ · · · ≤ uk and
q1 ≤ · · · ≤ qk. In both chains of inequalities, at least one inequality has to be strict. We
estimate
E[Q̂]E[Û ] =
(
1
k
k∑
i=1
qi
)
·
(
1
k
k∑
i=1
ui
)
<
1
k
k∑
i=1
qiui = E[Q̂ · Û ] ≤ 0.
Here, the first strict inequality is due to Chebyshev’s sum inequality [29, Theorem 43] and u
and q being non-constant. The last inequality is due to Û ∈ 0+A, Q̂ ∈ dom(σA), and Lemma
A.1. E[Û ] = E[U ] = 0 is hence impossible.
In a second step, let Q ∈ dom(σA) and δ > 0 be arbitrary. Suppose U ∈ 0+A satisfies
E[(Q + δ)U ] = E[QU ] + δE[U ] = 0. As Q, δ ∈ dom(σA), Lemma A.1 yields E[QU ] ≤ 0 and
δE[U ] ≤ 0. Combining these facts leads to the identities E[U ] = E[QU ] = 0, whence U = 0
follows with the first step. 
We continue with a result for comonotone functions. One easily verifies that for f ∈ C and
i ∈ [n] the coordinate function fi is Lipschitz continuous with Lipschitz constant 1. Moreover,
for γ > 0, we set
Cγ := {f ∈ C : f(0) ∈ [−γ, γ]n}.
From [26, Lemma B.1] we recall the following compactness result:
Lemma 5.11. For every γ > 0, Cγ ⊆ (Rn)R is sequentially compact in the topology of
pointwise convergence: for any sequence (fk)k∈N ⊆ Cγ there is a subsequence (kλ)λ∈N and
f ∈ Cγ such that
∀x ∈ R : fkλ(x)→ f(x), λ→∞.
We are now ready to prove Theorem 5.3.
10 That is the sets are pairwise disjoint, measurable, and their union is Ω.
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Proof of Theorem 5.3. (1) The individual acceptance sets Ai may be used to define P-law-
invariant l.s.c. monetary base risk measures ξi by
ξi(X) := inf{m ∈ R : X −m ∈ Ai} ∈ (−∞,∞], X ∈ L1.
By (5.1), ξi(Y ) ∈ R holds for all bounded random variables Y ∈ L∞. The lower level sets
Lc(ξi), c ∈ R, may be written as Lc(ξi) = c + Ai. The risk measures ξi admit a dual
representation
ξi(X) = sup
Q∈dom(ξ∗i )
E[QX]− ξ∗i (Q), X ∈ L1, (5.5)
where cash-additivity implies that
dom(ξ∗i ) ⊆ {Q ∈ L∞+ : E[Q] = 1} and ξ∗i (Q) = σAi(Q), Q ∈ dom(ξ∗i ). (5.6)
Moreover, the infimal convolution ξ := ni=1ξi > −∞ is a P-law-invariant monetary risk
measure on L1 as well and ξ∗ =
∑n
i=1 ξ
∗
i by Lemma A.4. Now, by [26, Corollary 2.7], ξ is
l.s.c., and for each X ∈ dom(ξ) there is f ∈ C such that
ξ(X) =
n∑
i=1
ξi(fi(X)). (5.7)
Suppose now X ∈ L1 satisfies ξ(X) ≤ 0 and let f as in (5.7). For all i ∈ [n] we may choose
ci ∈ R such that ξi(fi(X) − ci) = ξi(fi(X)) − ci ≤ 0 and
∑n
i=1 ci = 0. If gi := fi − ci,
gi(X) ∈ L0(ξi) = Ai, i ∈ [n]. Hence,
X =
n∑
i=1
gi(X) ∈
n∑
i=1
Ai = A+.
We have thus shown that
L0(ξ) = A+.
As ξ is l.s.c. the left-hand set (and thus also the right-hand set) is norm closed.
Let pi(·) = E[(Q+δ)·] as in Assumption 5.2. Suppose first that, for some c ∈ R, A+ = Lc(E[·]).
Then Q ∈ R+ holds and pi = pE[·] for a suitable p > 0. We obtain that 0+A+∩ker(pi) = ker(pi)
is a subspace. By Dieudonne´’s theorem [45, Theorem 1.1.8], A+ + ker(pi) is closed.
If A+ does not agree with one of the lower level sets of E[·], Proposition 5.10(2) allows us
to infer that 0+A+ ∩ ker(pi) = {0}, a subspace. Again, Dieudonne´’s theorem yields the
closedness of A+ + ker(pi).
For properness of Λ, let X ∈ L1 be arbitrary. Suppose Z ∈M is such that X −Z ∈ A+, i.e.
ξ(X − Z) ≤ 0. Let Q ∈ L∞+ and δ > 0 be chosen as in Assumption 5.2. By (5.6),
Q∗ :=
Q+ δ
E[Q] + δ
∈ dom(ξ∗).
Moreover,
0 ≥ E [Q∗(X − Z)]− ξ∗ (Q∗) = E [Q∗X]− ξ∗ (Q∗)− (E[Q] + δ)pi(Z),
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which implies
pi(Z) ≥ E [Q
∗X]− ξ∗ (Q∗)
E[Q] + δ
> −∞.
The properness follows with the representation of Λ given in Theorem 3.1(2). The lower
semicontinuity of Λ is due to Proposition 3.4.
(2) By (1), Λ is proper and A+ + ker(pi) is closed. By Proposition 3.4, every X ∈ dom(Λ)
admits an optimal payoff ZX and thus a Pareto-optimal allocation by Theorem 3.3. For
the concrete shape of ZX and the Pareto-optimal allocation, let U ∈ ∏ni=1 Si be as in the
assertion. As in the proof of (1), we may find f ∈ C such that fi(X − ZX) ∈ Ai, i ∈ [n].
As pi(ZX) = Λ(X), we have N := Λ(X)U − ZX ∈ ker(pi). For any N ∈ AsN , the security
allocation ZX := Λ(X)U−N lies in As
ZX
. According to Theorem 3.3,
f(X − ZX) + ZX = f(X − Λ(X)U +N) + Λ(X)U−N
is a Pareto-optimal allocation of X with f(X−Λ(X)U+N) ∈∏ni=1Ai. This proves (5.2). 
Proof of Corollary 5.5. Combine Theorem 5.3 and Theorem 3.5. 
Proof of Theorem 5.7. We start with any sequence (Xk)k∈N ⊆ int dom(Λ) that converges to
X ∈ int dom(Λ). For all k ∈ N let Xk = (Xki )i∈[n] ∈ P̂(Xk). By Appendix A.3, it is enough
to show that there is a subsequence (kλ)λ∈N and an allocation X ∈ P̂(X) such that Xkλ → X
coordinatewise for λ → ∞. To this end, we first recall the construction of Xk, k ∈ N, from
Theorem 5.3: There are sequences (Nk)k∈N ⊆ ker(pi) and (fk)k∈N ⊆ C such that
• Aki := fki (Xk − Λ(Xk)U +Nk) ∈ Ai, i ∈ [n];
• Xk = Ak + Λ(Xk)U−Nk, where Nk = Ψ(Nk).
We will establish in three steps that (Nk)k∈N and (fk)k∈N lie in suitable relatively sequentially
compact sets, which will allow us to choose a convergent subsequence.
First, as Λ is continuous on int dom(Λ) by [20, Corollary 2.5], the sequence (Xk−Λ(Xk)U)k∈N
is bounded.
The second step is to prove that (Nk)k∈N is a norm bounded sequence as well. We assume
for contradiction we can select a subsequence (kλ)λ∈N such that 1 ≤ ‖Nkλ‖1 ↑ ∞. Using
compactness of the unit sphere in the finite-dimensional space ker(pi) and potentially passing
to another subsequence, we may furthermore assume
1
‖Nkλ‖1N
kλ → N∗ ∈ ker(pi)\{0}, λ→∞,
Let Y ∈ A+ be arbitrary and note that
Y +N∗ = lim
λ→∞
(1− ‖Nkλ‖−11 )Y + ‖Nkλ‖−11
(
Xkλ − Λ(Xkλ)U +Nkλ
)
∈ A+,
as the latter set is closed and convex and the sequence
(
Xkλ − Λ(Xkλ)U)
λ∈N is norm bounded.
Hence, N∗ ∈ 0+A+∩ker(pi) which is trivial by Assumption 5.2 and Proposition 5.10(2), lead-
ing to the desired contradiction. (Nk)k∈N has to be bounded and {Nk : k ∈ N} ⊆ ker(pi) is
relatively (sequentially) compact by the finite dimension of the latter space.
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In a third step, we establish relative sequential compactness for the set {fk : k ∈ N}. To
this end, recall the definition of the monetary risk measures ξi in the proof of Theorem 5.3.
As 1 ∈ dom(σAi) by the proof of Proposition 5.10 and E[1] = 1, (5.6) implies ξ∗i (1) <∞ for
all i ∈ [n]. Now fix k ∈ N and let I := {i ∈ [n] : fki (0) > 0} and J := [n]\I. If I is empty,
fki (0) = 0 has to hold for all i ∈ [n]. Now suppose we can choose i ∈ I. We abbreviate
W k := Xk − Λ(Xk)U +Nk and estimate
−E[|W k|] ≤ −E[|fki (W k)− fki (0)|] ≤ E[fki (W k)− fki (0)]
≤ ξi(fki (W k)) + ξ∗i (1)− fki (0) ≤ ξ∗i (1)− fki (0),
where we used that Aki = f
k
i (W
k) ∈ Ai. Hence,
∀i ∈ I : |fki (0)| ≤ ξ∗i (1) + ‖W k‖1. (5.8)
If j ∈ J , we obtain from the requirement fk1 + · · ·+ fkn = idR
|fkj (0)| = −fkj (0) ≤ −
∑
i∈J
fki (0) =
∑
i∈I
fki (0) ≤
∑
i∈[n]
ξ∗i (1) + n‖W k‖1 =: γk.
Thus, fk ∈ Cγk . As the bound γk depends on k only in terms of ‖W k‖1 which is uniformly
bounded in k by the first and the second step, γ := supk∈N γk <∞ and (fk)k∈N ⊆ Cγ .
After passing to subsequences two times, we can find a subsequence (kλ)λ∈N such that
• ker(pi) 3 N := limλ→∞Nkλ exists and thus Ψ(Nkλ)→ Ψ(N) for λ→∞.
• for a suitable f ∈ Cγ it holds that maxi∈[n] |fkλi − fi| → 0 pointwise for λ → ∞, cf.
Lemma 5.11.
It remains to show that (fi(X − Λ(X)U +N) + Λ(X)Ui + Ψ(N)i)i∈[n] ∈ P̂(X) and that it is
the limit of the subsequence of the Pareto-optimal allocations chosen initially. To this end,
we set A := f(X − Λ(X)U +N) and g(kλ)i := f (kλ)i − f (kλ)i (0). P-a.s., the estimate∣∣∣Ai −Akλi ∣∣∣ ≤ ∣∣∣(gi − gkλi )(X − Λ(X)U +N)∣∣∣
+
∣∣∣fkλi (X − Λ(X)U +N)− fkλi (Xkλ − Λ(Xkλ)U +Nkλ)∣∣∣
+
∣∣∣fi(0)− fkλi (0)∣∣∣
(5.9)
holds. The third term vanishes for λ→∞. The first term vanishes in norm due to dominated
convergence. From the estimate∥∥∥∣∣∣fkλi (X − Λ(X)U +N)− fkλi (Xkλ − Λ(Xkλ)U +Nkλ)∣∣∣∥∥∥
1
≤
∥∥∥X −Xkλ − (Λ(X)− Λ(Xkλ))U +N −Nkλ∥∥∥
1
,
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we infer the second term vanishes in norm, as well. Set N := Ψ(N). Lower semicontinuity
of ρi — which follows from Theorem 5.3 applied in the case n = 1, see Remark 5.4 — yields
n∑
i=1
ρi(Ai + Λ(X)Ui −Ni) ≤ lim inf
λ→∞
n∑
i=1
ρi(A
kλ
i + Λ(X
kλ)Ui −Nkλi )
= lim inf
λ→∞
Λ(Xkλ) = Λ(X).
The definition of Λ eventually yields that the inequality is actually an equality, i.e.
n∑
i=1
ρi(Ai + Λ(X)Ui −Ni) = Λ(X).
We have proved that (Ai + Λ(X)Ui − Ni)i∈[n] ∈ P̂(X) and thus upper hemicontinuity, cf.
Appendix A.3.
The same proof applies if X ∈ dom(Λ) is such that Λ is continuous at X. 
We now turn our attention to localising the results to the case when for all i ∈ [n], X = Xi
and the space X conforms with one of the cases (BC) or (UC). As a first step, we need the
following crucial extension result:
Lemma 5.12. Let R := (A,S, p) be a risk measurement regime on a Banach lattice X
satisfying (BC) or (UC). Suppose that A is ‖·‖-closed, law-invariant and satisfies A∩R 6= ∅,
and p(Z) = E[QZ] for some Q ∈ dom(σA) ∩ L∞. If we set B := cl‖·‖1(A), R := (B,S, p) is
a risk measurement regime on L1 and ρR|X = ρR.
Proof. We first prove that
A = {Y ∈ X : ∀Q ∈ dom(σA) ∩ L∞ (E[QY ] ≤ σA(Q))}. (5.10)
In case (BC) this follows from A being closed in the σ(L∞, L∞)-topology, the weak topology
associated to the dual pairing 〈L∞, L∞〉; cf. [40, Proposition 1.2]. Now consider the case
(UC) and define the convex indicator of A to be
δA : X 3 X 7→
{
∞, X /∈ A,
0, X ∈ A.
This is a convex and law-invariant function. Without loss of generality we may assume
X 6= L1. As δA has the Fatou property in the sense of [12], δA is l.s.c. in the σ(X , L∞)-
topology by [12, Proposition 2.11]. This directly implies (5.10).
Furthermore, the identities dom(σB) = dom(σA) ∩ L∞ and σB = σA|L∞ are easily verified.
By Lemma A.1,
B = {Y ∈ L1 : E[QY ] ≤ σB(Q), ∀Q ∈ dom(σB)}
= {Y ∈ L1 : E[QY ] ≤ σA(Q), ∀Q ∈ dom(σA) ∩ L∞}.
This shows that B is an acceptance set and that A = B ∩ X .
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In order to verify (2.1), suppose X ∈ L1 and Z ∈ S satisfy X + Z ∈ B. Then
p(Z) = E[QZ] = E[Q(X + Z)]− E[QX] ≤ σB(Q)− E[QX] <∞.
Hence, R is a risk measurement regime on L1. For the identity ρR|X = ρR, note that for
X ∈ X and for Z ∈ S, X−Z ∈ B if and only if X−Z ∈ B∩X = A. We infer ρR(X) = ρR(X),
X ∈ X . 
For f ∈ C, i ∈ [n] and X ∈ X , 1-Lipschitz continuity of the function fi yields |fi(X)| ≤
|X| + |fi(0)| ∈ X P-a.s. As X is an ideal, fi(X) ∈ X holds as well; hence, f(X ) ⊆ X n,
and if we plug in X ∈ X in (5.2), the resulting Pareto-optimal allocation lies in X n because
U,N ∈ X n as Si ⊆ X for all i ∈ [n]. We can now give the proof of Theorem 5.8.
Proof of Theorem 5.8. Let Ri denote the extension of the risk measurement regime Ri to
L1 as in Lemma 5.12. Apply Theorem 5.3 to ρR1 , . . . , ρRn and X ∈ X to obtain generalised
versions of Theorem 5.3(2) and Corollary 5.5. This in conjunction with Proposition 3.4
generalises Theorem 5.3(1). The proof of Theorem 5.7 only needs to be altered at (5.8) and
(5.9). We may replace ‖W k‖1 by K‖W k‖ in the first and use the order continuity of ‖ · ‖ in
the second instance, where the constant K is chosen as in (5.3). 
Finally we turn to the upper hemicontinuity of the equilibrium correspondence E as formu-
lated in Theorem 5.9, and we prove this theorem.
Proof of Theorem 5.9. Let W be such that W :=
∑n
i=1Wi ∈ int dom(Λ). From the proof
of Theorem 3.5 we infer that, indeed, every (X, φ) ∈ E(W) is an equilibrium of W. For
upper hemicontinuity, we shall first establish that the equilibrium prices of an approximating
sequence lie in a sequentially relatively compact set in the dual X ∗. We shall hence prove
that there is ε > 0 and constants c1 and c2 only depending on W such that, given any X ∈ X
with ‖X −W‖ ≤ ε and any subgradient φ of Λ at X, it holds that
‖φ‖∗ ≤ c1 and Λ∗(φ) =
∑n
i=1 ρ
∗
i (φ) ≤ c2.
As we shall elaborate later, these bound imply that all subgradients of Λ at vectors in a
closed ball around W lie in a σ(X ∗,X )-sequentially compact set.
In order to prove the assertion, continuity of Λ on int dom(Λ) (see [20, Corollary 2.5]) allows
us to choose ε > 0 such that |Λ(W + Y )−Λ(W )| ≤ 1 whenever ‖Y ‖ ≤ 2ε. Let now δ > 0 be
such that δε+ δ‖W‖ ≤ ε and fix X such that ‖X −W‖ ≤ ε and a subgradient φ of Λ at X.
Moreover, suppose Y ∈ X is such that ‖Y ‖ ≤ 1. We obtain from the subgradient inequality
Λ(X) + εφ(Y ) ≤ Λ(X + εY ) ≤ Λ(W ) + 1.
Rearranging this inequality yields
‖φ‖∗ = sup
‖Y ‖≤1
φ(Y ) ≤ Λ(W ) + 1− Λ(X)
ε
≤ 2
ε
=: c2.
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Moreover,
Λ(X) = φ(X)− Λ∗(φ) = 1
1 + δ
(φ((1 + δ)X)− Λ∗(φ))− δ
1 + δ
Λ∗(φ)
≤ 1
1 + δ
Λ((1 + δ)X)− δ
1 + δ
Λ∗(φ).
By rearranging this inequality we obtain
n∑
i=1
ρ∗i (φ) = Λ
∗(φ) ≤ 1
δ
Λ((1 + δ)X)− 1 + δ
δ
Λ(X) ≤ 2 + δ
δ
− Λ(W ) =: c1,
where we have used ‖(1 + δ)X −W‖ ≤ 2ε following from the choice of δ.
Now consider a sequence (Wk)k∈N ⊆
∏n
i=1 int dom(ρi) such that, for all i ∈ [n], W ki → Wi,
k → ∞, holds. Without loss of generality, we may assume that W k := W k1 + · · · + W kn lies
in the ball around W with radius ε. For each k ∈ N assume that (Xk, φk) ∈ E(Wk), k ∈ N.
We set
Xki = Y
k
i +
φk(W
k
i − Y ki )
φ(Z˜)
Z˜, i ∈ [n].
As Yk ∈ P̂(W k) and W k → W , k → ∞, we may assume, after passing to a subsequence,
that Yk → Y ∈ P̂(W ) by Theorem 5.7.
We shall now select a convergent subsequence (φk)k∈N. In case (BC), we conclude from [33,
Proposition 3.1(iii)] and Lemma A.4 that
dom(Λ∗) ⊆ dom(ρ∗1) ⊆ L1,
which implies that all subgradients ψ of Λ have the shape ψ = E[Q¯ ·] for a unique Q¯ ∈ L1+.
Hence, the equilibrium prices are given by φk = E[Qk·] for a unique Qk ∈ L1+. Moreover,
all subgradients Qk lie in the σ(L
1, L∞)-compact set Lc1(ρ∗1). We may invoke the Eberlein-
Sˇmulian theorem [3, Theorem 6.34] to find a subsequence (kλ)λ∈N such that Qkλ → Q ∈ L1
weakly, or equivalently φkλ → φ = E[Q ·] in σ(X ∗,X ). In case (UC), reflexivity of X ,
the Banach-Alaoglu theorem and the bounds above imply the existence of a sequentially
relatively compact set Γ such that φ ∈ Γ whenever ‖X −W‖ ≤ ε and φ is a subgradient of
Λ at X. Hence there is a σ(X ∗,X )-convergent subsequence (φkλ)λ∈N.
Consequently, in both cases,
φkλ(W
kλ
i − Y kλi )→ φ(Wi − Yi), λ→∞.
It remains to prove that φ is a subgradient of Λ at W . But as Λ∗ is l.s.c. in the σ(X ∗,X )-
topology and φkλ(W
kλ)→ φ(W ), we obtain
Λ(W ) = lim sup
λ→∞
φkλ(W
kλ)− Λ∗(φkλ) = φ(W )− lim inf
λ→∞
Λ∗(φkλ)
≤ φ(W )− Λ∗(φ),
which implies that, necessarily, Λ(W ) = φ(W )−Λ∗(φ) and φ is a subgradient of Λ at W . 
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5.4. Examples. We conclude with two examples.
Example 5.13. We consider the model space X := L1 on which two agents operate with
acceptability criteria given by the entropic risk measure. More precisely, we choose 0 < β ≤ γ
arbitrary and define
A1 := {X ∈ L1 : ξβ(X) ≤ 0}, A2 := {X ∈ L1 : ξγ(X) ≤ 0},
where, for α > 0, ξα(X) :=
1
α log
(
E[eαX ]
)
, X ∈ L1. It is well-known, cf. [26, Example 2.9],
that
ξ := ξβξγ = ξ βγ
β+γ
.
The convex conjugate ξ∗α of ξα is given in terms of the relative entropy: for all Q ∈ L∞+ such
that E[Q] = 1, we have
ξ∗α(Q) =
1
αE[Q log(Q)] <∞.
In order to satisfy Assumption 5.2, we may hence choose any pricing density Q∗ ∈ L∞+
such that Q∗ ≥ δ > 0 for some δ > 0. The pricing functionals are given by pi = E[Q∗·].
Moreover, we choose A ∈ F such that E[Q∗1A] = E[Q∗1Ac ], S1 =M = span{1A,1Ac}, and
S2 = span{1A}. Given these specifications, (R1,R2) is an agent system.
Note that ker(pi) = {Nr := r1A − r1Ac : r ∈ R}. We will now characterise A+ + ker(pi) and
set, for the sake of brevity,
α :=
βγ
β + γ
.
Given the characterisation of A+, X − Nr ∈ A+ for some r ∈ R if and only if E[eαX1A] ·
E[eαX1Ac ] ≤ 14 , as there is then a solution r ∈ R to
0 ≥ 1
α
log
(
E[eα(X−Nr)]
)
=
1
α
log
(
e−αrE[eαX1A] + eαrE[eαX1Ac ]
)
.
Now, for arbitrary X ∈ dom(Λ) = dom(ξα), we note that
Λ(X) = inf{pi(r1) : r ∈ R, X − r1 ∈ A+ + ker(pi)}
= inf
{
rE[Q∗] : r ∈ R, e−αrE[eαX1A] · E[eαX1Ac ] ≤ 1
4
}
=
E[Q∗]
α
(
logE[eαX1A] + logE[e
αX1Ac ] + 2 log(2)
)
.
Hereafter, we choose a solution r∗ of
e−αrE[eα(X−Λ(X))1A] + eαrE[eα(X−Λ(X))1Ac ] = 1,
e.g.
r∗ := log
(
2E[eα(X−Λ(X))1A]√
1− 4E[eα(X−Λ(X))1A] · E[eα(X−Λ(X))1Ac ] + 1
)
.
Using the results from [26, Example 2.9],
(
γ
β + γ
(X − Λ(X)1−Nr∗), β
β + γ
(X − Λ(X)1−Nr∗)) ∈ A1 ×A2.
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Consequently, the following is a Pareto-optimal allocation of X:(
γ
β + γ
(X − Λ(X)1−Nr∗) + Λ(X)1 +Nr∗ , β
β + γ
(X − Λ(X)1−Nr∗)
)
Example 5.14. Here, we choose the model space X = L∞ and illustrate the existence of
Pareto-optimal allocations for two agents with acceptance sets less similar than in Example
5.13. To this end, we fix two parameters β ∈ (0, 1) and γ > 0 and suppose that acceptability
for agent 1 is based on the Average Value at Risk, i.e.
A1 = {X ∈ L∞ : ξ1(X) := AVaRβ(X) ≤ 0}
= {X ∈ L∞ : ∀Q ∈ Q (E[QX] ≤ 0)},
where Q = {Q ∈ L∞+ : 0 ≤ Q ≤ 11−β P-a.s., E[Q] = 1}. The acceptance set of agent 2 is, as
in Example 5.13, given by an entropic risk measure, i.e.
A2 := {X ∈ L∞ : ξ2(X) := 1γ log
(
E[eγX ]
) ≤ 0}.
By [27, Example 4.34 & Theorem 4.52], the support function of A+ = A1 +A2 is given for
Q ∈ L∞+ by
σA+(Q) = (σA1 + σA2)(Q) =

0, Q = 0
1
γE
[
Q log
(
Q
E[Q]
)]
, if Q 6= 0 and QE[Q] ∈ Q,
∞ otherwise.
As in Example 2.2, we choose a pricing density Q∗ ∈ L∞+ such that, for some δ ∈ (0, 1),
δ ≤ Q∗ ≤ 1−δ1−β + δ holds and such that E[Q∗] = 1. In this case, Q∗ = δ + (1 − δ)Q, where
Q = Q
∗−δ
1−δ ∈ Q, hence Q∗ satisfies Assumption 5.2.
Suppose the security spaces Si, i = 1, 2, are given as in Example 5.13 for some nonempty
A ∈ F . As pricing rules we set pi := E[Q∗·], i = 1, 2, which results in
ker(pi) = span{N := 1A − r∗1Ac}, r∗ = E[Q
∗1A]
1− E[Q∗1A] .
Let X ∈ L∞ be any aggregated loss. Using [24, Theorem 3], we obtain the dual representation
Λ(X) = max
Q∈Q˜
E[QX]− 1
γ
E[Q log(Q)],
where Q˜ = {Q ∈ Q : E[Q1A] = E[Q∗1A]}. We will now compute the right scaling factor
s ∈ R such that X−Λ(X)−sN ∈ A+. This is the case if and only if we have for all Q ∈ Q\Q˜
E[QX]− 1
γ
E[Q log(Q)]− Λ(X) ≤ sE[QN ].
We obtain
s ≥ sup
Q∈Q\Q˜:E[Q1A]>E[Q∗1A]
E[QX]− 1γE[Q log(Q)] + Λ(X)
E[QN ]
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and
s ≤ inf
Q∈Q\Q˜:E[Q1A]<E[Q∗1A]
1
γE[Q log(Q)] + Λ(X)− E[QX]
|E[QN ]| ,
and the bounds describe an a priori nonempty interval. Choose any s∗ in this interval.
Combining [31, Proposition 3.2 & Sect. 3.5], we obtain that(
(X − Λ(X)− s∗N − ζ)+, (X − Λ(X)− s∗N) ∧ ζ) ∈ A1 ×A2.
for a suitable ζ ∈ R. Thus (X1, X2) given by
X1(ζ) = (X − Λ(X)− s∗N − ζ)+ − s∗r∗1Ac + Λ(X),
X2(ζ) = (X − Λ(X)− s∗N) ∧ ζ + s∗1A,
is a Pareto-optimal allocation of X.
6. Optimal portfolio splits
In this section we study the existence of optimal portfolio splits. For a thorough discussion
of this problem, we refer to Tsanakas [42], although the problem we consider is rather akin to
Wang [43]. A financial institution holds a portfolio which yields the future loss W . In order
to diversify the risk posed by W , it may consider dividing the portfolio into n sub-portfolios
X1, . . . , Xn ∈ X , X1 + · · ·+Xn = W , and transfer these sub-portfolios to, e.g., distinct legal
entities such as subsidiaries which operate under potentially varying regulatory regimes. As
observed by Tsanakas, for convex, but not positively homogeneous risk measures, without
market frictions like transaction costs risk can usually be reduced arbitrarily by introducing
more subsidiaries, and hence, there is no incentive to stop this splitting procedure. However,
since n can be arbitrarily large, transaction costs should not be neglected in this setting, and
we will study the problem of finding cost-optimal portfolio splits under market frictions.
To be more precise, we model the subsidiaries as a family (ρi)i∈N of normalised risk measures
on one and the same Fre´chet lattice (X ,, τ) – which entails ρ∗i ≥ 0 for all i ∈ N – such
that the associated risk measurement regimes (Ri)i∈N check infinite supportability (A4): as
one and the same parent company splits the losses into n sub-portfolios, assuming that, for
each n ∈ N, the set of subsidiaries (ρi)i∈[n] forms an agent system satisfying (A3) seems
natural. Let further c : N→ [0,∞) be a nondecreasing cost function. The transaction costs
of introducing subsidiaries i ∈ [n] and splitting a portfolio among them are given by c(n).
The condition limn→∞ c(n) = ∞ prevents infinite splitting. At last we introduce Λn(X) :=
infX∈AX
∑n
i=1 ρi(Xi), X ∈ X , the usual risk sharing functional associated to (R1, . . . ,Rn).
Note that for all X ∈ X , n ∈ N, and every X ∈ X n with ∑ni=1Xi = X, the estimate∑n
i=1 ρi(Xi) =
∑n
i=1 ρi(Xi) + ρn+1(0) ≥ Λn+1(X) holds, which entails Λn(X) ≥ Λn+1(X),
n ∈ N. In this setting, optimal portfolio splits exist if each Λn is exact on dom(Λn):
Theorem 6.1. Suppose (Ri)i∈N is a sequence of risk measurement regimes on a Fre´chet
lattice X which checks (A4) and results in all ρi being normalised. Moreover, assume that
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the cost function satisfies
lim
n→∞ c(n) =∞
and that Λn is exact on dom(Λn) for all n ∈ N and let W ∈
∑m
i=1 dom(ρi) for some m ∈ N.
Then there is (n∗, X1, . . . , Xn∗), where n∗ ∈ N and (X1, . . . , Xn∗) is an attainable allocation
of W , which is a solution of
n∑
i=1
ρi(Xi) + c(n)→ min subject to n ∈ N and X ∈ X n with
n∑
i=1
Xi = W. (6.1)
Proof. Note that (A4) can be rewritten as
∃φ0 ∈
∞⋂
i=1
dom(ρ∗i ) :
∞∑
i=1
ρ∗i (φ0) <∞. (6.2)
Let
m∗ := min{m ∈ N : Λm(W ) <∞} = min{m ∈ N : W ∈
m∑
i=1
dom(ρi)} <∞.
By (6.2), we have Λn(W ) ≥ φ0(W ) −
∑∞
i=1 ρ
∗
i (φ0) > −∞ for all n ≥ m∗. Thus, Λn(W ) +
c(n) =∞ whenever n < m∗ and
lim inf
n→∞ Λn(W ) + c(n) ≥ φ0(W )−
∞∑
i=1
ρ∗i (φ0) + limn→∞ c(n) =∞.
Therefore, we can find n∗ ∈ N such that
Λn∗(W ) + c(n∗) = inf
n∈N
Λn(W ) + c(n) ∈ R.
In order to obtain a solution to (6.1), choose an attainable allocation X ∈ X n∗ of X such
that Λn∗(X) =
∑n∗
i=1 ρi(Xi). 
Corollary 6.2. Suppose (Ri)i∈N is a sequence of risk measurement regimes on a Fre´chet
lattice X such that all ρi are normalised. Then the assertion of Theorem 6.1 holds under
each of the following conditions:
(1) The risk measures (ρ1, . . . , ρn) comply with Theorem 5.8 for each n ∈ N and the
pricing functionals are given by pi = E[(Q+ δ)·]|Si for a fixed δ > 0 and Q ∈ L∞+ with
supY ∈Ai E[(Q+ δ)Y ] ≤ 0, i ∈ N.
(2) (A4) is satisfied, and for each n ∈ N, (R1, . . . ,Rn) is a polyhedral agent system.
Proof. (1) Let Q ∈ L∞+ and δ > 0 be as described in the assertion and set Q∗ := Q + δ.
Assumption 5.2 is satisfied. Let i ∈ N be arbitrary and recall the definition of the cash-
additive risk measures ξi in the proof of Theorem 5.3. By (5.6), ξ
∗
i (
Q∗
E[Q∗]) ≤ 0. Theorem 5.8
in the case n = 1 (see Remark 5.4) yields that each X ∈ dom(ρi) admits an optimal payoff
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ZX ∈ Si, i.e. X − ZX ∈ Ai and E[Q∗ZX ] = pi(ZX) = ρi(X). Hence,
ρ∗i (Q
∗) = sup
X∈dom(ρi)
E[Q∗X]− ρi(X) = sup
X∈dom(ρi)
E[Q∗(X − ZX)]
≤ E[Q∗]ξ∗i ( Q
∗
E[Q∗]) ≤ 0.
Conversely, as ρi is normalised, we have ρ
∗
i (Q
∗) ≥ 0. Hence, (A4) holds and φ0 in (6.2) may
be chosen as φ0 = E[Q∗·]. The solvability of (6.1) under (1) follows from Theorems 5.8 and
6.1.
(2) By Theorem 4.3 Λn is exact on dom(Λn) for every n ∈ N. Apply Theorem 6.1. 
Remark 6.3. Suppose that in the situation of Corollary 6.2(1) each of the monetary base
risk measures ξi(X) := inf{m ∈ R : X − m ∈ Ai}, X ∈ X , is normalised. Then each
δ > 0 and each Q ∈ R+ satisfy the assumptions of part (1). This follows from the fact that
ξ∗i (1) = 0 holds for every i ∈ N. Indeed, by arguments similar to the proof of Proposition 5.10,
ξ∗i (E[Q|H]) ≤ ξ∗i (Q) holds for all Q ∈ dom(ξ∗i ) and all sub-σ-algebras H ⊆ F . Hence,
ξ∗i (1) = inf
Q∈dom(ξ∗i )
ξ∗i (Q) = − sup
Q∈dom(ξ∗i )
−ξ∗i (Q) = −ξi(0) = 0, i ∈ N.
Appendix A. Technical supplements
A.1. The geometry of convex sets. Fix a nonempty convex subset C of a locally convex
Hausdorff topological Riesz space (X ,, τ) with dual space X ∗. The support function of C
is the functional
σC : X ∗ → (−∞,∞], φ 7→ sup
Y ∈C
φ(Y ).
The recession cone of C is the set
0+C := {U ∈ X : Y + kU ∈ C, ∀Y ∈ C, ∀ k ≥ 0}.
A vector U lies in 0+C if and only if Y +U ∈ C holds for all Y ∈ C. U is then called a direction
of C. The lineality space of C is the vector space lin(C) := 0+C ∩ (−0+C). In the case of
an acceptance set A, monotonicity implies dom(σA) ⊆ X ∗+. If C is closed, the Hahn-Banach
separation theorem shows that
C = {Y ∈ X : φ(Y ) ≤ σC(φ), ∀φ ∈ dom(σC)}.
Combining this identity with the definition of the recession cone and the lineality space yields
Lemma A.1. If C ⊆ X is closed and convex and J ⊆ dom(σC) is such that
C = {X ∈ X : φ(X) ≤ σC(φ), ∀φ ∈ J },
then
0+C =
⋂
φ∈J
L0(φ) = {U ∈ X : φ(U) ≤ 0, ∀φ ∈ J } and lin(A) =
⋂
φ∈J
ker(φ).
Last we state a decomposition result for closed convex sets specific to finite-dimensional
spaces. It follows from arguments in the proofs of [9, Lemmas II.16.2 and II.16.3].
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Lemma A.2. Let C ⊆ Rd be convex and closed and V := lin(C)⊥. If ext(C ∩ V) denotes the
set of extreme points of C ∩ V and co(·) is the convex hull operator, C can be written as
C = co(ext(C ∩ V)) + 0+C.
A.2. Infimal convolution. Let (X ,) be a Riesz space and suppose that functions gi :
X → (−∞,∞], i ∈ [n], are given. The infimal convolution or epi-sum of g1, . . . , gn is the
function ni=1gi : X → [−∞,∞] defined by
ni=1gi(X) := inf
{
n∑
i=1
gi(Xi) : X1, . . . , Xn ∈ X ,
n∑
i=1
Xi = X
}
, X ∈ X .
The convolution is said to be exact at X ∈ X if (ni=1gi)(X) ∈ R and there is X1, . . . , Xn ∈ X
with
∑n
i=1Xi = X such that
n∑
i=1
gi(Xi) = (ni=1gi)(X).
Lemma A.3. Suppose Xi ⊆ X , i ∈ [n], are ideals in a Riesz space (X ,) such that X =∑n
i=1Xi.
(1) If all gi : X → (−∞,∞] are convex, then ni=1gi is convex.
(2) If gi is monotone on Xi with respect to  for all i ∈ [n], i.e., X,Y ∈ Xi, X  Y ,
implies gi(X) ≤ gi(Y ), and gi|X\Xi ≡ ∞, then ni=1gi is monotone on X .
Proof. We only prove (2). Let X,Y ∈ X , X  Y , and let X,Y ∈∏ni=1Xi with ∑ni=1Xi = X
and
∑n
i=1 Yi = Y . We thus have
0  Y −X = |Y −X| ∑ni=1 |Yi −Xi|.
By the Riesz space property of X and the Riesz Decomposition Property (cf. [3, Sect. 8.5]),
there is a vector Z ∈ (X+)n such that Y −X =
∑n
i=1 Zi and such that Zi = |Zi|  |Yi−Xi|,
i ∈ [n]. Xi being an ideal yields that in fact Z ∈
∏n
i=1Xi. By monotonicity of gi on Xi,
i ∈ [n], we obtain
(ni=1gi)(X) ≤
n∑
i=1
gi(Yi − Zi) ≤
n∑
i=1
gi(Yi).
As (ni=1gi)(Y ) = inf{
∑n
i=1 gi(Yi) : Y ∈
∏n
i=1Xi} by the assumption that gi|X\Xi ≡ ∞,
taking the infimum over suitable Y on the right-hand side proves the assertion. 
Note that the risk sharing functional satisfies Λ = ni=1gi, where the functions gi are defined
by gi(X) = ρi(X) if X ∈ Xi and gi(X) = ∞ otherwise, X ∈ X , i ∈ [n]. These functions gi
inherit convexity on X and monotonicity on Xi from ρi.
Lemma A.4. Given a locally convex Hausdorff topological Riesz space (X ,, τ) and proper
functions gi : X → (−∞,∞], i ∈ [n], the following identities hold:
(ni=1gi)∗ =
n∑
i=1
g∗i and dom((ni=1gi)∗) =
n⋂
i=1
dom(g∗i ).
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A.3. Correspondences. Given two nonempty sets A and B, a map Γ : A → 2B mapping
elements of A to subsets of B is called a correspondence and will be denoted by Γ : A 
B. Assume now that (X , τ) and (Y, σ) are topological spaces, and let Γ : X  Y be a
correspondence.
A continuous function Ψ : X → Y is a continuous selection for the correspondence Γ if
Ψ(x) ∈ Γ(x) holds for all x ∈ X .
If (X , σ) is first countable, Γ is upper hemicontinuous at x ∈ X if, whenever (xk)k∈N is a
sequence σ-convergent to x and (yk)k∈N ⊆ Y is such that, for each k ∈ N, yk ∈ Γ(xk), there
is a limit point y ∈ Γ(x) of (yk)k∈N. If both topological spaces are first countable, Γ is lower
hemicontinuous at x ∈ X if, whenever (xk)k∈N is a sequence σ-convergent to x and y ∈ Γ(x),
there is a subsequence (kλ)λ∈N and yλ ∈ Γ(xkλ), λ ∈ N, such that yλ → y with respect
to τ as λ → ∞.11 An example of a lower hemicontinuous correspondence relevant for our
investigations is the security allocation map
As· :M3 Z 7→ AZ ∩
n∏
i=1
Si.
Lemma A.5. The correspondence As· is lower hemicontinuous on the global security market
M and admits a continuous selection Ψ :M→∏ni=1 Si with respect to any norm on M.
Proof. Let 〈·, ·〉 be an inner product on M. Set S0 := {0}. We claim that there are natural
numbers 0 = m0 < m1 ≤ · · · ≤ mn and Z1, . . . , Zmn ∈
⋃n
i=1 Si such that for all i ∈ [n], it
holds that {Zmi−1+1, . . . , Zmi} is an orthonormal basis of
{
X ∈ Si : X ⊥ span{Z1, . . . , Zmi−1}
}
.
Note that every Z ∈ M can be expressed as Z = ∑mni=1〈Zi, Z〉Zi, hence the mapping
Ψ : Z 7→ AsZ defined by
Ψ(Z)i :=
∑mi
i=mi−1+1〈Zi, Z〉Zi, i ∈ [n],
is a selection of As· and continuous with respect to the unique locally convex Hausdorff
topology on M. Lower hemicontinuity follows immediately. 
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a b s t r a c t
We study the problem of optimising the aggregated utility within a system of agents under the
assumption that individual utility assessments are law-invariant: they rank Savage acts merely in terms
of their distribution under a fixed reference probability measure. We present a unifying framework
in which optimisers can be found which are comonotone allocations of an aggregated quantity. Our
approach can be localised to arbitrary rearrangement invariant commodity spaces containing at least
all bounded wealths. The aggregation procedure is a substantial degree of freedom in our study.
Depending on the choice of aggregation, the optimisers of the optimisation problems are allocations
of a wealth with desirable economic efficiency properties, such as (weakly, biased weakly, and
individually rationally) Pareto efficient allocations, core allocations, and systemically fair allocations.
© 2019 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
A substantial driver in the development of mathematical eco-
nomics has been the theory of general equilibrium, surveyed,
among many others, by Debreu (1982) and Mas-Colell and Zame
(1991). It mainly analyses whether and how a pure exchange
economy populated by a finite number of agents can share a com-
modity in an efficient way. Efficiency is always to be understood
against the backdrop of potentially varying individual preferences
the agents have concerning the shares of the commodity they
receive.
We shall refer to such sharing schemes as allocations. The most
prominent notion of their efficiency is Pareto efficiency, a systemic
notion of stability and efficiency of an economy which means
that no agent can improve her share without worsening the share
of another agent. Formally, suppose the agents are represented
by the set {1, . . . , n}, share a common good X , and entertain
preferences  i, i 2 {1, . . . , n}, concerning the share they are to
receive. Then a sharing X = (X1, . . . , Xn) is Pareto efficient if any
other sharing scheme Y = (Y1, . . . , Yn) which satisfies Xi   Yi for
some agent i necessarily satisfies Yj   Xj for another agent j 6= i.
Pareto efficient allocations can be analysed particularly well if
the individual preferences  i, i 2 {1, . . . , n}, admit a numerical
representation: if X denotes the set of commodities agent i ac-
cepts as her share, a function Ui : X ! [ 1,1) is a numerical
representation of the preference relation  i if i weakly prefers Y
⇤ Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: liebrich@math.lmu.de (F.-B. Liebrich),
svindla@math.lmu.de (G. Svindland).
to X if, and only if, Ui(X)  Ui(Y ). We will refer to Ui as a utility
function.1
Let us assume now that the commodity space involved in such
a problem is a vector space X . Given a good X 2 X which is to
be shared, an allocation of X is any vector X = (X1, . . . , Xn) with
the property X1+· · ·+Xn = X . This assumption of perfect substi-
tution means that in principle, any sharing of X is hypothetically
feasible for the agents. Suppose furthermore that each individual
preference relation  i can be numerically represented by a utility
function Ui : X ! [ 1,1), i 2 {1, . . . , n}.
A key observation which will be the guiding thread of our
investigations, initially due to Negishi, is the following: suppose
that suitable positive weights w1, . . . , wn > 0 can be found such
that the allocation X⇤ = (X⇤1 , . . . , X⇤n ) satisfies
nX
i=1
wiUi(Xi) 
nX
i=1
wiUi(X⇤i ) 2 R,
where X = (X1, . . . , Xn) 2 X n is an arbitrary allocation of X . Then
X⇤ is indeed a Pareto efficient allocation of X .
Let us abstract this example which we shall get back to at a
later stage of the paper. The allocation X⇤ is a maximiser for the
optimisation problem
⇤(U(X))! max subject to X 2  X , (1)
where  X is the set of all allocations X 2 X n with the property
X1 + · · · + Xn = X , whereas U(X) := (U1(X1), . . . ,Un(Xn)) denotes
the vector of individual utilities resulting for the agents from the
1 As usual, we exclude the case of infinite utility, whereas infinite disutility
cannot be excluded a priori.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2019.05.002
0304-4068/© 2019 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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sharing X. These individual utilities are aggregated to a single
quantity using the aggregation function
⇤(y) :=
nX
i=1
wiyi,  1  yi <1, (2)
and the optimal value is finite. As the aggregation function ⇤
in problem (1) may be chosen freely, it introduces substantial
flexibility which we shall exploit in Section 5. Given a parameter
0 < ↵  1, we will use the aggregation function
⇤↵(y) := ↵ min
1in yi + (1  ↵) max1in yi,  1  yi <1,
to obtain (biased) weakly Pareto efficient allocations as maximisers
for problem (1). Similarly, if we choose the aggregation function
⌅↵(y) :=
X
;6=S⇢{1,...,n}
↵ min
1in yi + (1  ↵)maxi2S yi,  1  yi <1,
maximisers will be so-called core allocations, which reflect certain
notions of fairness in game theory. The reader should keep in
mind that both the optimal value and the optimisation problem
itself will be of secondary importance.
We shall assume throughout our study that all goods are risky
future quantities or Savage acts, i.e. real-valued random variables
contingent on a measurable space (⌦,F) of future states of
the world. One may also think of them in the interpretation of
Mas-Colell and Zame (1991) as consumption patterns. Riskiness
in the realisation of the states ! 2 ⌦ is assumed to be governed
by a reference probability measure P such that the probability
space (⌦,F,P) is non-atomic.2 As usual, we shall identify two
Savage acts X and Y if the event {! 2 ⌦ | X(!) = Y (!)}
has full P-probability. Substantial results have been achieved
solving problem (1) with aggregation function ⇤ chosen as in
(2) in a framework of Savage acts and involving law-invariant
preferences, c.f. Acciaio (2007), Carlier and Dana (2008), Chen
et al. (2018), Dana (2011), Filipovi¢ and Svindland (2008), Jouini
et al. (2008), Ravanelli and Svindland (2014).
We adopt the assumption that the agents involved have law-
invariant preferences, i.e. the values of the utility functions Ui,
i 2 {1, . . . , n}, only depend on the distribution of the commodity
under the reference probability measure P: if two Savage acts X
and Y induce the same lottery over the real line under P, i.e. if the
Borel probability measures P X 1 and P Y 1 on R are identical,
then Ui(X) = Ui(Y ) holds for all i = 1, . . . , n, the reasoning being
that utility only depends on statistical properties of the commod-
ity. Along the lines of Dana (2011) and Jouini et al. (2008), we
shall refer to such utility assessments as law-invariant. Under
the name of probabilistic sophistication it is a well-known prop-
erty of preference relations which was introduced by Machina
and Schmeidler (1992); we refer to Cerreia-Vioglio et al. (2012)
as well as the references in Cerreia-Vioglio et al. (2012, foot-
note 2); however, these references typically study preference
relations in an Anscombe–Aumann framework with general sets
of consequences. Strzalecki (2011), on the other hand, studies
probabilistic sophistication for general finitely additive reference
probabilities. We use the term law-invariance to emphasise that
we are working in a Savage setting with a numerical represen-
tation of a preference relation whose values only depend on the
law under a countably additive reference probability measure.
Normatively, law-invariance can be interpreted as a form of
consequentialism of the agents in that they are indifferent be-
tween two Savage acts yielding the same consequences — by
inducing the same lottery under the reference probability mea-
sure P. Practically, this consequentialism mostly relies on the fact
2 That is, there is a random variable U whose distribution function R 3 x 7!
P(U  x) is a continuous function.
that Savage acts can be grasped only in terms of empirical distri-
butions of certain quantities, an observation which also explains
the requirement of non-atomicity of the state space (⌦,F,P).
There is a one-to-one correspondence between law-invariant util-
ity functions over Savage acts contingent on a non-atomic space
and preference relations on (suitable sets of) lotteries on the real
line.
Preferences expressed by law-invariant utility functions have
another economically appealing feature. Under a mild continuity
assumption and quasi-concavity of the utility function Ui – that
is, convexity of the preference relation expressed by Ui – law-
invariance of Ui is equivalent to two standard notions of risk
aversion: (i) monotonicity in the concave order which was in-
troduced to the economics literature by Rothschild and Stiglitz
(1970): if every risk averse expected utility agent weakly prefers
X to Y , agent i with utility Ui weakly prefers X to Y ; (ii) dilatation
monotonicity: if ⇧ is a finite measurable partition of the state
space, agent i weakly prefers the act associated to more informa-
tion encoded by ⇧ , i.e. the conditional expectation EP[X |  (⇧ )],
to X itself. This will be discussed in detail in Theorem 18, to the
best of our knowledge the most general version of this result in
the literature and one of the main results of the paper.
Our established equivalence between law-invariance and con-
cave order monotonicity has the important consequence that, in
many situations, comonotone maximisers for (1) can be found.
An allocation X of X 2 X is comonotone if there are n non-
decreasing functions fi : R ! R summing up to the identity
— f1(x) + · · · + fn(x) = x holds for all x 2 R — such that
Xi = fi(X), i = 1, . . . , n. The commodity fi(X) can be inter-
preted as a contract contingent on the common risk driver X .
Such comonotone allocations are desirable and have been widely
studied. Empirical investigations of comonotonicity as a property
of (optimal) allocations can be found in Attanasio and Davis
(1996) and Townsend (1994). According to Carlier et al. (2012),
who study multivariate comonotonicity, it is a property which –
statistically – is ‘‘testable and tractable’’. Key to solving (1) are so-
called comonotone improvement results as given by Landsberger
and Meilijson (1994), Ludkovski and Rüschendorf (2008), Carlier
et al. (2012), and Filipovi¢ and Svindland (2008). For comono-
tonicity in a multivariate setting we refer to Carlier et al. (2012)
and the references therein. For its use beyond the risk sharing
problem, see Cheung et al. (2014) and Jouini and Napp (2003) as
well as the references therein.
Before we outline our main contributions, we give a brief
overview of the rich existing literature of sharing problems as
described above. For its treatment in general equilibrium theory,
we refer to the survey articles by Debreu (1982) and Mas-Colell
and Zame (1991) as well as the Khan and Yannelis (1991). More
closely related and involving law-invariant criteria are the prob-
lems studied by Carlier and Dana (2008), which focuses on Rank
Dependent Expected Utility agents and uses additional condi-
tions, and Dana (2011), which studies optimal allocations and
equilibria for concave, monotone and law-invariant preferences
with strong order continuity properties on bounded wealths.
Jouini et al. (2008) and Acciaio (2007) study the problem for
law-invariant utility functions under the additional assumption of
cash-additivity. The comonotonicity of solutions to such sharing
problems has been subject of, e.g., Chateauneuf et al. (2000) for
Choquet expected utility agents, Strzalecki and Werner (2011)
in the case of more general ambiguity averse preferences, and
Ravanelli and Svindland (2014) who study agents with varia-
tional preferences as axiomatised by Maccheroni et al. (2006).
There is also a rich strand of literature on sharing problems
when the objective is not to maximise utility, but to minimise
risk. The functionals involved are thus not utility functions, but
risk measures. The case of agents with convex law-invariant and
105
30 F.-B. Liebrich and G. Svindland / Journal of Mathematical Economics 84 (2019) 28–45
cash-additive risk measures has been studied by Filipovi¢ and
Svindland (2008) on Lebesgue spaces, and by Chen et al. (2018) on
general rearrangement invariant spaces. While Acciaio and Svind-
land (2009) treat the case of law-invariance for different reference
probability measures, Liebrich and Svindland (2018) consider the
problem for convex risk measures beyond law-invariance of the
involved functionals. Finally, Mastrogiacomo and Rosazza Gianin
(2015) study weak Pareto optima involving quasi-convex risk
measures.
Our main contribution is to prove the existence of comonotone
maximisers in (1), and thus of economically desirable allocations,
in a wide range of situations by laying the groundwork in clear-
cut meta results and then applying these in concrete cases which
encompass, but go beyond Pareto efficiency, such as the applica-
tion in game theory mentioned above. We prove that maximisers
in problem (1) exist for agents with heterogeneous preferences
as long as their utilities are law-invariant with respect to the
reference probability measure P and suitable bounds hold on the
one-dimensional subspace of riskless commodities. This approach
distinguishes it from other contributions in this direction which
restrict preferences to certain classes of law-invariant utilities. It
therefore qualifies as unifying. We would like to point out a few
noteworthy directions in which we were able to obtain general
results:
• The range of applications: By making suitable choices for
the aggregation function ⇤ in (1), we show the existence
of comonotone biased weakly Pareto efficient, Pareto effi-
cient, and individually rational Pareto efficient allocations
under mild assumptions. Moreover, we discuss applications
in game theory and the systemic fairness of allocations.
• Concavity assumptions: Apart from
Mastrogiacomo and Rosazza Gianin (2015), preceding stud-
ies of instances of the optimisation problem (1) assume
full concavity of the utility functions Ui.3 However, this
requirement is a very strong form of convexity of the pref-
erence relation  i on X , which means that diversification
does (comparatively) not decrease utility.4 Convexity of the
preference relation is equivalently characterised by quasi-
concavity of the numerical representations Ui: all upper level
sets {X 2 X | Ui(X)   c}, c 2 R, are convex sets.
• Monotonicity assumptions: Particularly in the financial con-
text, law-invariant utilities are widely assumed to be mono-
tone in the P-a.s. order: if for two Savage acts X and Y the
event {! 2 ⌦ | X(!)  Y (!)} has P-probability 1, the
individual utility assessments satisfy Ui(X)  Ui(Y ). This
assumption of ‘‘more is better’’ is not always convincing, in
particular in light of finiteness of resources as well as the
adverse collateral and ecological effects of economic activ-
ity. Our analysis does therefore not rely on monotonicity
whatsoever. In all our applications, we only assume that the
utility of strictly negative riskless commodities satisfies
lim
c# 1Ui(c) =  1.
Such an assumption of loss aversion does not seem far-
fetched.
Non-monotonicity of individual preferences is also the rea-
son why we distinguish between sharing with and without
free disposal. In the first case, the aggregated good X 2 X
has to be shared without any remainder, i.e. one considers
allocations X = (X1, . . . , Xn) 2 X n with the property X1 +
3 That is, for all i = 1, . . . , n, for all X, Y 2 X , and all 0 <   < 1,
Ui( X + (1   )Y )    Ui(X)+ (1   )Ui(Y ) holds.
4 That is, for all X, Y , Z 2 X and 0 <   < 1, X  i Y and X  i Z together
imply X  i  Y + (1   )Z .
· · · + Xn = X . In the second case, a unanimously rejected
remainder term may be left aside in the sharing scheme,
i.e. relevant allocations have the property X1 + · · · + Xn 
X with P-probability 1. In other words, we will study the
problem
⇤(U(X))! max subject to
X 2 b X := {X 2 X n | P(X1 + · · · + Xn  X) = 1}.
• Choice of the commodity space: Most applications – apart
from Chen et al. (2018) – assume order continuity of the
model space norm, or, even more specifically, the com-
modity space being an Lp-space of random variables. We
show that any rearrangement invariant Banach lattice of
P-integrable random variables containing all riskless com-
modities may be considered. This is a consequence of law-
invariance in conjunction with slight regularity
assumptions, a combination which implies that the problem
in question may be viewed as the localised version of a
problem posed on the space L1 of all integrable random
variables. To phrase this differently, the problem can be
solved on the level of all integrable random variables if,
and only if, it can be solved on any rearrangement invariant
commodity space. In this sense, Section 4 and Proposition 20
contain some of the main results of our investigations.
• Methodology: Throughout our investigations, we will solve
problem (1) in the most classical fashion: we show that
a maximising sequence of allocations has a subsequence
which converges to a maximiser. This seems interesting
against the backdrop of general equilibrium theory in in-
finite dimensional spaces. As elaborated in Mas-Colell and
Zame (1991), infinite dimensionality poses multiple chal-
lenges which are usually overcome using fixed point argu-
ments. Whereas it is not clear if the fixed point argument
works in our setting, the methodology we use is a powerful
addition to the toolkit of general equilibrium theory.
Structure of the paper. In Section 2, we thoroughly describe
the setting in which we shall study the sharing problem. In
Section 3, we study the problem on the commodity space L1
of all P-integrable random variables. We isolate the core dif-
ficulties of the problem, find powerful meta results applicable
in a range of situations as wide as possible, and give a set
of straightforward criteria guaranteeing that problems of the
shape (1) have maximisers. Section 4 has two parts: Section 4.1
collects the main contributions of our paper on the structural
properties of quasi-concave functions on general rearrangement
invariant Banach lattices of integrable functions. These findings
are of interest beyond the existence of efficient allocations. In
Section 4.2 we provide suitable local versions of the results in
Section 3 on such general rearrangement invariant commodity
spaces. Section 5 illustrates the range of economically relevant
allocations which can be obtained with our method. Technical
but straightforward estimates necessary for the applications are
relegated to Appendix.
2. Preliminaries
We begin with a few crucial pieces of terminology in use
throughout our investigations and introduce the setting of the
paper.
Given a non-empty set X , a function f : X ! [ 1,1] :=
R[ { 1,1} and a level c 2 R, the upper level set of f at level
c is the set
Ec(f ) := {x 2 X | f (x)   c}.
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If X is endowed with a topology ⌧ , f is upper semicontinuous
with respect to ⌧ if the sets Ec(f ) are ⌧ -closed, c 2 R. If X is a real
vector space, f is called quasi-concave if each set Ec(f ), c 2 R, is
convex, i.e. for all choices of x, y 2 Ec(f ) and all 0 <   < 1, we
have  x + (1   )y 2 Ec(f ).
The effective domain of f is defined by
dom(f ) := {x 2 X | f (x) >  1}.
If f  1({1}) = ; and dom(f ) 6= ;, f is called proper.
Throughout the text, bolded symbols will refer to vectors of
objects. Hence, whenever X is a set and n 2 N is a dimension,
objects in X n will be denoted by x = (x1, . . . , xn). If f : X !
[ 1,1] is a function, we denote by f (x) := (f (x1), . . . , f (xn))
the vector in [ 1,1]n arising from a coordinatewise evaluation
with f . Similarly, if g : X n ! [ 1,1]n is a vector-valued
function, g(x) is defined as g(x) := (g1(x1), . . . , gn(xn)).
We shall fix an atomless probability space (⌦,F,P), i.e. there
is a random variable U with continuous cumulative distribution
function R 3 x 7! P(U  x). Given a real-valued random variable
X : ⌦ ! R, P   X 1 denotes its distribution or law under P, i.e.
the probability measure P({! 2 ⌦ | X(!) 2 ·}) on Borel sets of
the real line.
We will usually identify random variables if they agree
P-almost surely (P-a.s.). The space of (equivalence classes of)
P-integrable random variables is, as usual, denoted by L1. Sim-
ilarly, L1 is the space of equivalence classes of P-a.s. bounded
random variables. By E[·] := EP[·] and E[·|H] := EP[·|H] we
abbreviate the (conditional) expectation operator (with respect
to a sub-  -algebra H ⇢ F) under P. The following notions will
be of the utmost importance for our investigations:
Definition 1. A set C ⇢ L1 is called rearrangement invariant
with respect to P if X 2 C and Y being equal to X in law under P,
i.e. P   X 1 = P   Y 1, implies Y 2 C.
Given a rearrangement invariant set C and a function f : C !
[ 1,1], f is law-invariant with respect to P if f (X) = f (Y )
whenever P   X 1 = P   Y 1.
Whenever we speak of law-invariance in the following, we
mean law-invariance with respect to the underlying reference
probability measure P unless specified otherwise. The term is also
widely used in the theory of risk measures; c.f. Föllmer and Schied
(2011).
Economically, we shall model all appearing goods as ran-
dom and contingent on the probability space (⌦,F,P). They are
Savage acts and represent state-dependent wealth.
The set of all goods towards which the agents in question have
preferences will be assumed to be an ideal X of L1 with respect
to the P-a.s. order between random variables5 which contains all
bounded random variables, i.e.
L1 ⇢ X ⇢ L1.
Although the precise formal properties of these commodity spaces
will be elaborated later in Section 4, we remark at this point
already that X is assumed to be rearrangement invariant and
normed by a law-invariant lattice norm k · k. Hence, the com-
modity spaces cover a very general range of spaces of random
variables. One of the crucial messages of our investigations, how-
ever, is that we can treat the problem in the setting X = L1, and
we shall do so in Section 3. The general case follows by means of
localisation as elaborated in Section 4.
We close this section by recalling the concave order, a crucial
notion of risk aversion.
5 That is, X ⇢ L1 is a vector space, and if X, Y 2 L1 satisfy |X |  |Y | a.s. and
Y 2 X , then also X 2 X .
Definition 2. Let X, Y 2 L1. Y dominates X in the concave
order (X  c Y ) if, and only if, E[u(X)]  E[u(Y )] for all concave
u : R! R. Given a subset C ⇢ L1, a function f : C ! [ 1,1]
is non-decreasing in the concave order if f (X)  f (Y ) holds for all
X, Y 2 C such that X  c Y .
3. The cornerstones of optimisation involving law-invariance
In the following, for a natural number n 2 N, [n] denotes
the set of the first n natural numbers, i.e. [n] = {1, 2, . . . , n}.
Throughout this section, we assume the commodity space X to
be given by L1 endowed with its natural norm k · k1, that is
kXk1 := E[|X |], X 2 L1.
We identify each agent with some i 2 [n] and assume that their
preferences over L1 are represented by a vector U = (Ui)i2[n] of
functions Ui : L1 ! [   1,1), i 2 [n], with the following
properties:
Assumption 3. For each i 2 [n], the function Ui : L1 !
[  1,1) is proper, quasi-concave, upper semicontinuous, and
law-invariant.
As discussed in the introduction, law-invariance is a con-
sequentialist assumption which means that two commodities
produce the same utility if their distribution under the reference
measure P is the same; that is, Ui(X) = Ui(Y ), i 2 [n], if the two
distributions P   X 1 and P   Y 1 on the real line agree. Alter-
natively, we will see later in Theorem 18(iii) that law-invariance
of Ui is equivalent to risk aversion in the sense of Ui being non-
decreasing in the concave order. We remark here that without
law-invariance, the existence of solutions to the optimisation
problems studied in this paper cannot be guaranteed.
Recall that we abbreviate U : (L1)n ! [ 1,1)n, U(X) =
(U1(X1), . . .Un(Xn)). As mentioned above, vectors in (L1)n will be
denoted by X, whereas their individual coordinates are denoted
by Xi, i 2 [n].
As our aim is to maximise aggregated utility within a system
arising from distributing a good X 2 L1, we first have to clarify
what a feasible distribution scheme, an allocation, is. To this end,
we introduce two types of attainable sets relevant throughout
the remainder of the paper. For X 2 L1, we consider
 X := {X 2 (L1)n | X1 + · · · + Xn = X}
andb X := {X 2 (L1)n | X1 + · · · + Xn  X}.
The vectors X in  X or b X , respectively, are called allocations
of X . X 2  X allocates X without free disposal, whereas X 2b X is an allocation of X when free disposal is allowed. It is
apparent from the definition that we study an economy without
production. Due to potential non-monotonicity of utilities in the
almost sure order, b X is more relevant in situations in which the
economy is not subject to external constraints and a unanimously
rejected remainder of X may thus be left aside. Second, we need
to introduce the notion of an aggregation function.
Definition 4. A function
⇤ : [ 1,1)n ! [ 1,1)
is an aggregation function if it is non-decreasing with respect
to the pointwise order on [ 1,1)n, i.e. ⇤(y)  ⇤(z) for all
y, z 2 [ 1,1)n such that yi  zi for all i 2 [n].
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Given a vector U of utility functions satisfying Assumption 3
and an aggregation function ⇤, we will hence be interested in
the quantity
⇤ (U(X)) = ⇤ (U1(X1), . . . ,Un(Xn))
representing the aggregated individual utilities in the system
given by an allocation X 2  X or X 2 b X of a commodity X 2 L1.
3.1. Comonotone allocations
The first step towards tackling the optimisation problem (1)
would be to reduce the attention to a well-behaved subset of
the attainable set. This will turn out to be the set of comonotone
allocations.
Definition 5. Given n 2 N, the set of comonotone n-partitions
of the identity (or comonotone functions) is the set C(n) of
functions f = (f1, . . . , fn) : R ! Rn such that each coordinate fi
is non-decreasing and
Pn
i=1 fi = idR holds.
For   > 0, we set C(n)  to be the subset of f 2 C(n) which
satisfy
Pn
i=1 |fi(0)|    . Moreover, for f 2 C(n), we set f˜ :=
f  f(0) 2 C(n).
For each f 2 C(n), i 2 [n], and x, y 2 R, the equality
nX
i=1
|fi(x)  fi(y)| = |x  y|, (3)
holds.6 In particular, it entails that each fi, i 2 [n], is a Lipschitz
continuous function with Lipschitz constant 1. As a consequence,
fi(X) 2 L1 holds for all X 2 L1. Given X 2 L1, recall the
abbreviation f(X) := (f1(X), . . . , fn(X)) 2 (L1)n. Clearly, f(X) 2  X
holds by definition. Moreover, if f 2 C(n+1) and fn+1(X)   0 a.s.,
(f1(X), . . . , fn(X)) 2 b X holds.
The following results on comonotone functions are essen-
tial; statement (ii) is usually referred to as comonotone order
improvement.
Proposition 6.
(i) For every   > 0, C(n)  ⇢ (Rn)R is sequentially compact
in the topology of pointwise convergence. That is, for each
sequence (fk)k2N ⇢ C(n)  there is a subsequence (k ) 2N and
f 2 C(n)  such that for all x 2 R
fk  (x)! f(x), n !1.
(ii) Let X 2 (L1)n and set X := X1+· · ·+Xn. Then there is f 2 C(n)
such that Xi  c fi(X) holds for all i 2 [n].
Proof. For (i), note that C(n)  is a closed subset of the set {f 2
C(n) | f(0) 2 [   ,   ]n} and the latter is sequentially compact in
the topology of pointwise convergence by Filipovi¢ and Svindland
(2008, Lemma B.1). (ii) is proved in Filipovi¢ and Svindland (2008,
Proposition 5.1). In the case X 2 (L1)n, it is Carlier et al. (2012,
Theorem 3.1). We also refer to Landsberger and Meilijson (1994)
and Ludkovski and Rüschendorf (2008). ⇤
The next two results are essential for optimisation with law-
invariant inputs: Proposition 7 shows that in the optimisation
problems we consider an optimal allocation can be found if,
and only if, an optimal comonotone allocation can be found.
6 Each fi is non-decreasing. Hence, for x, y 2 R, x   y, we have,
nX
i=1
|fi(x)  fi(y)| =
nX
i=1
fi(x)  fi(y) = x  y = |x  y|.
Proposition 8 shows that, under further mild conditions, such
optimal comonotone allocations actually exist because the set of
comonotone allocations is particularly well-behaved.
Proposition 7. Suppose U checks Assumption 3, ⇤ is an aggrega-
tion function, and X 2 L1 is arbitrary. Then the identities
sup
Y2 X
⇤(U(Y)) = sup
f2C(n)
⇤ (U(f(X))) (4)
and
sup
Y2b X ⇤(U(Y)) = sup{⇤(U(f1(X), . . . , fn(X))) | f 2 C(n + 1),
fn+1(X)   0} (5)
hold.
Proof. Fix an arbitrary X 2 L1. In order to prove (4), let Y 2  X
be arbitrary. By Proposition 6(ii), there is g 2 C(n) such that Yi  c
gi(X) holds for all i 2 [n]. By Theorem 18, U(Y)  U(g(X)) holds
in the pointwise order on [ 1,1)n. As ⇤ is non-decreasing by
assumption,
⇤(U(Y))  ⇤(U(g(X)))  sup
f2C(n)
⇤(U(f(X))),
and thus
sup
Y2 X
⇤(U(Y))  sup
f2C(n)
⇤ (U(f(X))) .
The converse inequality, however, follows from the observation
that f(X) 2  X holds for all f 2 C(n), and (4) is proved.
For the second assertion, consider the slightly altered aggre-
gation function
⌅ : [ 1,1)n+1 ! [ 1,1),
⌅ (x1, . . . , xn+1) = ⇤(x1, . . . , xn)+ xn+1,
which, indeed, is non-decreasing in the pointwise order on
[ 1,1)n+1. Moreover, let
Un+1 =  (·|L1+) : L1 ! [ 1,1), X 7!
⇢
0, X 2 L1+,
 1, X /2 L1+,
be the concave indicator of L1+ := {Y 2 L1 | Y   0 a.s.}, the
positive cone of L1 in the almost sure order. The function Un+1
is proper, concave, upper semicontinuous, and law-invariant. We
set
U¯ : (L1)n+1 ! [ 1,1)n+1,
X 7! (U1(X1), . . . ,Un(Xn),Un+1(Xn+1)),
and obtain
sup
Y2b X ⇤(U(Y)) =
 
⌅ (U¯(Z)) | Z 2 (L1)n+1, Z1 + · · · + Zn+1 = X
 
= sup
f2C(n+1)
⌅
 
U¯(f(X))
 
.
The last equality here is due to (4). In the last supremum only
vectors f(X), f 2 C(n + 1), are relevant for which fn+1(X) 2 L1+.
This in turn implies (f1(X), . . . , fn(X)) 2 b X for these f 2 C(n+1).
Since they also satisfy Un+1(fn+1(X)) = 0, we obtain (5) as follows:
sup
Y2b X ⇤(U(Y)) = sup
 
⌅
 
U¯(f(X))
  | f 2 C(n + 1), fn+1(X)   0 
= sup{⇤ (U1(f1(X)), . . . ,Un(fn(X))) | f 2 C(n + 1),
fn+1(X)   0}. ⇤
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Proposition 8. In the situation of Proposition 7 assume ⇤ is
additionally upper semicontinuous. For X 2 L1 we define the
quantities
⌘(X) := sup
Y2 X
⇤(U(Y)) and b⌘(X) := sup
Y2b X ⇤(U(Y)).
(i) If ⌘(X) < 1 and there is a constant   (X) > 0 such that for
f 2 C(n),
⇤(U(f(X)))   ⌘(X)  1 H) f 2 C(n)  (X),
there is a g 2 C(n)  (X) such that
⌘(X) = ⇤ (U(g(X))) .
(ii) Ifb⌘(X) < 1 and there is some constant b  (X) > 0 such that
for f 2 C(n + 1) with fn+1(X)   0,
⇤(U1(f1(X)), . . . ,Un(fn(X)))  b⌘(X) 1 H) f 2 C(n+1)b  (X),
there is a g 2 C(n + 1)b  (X) such that gn+1(X)   0 a.s. andb⌘(X) = ⇤ (U1(g1(X)), . . . ,Un(gn(X))) .
Proof.
(i) By Proposition 7, we may choose a maximising sequence
(fk)k2N ⇢ C(n), i.e.
⇤
 
U(fk(X))
  " ⌘(X) <1.
Combining the assumption and Proposition 6(i) there is a
subsequence (k ) 2N and g 2 C(n)  (X) such that
8x 2 R : fk  (x)! g(x),  !1.
Moreover, by 1-Lipschitz continuity, for all   2 N and
i 2 [n],
|f k i (X)  gi(X)|  |f˜ k i (X)| + |g˜i(X)| + |f k i (0)  gi(0)|
 2|X | + 2  (X) P-a.s.
By the Dominated Convergence Theorem,
fk  (X)! g(X) in (L1)n,  !1.
As the limes superior is realised as limit along a subse-
quence, we may, after potentially passing to another sub-
sequence, assume without loss of generality that for each
Ui, i 2 [n], the identity lim !1 Ui(f k i (X)) = lim sup !1
Ui(f
k 
i (X)) holds. As Ui is upper semicontinuous, we also ob-
tain lim !1 Ui(f k i (X))  Ui(gi(X)).⇤ being non-decreasing
in the pointwise order implies
⇤(U(g(X)))
  ⇤
✓
lim sup
 !1
U1(f
k 
1 (X)), . . . , lim sup
 !1
Un(f k n (X))
◆
= ⇤
⇣
lim
 !1U1(f
k 
1 (X)), . . . , lim
 !1Un(f
k 
n (X))
⌘
.
Moreover, upper semicontinuity of ⇤ shows
⇤
⇣
lim
 !1U1(f
k 
1 (X)), . . . , lim
 !1Un(f
k 
n (X))
⌘
  lim sup
 !1
⇤
 
U(fk  (X))
 
= ⌘(X).
Together the inequalities read as ⇤ (U(g(X)))   ⌘(X). As
the converse inequality holds a priori, the proof is com-
plete.
(ii) This is proved in complete analogy with (i). ⇤
Proposition 8 may appear technical at first sight, but it is
precisely the instrument which allows us to prove the existence
of efficient allocations in Theorem 12. This, however requires to
characterise when the interplay between the aggregation func-
tion ⇤ and the individual utilities (Ui)i2[n] is such that the ad-
ditional assumptions are met, i.e. the bounds   (X) and b  (X),
respectively, can be found. To this end we suggest the notion of
coercive aggregation functions.
3.2. Coercive aggregation rules
Recall that for a vector u of scalar functions ui : R !
[   1,1), we define u : Rn ! [ 1,1)n by u(y) =
(u1(y1), . . . , un(yn)), y 2 Rn.
Definition 9. Let n 2 N, u : Rn ! [ 1,1)n be a vector-
valued function, and ⇤ : [ 1,1)n ! [ 1,1) be an
aggregation function. For x,m 2 R, we define the set
S(x,m) :=
(
y 2 Rn
    nX
i=1
yi  x, ⇤(u(y))   m
)
. (6)
We say ⇤ is coercive7 for u if there are functions G : R⇥R! R
and H : R ! R such that for all x,m 2 R, the condition
S(x,m) 6= ; implies
nX
i=1
|yi|  G(x,m), y 2 S(x,m), (7)
and
m  H(x). (8)
From an economic point of view, we can interpret a vector
y 2 Rn as a collection of (deterministic) endowments of agents
i = 1, . . . , n. The sum Pni=1 yi then is the total endowment of
the system [n]. If we think of the vector-valued function u as
the individual utility assessments, the quantity ⇤(u(y)) is the
aggregated utility in the system. Suppose the aggregation func-
tion ⇤ is coercive for u. Condition (8) means that a bounded
total endowment x cannot lead to arbitrarily large aggregated
utility. Regarding condition (7), consider a fixed total endowment
x allocated over the system such that yi !1 and yj ! 1 for
at least two agents i, j 2 [n]. This implies substantial disutility
for agent j, and condition (7) ensures that such allocations will
eventually not lead to optimal utility if the spread yi   yj is too
large. However, as the functions G and H do not have to fulfil any
specific requirements, they only pose very soft constraints.
We will use in Section 5 and show in the Appendix that the
following aggregation functions are coercive for suitable vector-
valued functions u : Rn ! [ 1,1)n:
• ⇤↵(y) := ↵mini2[n] yi + (1   ↵)maxi2[n] yi, y 2 [ 1,1)n,
where 0 < ↵  1 is a fixed parameter;
• ⌅↵(y) := P;6=S⇢[n] ↵mini2[n] yi + (1   ↵)maxi2S yi, y 2
[ 1,1)n, where 0 < ↵ < 1 is a fixed parameter;
• ⇤w(y) := Pni=1 wiyi, y 2 [ 1,1)n, where
w = (w1, . . . , wn) 2 (0,1)n is a family of positive weights.
Let us also give an example of a vector-valued function u :
R2 ! R2 and an aggregation function ⇤ : [ 1,1)2 ! [0,1)
such that ⇤ is not coercive for u.
7 We remark that our use of the term coercive is not canonical, however,
it does not have a unique meaning in the literature anyway. For instance, a
function f : (X , k · kX ) ! (Y, k · kY ) between two normed spaces is called
coercive if kxkX ! 1 implies kf (x)kY ! 1. As coercive functions in
optimisation usually play a similar role as coercive aggregation functions in our
setting, we decided to use this suggestive terminology.
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Example 10. Let A1, A2 2 R and B1, B2 > 0. We set u(y) := (A1 +
B1y1, A2 + B2y2), y 2 R2. Moreover, we consider the aggregation
function ⇤(z) := ez1 + ez2 , z 2 [ 1,1)2 (here, e 1 := 0). Let
x,m 2 R be arbitrary. As
⇤(u(x  n, n)) = eA1+B1x B1n + eA2+B2n !1, n !1,
and x   n + n = x, we have for all m 2 R and all n   n0 for
some n0 2 N depending on x and m that (x  n, n) 2 S(x,m). This
implies
8m > 0 : sup
y2S(x,m)
|y1| + |y2|   sup
n n0
|x  n| + |n| = 1.
Therefore the function G as in (7) cannot exist in this situation.
Similarly, as S(x,m) 6= ; holds for all m 2 R, the function H in (8)
cannot exist either. Note that⇤ not being coercive for u is a result
of the very different and conflicting nature of utility assessment
and aggregation.
The class of coercive aggregation functions is usually rich
though and closed under certain algebraic and order operations:
Proposition 11. Suppose n 2 N and u : Rn ! [ 1,1)n is a
vector-valued function. Moreover, assume ⇤, ⌅ ,   : [ 1,1)n
! [ 1,1) are aggregation functions such that ⇤ and ⌅ are
coercive for u and such that    ⇤. Then the following functions
are coercive for u, as well:
(i) ↵⇤, ↵ > 0 arbitrary;
(ii) ⇤+⌅ ;
(iii)   .
Proof. Let G,G0 : R⇥ R! R and H,H 0 : R! R be functions as
in Definition 9 for ⇤ or ⌅ , respectively.
(i) The functions G↵(m, x) := G(x, m↵ ) and H↵ := ↵H satisfy (7)
and (8).
(ii) If y 2 Rn satisfies (⇤ + ⌅ )(u(y))   m, this is only
possible if max{⇤(u(y)),⌅ (u(y))}   m2 . Hence, the function
G+(x,m) := max{G(x, m2 ),G0(x, m2 )} satisfies (7). Similarly,
the function H+ := 2max{H,H 0} satisfies (8).
(iii) As    ⇤, the inclusion
{y 2 Rn |
nX
i=1
yi  x,   (u(y))   m} ⇢ {y 2 Rn |
nX
i=1
yi  x,
⇤(u(y))   m}
holds. Hence, the same functions G and H work for   in (7)
and (8), as well. ⇤
3.3. The existence theorem
The aim of this section is to combine the results obtained
above and give a unifying criterion for the existence of comono-
tone solutions to optimisation problems involving agents with
law-invariant preferences.
Beforehand, we define the regions of relevance for the optimi-
sation problem in question. Given a vector of utilities U : (L1)n !
[ 1,1)n and an aggregation function ⇤ : [ 1,1)n !
[   1,1), the relevant region corresponding to the attainable
set  X is
  := {X 2 L1 | sup
Y2 X
⇤(U(Y)) >  1},
whereas the region corresponding to the attainable set b X isb  := {X 2 X | sup
Y2b X ⇤(U(Y)) >  1}.
Theorem 12. Suppose U checks Assumption 3. Let ⇤ : [ 1,1)n
! [   1,1) be an upper semicontinuous aggregation function
which is coercive for u := (u1, . . . , un), where ui := Ui|R, i 2 [n].
Then:
(i) For all X 2 L1, the optimal values satisfy
⌘(X) := sup
Y2 X
⇤(U(Y)) <1 and b⌘(X) := sup
Y2b X ⇤(U(Y)) <1.
(9)
(ii) There is a function   :   ! R such that for all X 2   and
all f 2 C(n),
⇤ (U(f(X)))   ⌘(X)  1 H) f 2 C(n)  (X).
Moreover, the first supremum in (9) is attained by g(X) 2  X ,
g 2 C(n) suitably chosen.
(iii) There is a function b  : b  ! R such that for all X 2 b  and
all f 2 C(n + 1) with fn+1(X)   0
⇤ (U1(f1(X)), . . . ,Un(fn(X)))  b⌘(X) 1 H) f 2 C(n)b  (X).
Moreover, the second supremum in (9) is attained by
(g1(X), . . . , gn(X)) 2 b X , g 2 C(n + 1) suitably chosen.
(iv) If the function G : R ⇥ R ! R in (7) is non-decreasing
in the first coordinate and non-increasing in the second, the
optimal value mappings X 7! ⌘(X) and X 7!b⌘(X) are upper
semicontinuous on   and b , respectively.
Proof. Recall that for Y 2 X n we abbreviate E[Y] := (E[Y1], . . . ,
E[Yn]) 2 Rn.
(i) By Corollary 19 and the assumptions on ⇤, for all X 2 X
and all Y 2 b X we have
⇤(U(Y))  ⇤(U(E[Y])) = ⇤(u(E[Y])).
Moreover,
Pn
i=1 Yi  X implies
Pn
i=1 E[Xi]  E[X]. Hence,
coercivity of ⇤ for u yields
⌘(X) = sup
Y2 X
⇤(U(Y))  sup
Y2b X ⇤(U(Y)) =b⌘(X)
 sup
Y2b X ⇤(u(E[Y]))  H(E[X]) <1.
(ii) Let X 2   and suppose f 2 C(n) is such that ⌘(X)   1 
⇤ (U(f(X))). By Corollary 19, ⌘(X)   1  ⇤ (u(E[f(X)])),
which means that
nX
i=1
|fi(0)|  |E[f˜i(X)]| 
nX
i=1
|E[fi(X)]|  G(E[X], ⌘(X)  1).
Rearranging this inequality yields
nX
i=1
|fi(0)|  G(E[X], ⌘(X)  1)+
nX
i=1
|E[f˜i(X)]|
 G(E[X], ⌘(X)  1)+
nX
i=1
E[f˜i(|X |)]
 G(E[X], ⌘(X)  1)+ E[|X |] =:   (X).
The existence of a maximiser g(X), g 2 C(n), follows with
Proposition 8.
(iii) Let X 2 b . If f 2 C(n + 1) is such that fn+1(X)   0 andb⌘(X)  1  ⇤(U1(f1(X)), . . . ,Un(fn(X))),
using the same arguments as in (ii) yields
nX
i=1
|fi(0)|  G(E[X],b⌘(X)  1)+ E[|X |].
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As fn+1(0) =  Pni=1 fi(0),
n+1X
i=1
|fi(0)|  2
nX
i=1
|fi(0)|  2G(E[X],b⌘(X) 1)+2E[|X |] =: b  (X).
The existence of a maximiser g(X), g 2 C(n + 1), follows
with Proposition 8.
(iv) This will be proved in the context of Theorem 23. ⇤
4. Commodity spaces and law-invariance
As mentioned above, we will now demonstrate how the re-
sults in the preceding section can be generalised – or rather
localised – to general rearrangement invariant commodity spaces
X with the property L1 ⇢ X ⇢ L1. For the terminology
concerning ordered vector spaces, we refer to Aliprantis and
Burkinshaw (2003). The space X is assumed to have the following
properties:
(a) As a subset of L1, X is rearrangement invariant;
(b) with respect to the P-a.s. order on L1, it is a solid Riesz
subspace;
(c) X carries a lattice norm k · k which makes it into a Banach
lattice and is law-invariant as a function k·k : X ! [0,1).
The preceding assumptions entail that the embeddings L1 ,!
X ,! L1 are continuous, i.e. there are positive constants , K > 0
such that for all X 2 L1 and all Y 2 X the estimates
kYk  kYk1 and E[|Y |]  KkYk (10)
hold. For the aforementioned facts on rearrangement invariant
function spaces, we refer to Chen et al. (2018, Appendix A) and
the references therein.
Let X ⇤ denote the dual space of X . A linear functional   2 X ⇤
is order continuous if limn!1  (Xn) = 0 holds for every sequence
(Xn)n2N ⇢ X such that Xn # 0 P-a.s.8 The space X⇠n of all order
continuous functionals may be identified with a subspace of L1.
More precisely, for every   2 X⇠n there is a unique Q 2 L1
such that E[|QX |] < 1 holds for all X 2 X and  (X) =
E[QX]. Moreover, for each Q 2 L1, X 7! E[QX] defines an
order continuous bounded linear functional by (10). Using the
Hardy–Littlewood inequalities as stated in Chong and Rice (1971,
Theorem 13.4), one can prove that X⇠n ⇢ L1 is rearrangement
invariant, as well.
4.1. Structural properties of law-invariant functions
We assume that (X , k · k) is either (L1, k · k1) or a rearrange-
ment invariant Banach lattice L1 ⇢ X ( L1 as introduced
above.
Before we can generalise the results on the existence of effi-
cient allocations to general commodity spaces X , we point out
that the potential lack of order continuity of the norm k · k is
the main problem which needs to be overcome. It results in the
fact that X⇠n ( X ⇤ is possible. Hence, many of the structural
properties of (quasi-)concave and law-invariant functions do not
transfer directly.
This necessitates to study structural properties of law-invariant
functions on general commodity spaces more closely. We shall
see that the localisation procedure works if the individual utilities
in question have minimal order continuity properties on X .
For the (strong) Fatou property introduced in the following we
particularly refer to the recent contributions of Chen et al. (2018)
and Gao et al. (2018).
8 As the P-a.s. order on L1 (and also X ) renders super Dedekind complete
spaces, order convergent sequences suffice to characterise order continuity.
Definition 13. Let L1 ⇢ X ⇢ L1 be a rearrangement invariant
Banach lattice as elaborated above. A function f : X ! [ 1,1)
is said to have
• the Fatou property if every order convergent sequence
(Xn)n2N ⇢ X with limit X 2 X satisfies9
f (X)   lim sup
n!1
f (Xn);
• the strong Fatou property if the preceding estimate holds
for every norm bounded sequence (Xn)n2N ⇢ X which
converges to X 2 X a.s.
Note that the space X is closed under suitable conditional
expectations: if a   -algebra H is finitely generated, i.e. H =   (5)
for some finite measurable partition 5 = {A1, . . . , An} ⇢ F of ⌦ ,
and X 2 X , then E[X |H] is well-defined and a simple – and thus
bounded – function.
Lemma 14. Given X 2 X and a finitely generated sub-  -algebra
H ⇢ F , the conditional expectation E[X |H] lies again in X and
satisfies kE[X |H]k  kXk.
Proof. Fix arbitrary X 2 X and a finitely generated sub-  -algebra
H ⇢ F . Moreover, let Ak := {|X |  k} 2 F . For all k 2 N,
E[X1Ak |H] 2 L1 ⇢ X , and the set {Y 2 L1 | kYk  kX1Akk}, isk · k1-closed by (10). Applying Svindland (2010, Lemma 1.3) for
the first and the lattice norm property for the second inequality
yields
kE[X1Ak |H]k  kX1Akk  kXk.
As H is finitely generated, E[X1Ak |H] ! E[X |H] in L1. Again by
(10),
kE[X |H]k = lim
k!1kE[X1Ak |H]k  kXk. ⇤
This observation allows us to define dilatation monotonicity of
a function on X .
Definition 15. A function f : X ! [ 1,1] is dilatation
monotone if for every X 2 X and every finite measurable
partition 5 we have
f (X)  f (E[X |  (5)]) .
By Jensen’s inequality, E[X |  (5)] dominates X in the concave
order. As an immediate consequence, a function f : X !
[ 1,1] is dilatation monotone if it is non-decreasing in the
concave order.
Our main goal here, however, is to link law-invariance of a
quasi-concave function to monotonicity properties such as dilata-
tion monotonicity or being non-decreasing in the concave order,
c.f. Definition 2, and mild order continuity properties such as
the Fatou property, strong Fatou property, and   (X , L1)-upper
semicontinuity.
As a first step, we recall the version of Chen et al. (2018,
Proposition 2.11) suited to our purposes.
Proposition 16. Suppose X ( L1 and k · k is order continuous.
For a proper, quasi-concave, and law-invariant function f : X !
[ 1,1), the following are equivalent:
(i) f has the strong Fatou property;
(ii) f has the Fatou property;
(iii) f is   (X , L1)-upper semicontinuous.
9 That is, P(Xn ! X) = 1 and there is some X0 2 X+ such that supn2N |Xn| 
X0 holds a.s.
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Hence, in the situation of the preceding proposition, the three
aforementioned order continuity properties agree.
In the following, we shall denote the left-continuous quantile
function of X 2 L1 by qX , i.e.
qX (s) := inf{x 2 R | P(X  x)   s}, 0 < s < 1.
The concave order can be characterised in terms of quantiles;
c.f. Dana (2005, Lemma 2.2):
Lemma 17. For X, Y 2 L1, X  c Y if, and only if, the estimateZ 1
0
qX (s)g(s)ds 
Z 1
0
qY (s)g(s)ds
holds for any choice of a non-increasing bounded function g :
(0, 1)! R.
The following theorem – which is furthermore of independent
interest – encompasses all relevant structural properties needed
for the utility inputs in the optimisation problems in question. We
will discuss the relation to dilatation monotonicity of f : X !
[ 1,1] for the sake of completeness.
Theorem 18. Let f : X ! [ 1,1] be a function.
(i) Suppose f is quasi-concave,   (X , L1)-upper semicontinuous,
and law-invariant. Then it is non-decreasing in the concave
order.
(ii) If f does not attain the value +1, is dilatation monotone
and has the strong Fatou property, then it is law-invariant.
The same assertion holds if k · k is order continuous and f is
k · k-upper semicontinuous.
If f is additionally quasi-concave, it is   (X , L1)-upper semi-
continuous in both cases.
(iii) Suppose a quasi-concave function f : X ! [   1,1) has
the strong Fatou property, or, if k · k is order continuous, is
k ·k-upper semicontinuous. Then the following statements are
equivalent:
(a) f is non-decreasing in the concave order;
(b) f is dilatation monotone;
(c) f is law-invariant.
Under any of the equivalent conditions (a)–(c), f is   (X , L1)-
upper semicontinuous.
Proof.
(i) Suppose f : X ! [ 1,1] is quasi-concave,   (X , L1)-
upper semicontinuous, and law-invariant. For r 2 R, we
set  r : X ⇤ ! [ 1,1] to be the support function of the
superlevel set Er (f ) = {Y 2 X | f (Y )   r}, i.e.
 r ( ) = inf
Y2Er (f )
 (Y ),   2 X ⇤.
Suppose Er (f ) 6= ;. The Hahn–Banach Theorem and
  (X , L1)-closedness or the superlevel sets show that Y 2
Er (f ) holds if, and only if,
8Q 2 dom( r ) \ L1 : E[QY ]    r (Q ). (11)
Moreover, the superlevel sets of f are rearrangement in-
variant. This property transfers to law-invariance of  r |L1
and rearrangement invariance of dom( r ) \ L1.
Let now X, Y 2 X be arbitrary with the property X  c Y .
We have to show that f (X)  f (Y ). This inequality holds
trivially if f (X) =  1. Otherwise, if f (X) >  1, there
is r 2 R such that X 2 Er (f ). Pick any such r and let
Q 2 dom( r ) \ L1 be arbitrary. By Chong and Rice (1971,
Theorem 13.4),
E[QY ]   inf
Q˜⇠Q
E[Q˜ Y ] =   sup
Q 0⇠ Q
E[Q 0Y ] =
Z 1
0
( q Q (s))qY (s)ds.
(12)
As  Q is bounded,  q Q : (0, 1) ! R is a non-increasing
bounded function. Lemma 17 yields the estimateZ 1
0
( q Q (s))qX (s)ds 
Z 1
0
( q Q (s))qY (s)ds. (13)
Combining (12) and (13) yields
E[QY ]  
Z 1
0
( q Q (s))qY (s)ds  
Z 1
0
( q Q (s))qX (s)ds
= inf
Q˜⇠Q
E[Q˜ X].
Using law-invariance of  r on L1, we obtain
E[QY ]   inf
Q˜⇠Q
 r (Q˜ ) =  r (Q ).
As Q 2 dom( r ) \ L1 was chosen arbitrarily, f (Y )   r
whenever f (X)   r , which in turn implies f (X)  f (Y ).
(ii) In a first step, we show that f is law-invariant on the
level of simple functions. To this end, suppose two simple
functions X and Y are equal in law, i.e. P   X 1 = P   Y 1.
By Cherny and Grigoriev (2007, Lemma 2.4), for every " >
0 there is a K" 2 N and finitely generated sub-  -algebras
H1, . . . ,HK" ⇢ F such that
kX   E[E[...E[Y |H1]|H2]...|HK" ]k1 < ".
Setting Xn := E[E[...E[Y |H1]|H2]...|HK"n ] for a sequence
"n # 0, we infer that X is approximated by a sequence
(Xn)n2N ⇢ L1 uniformly which is bounded in norm k · k
and converges a.s.
If f has the strong Fatou property, this yields
f (X)   lim sup
n!1
f (Xn)   lim inf
n!1 f (Xn)   f (Y ),
where the last inequality is due to dilatation monotonicity
applied to each n 2 N. The argument is symmetric in the
roles of X and Y , hence f (X) = f (Y ).
In the second case, i.e. k · k is order continuous and f is
upper semicontinuous, using limn!1 kXn   Xk = 0 yields
the same assertion.
In a second step, let X and Y be arbitrary in X with the
property of being equal in law. Note that there are two
sequences of finitely generated sub-  -algebras (Hn)n2N and
(Gn)n2N such that E[X |Hn] ! X and E[Y |Gn] ! Y a.s.
and P   E[X |Hn] 1 = P   E[Y |Gn] 1, n 2 N. Moreover, by
Lemma 14,
sup
n2N
kE[X |Hn]k  kXk and sup
n2N
kE[Y |Gn]k  kYk.
Combining dilatation monotonicity and the strong Fatou
property yields
f (X) = lim
n!1 f (E[X |Hn]) and f (Y ) = limn!1 f (E[Y |Gn]).
(14)
In the second case, order continuity of k·k yields E[X |Hn] =
X and limn!1 E[Y |Gn] = Y , whence the statement of
(14) follows by upper semicontinuity and dilatation mono-
tonicity. Finally, in both cases, the already proved law-
invariance on the level of simple functions combined with
P  E[X |Hn] 1 = P  E[Y |Gn] 1, n 2 N proves the assertion.
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  (X , L1)-upper semicontinuity of f is implied by our
assumptions and law-invariance by Chen et al. (2018, The-
orem 2.6) in the case of the strong Fatou property. If k · k
is order continuous, upper semicontinuity of f entails that
it enjoys the Fatou property. If X 6= L1, f is hence both
  (X , L1)-upper semicontinuous and has the strong Fatou
Property by Chen et al. (2018, Proposition 2.11). If X = L1,
  (X , L1)-upper semicontinuity is weak upper semiconti-
nuity and hence already captured by the assumption of
k · k-upper semicontinuity.
(iii) Combine (i) and (ii). ⇤
From the preceding proposition, we immediately obtain the
following corollary which allows control of the global behaviour
of a quasi-concave function f as in Theorem 18(i) or (iii) in terms
of the behaviour on deterministic random variables.
Corollary 19. In the situation of Theorem 18(i) or (iii),
8 X 2 X : f (X)  f (E[X]).
We conclude this interlude on the structural properties of law-
invariant functions with an important generalisation of Chen et al.
(2018, Theorem 2.6). It will be the key to localising Theorem 12
to general commodity spaces in Theorem 23.
Proposition 20. If f : X ! [ 1,1] is quasi-concave,
  (X , L1)-upper semicontinuous and law-invariant, there exists a
unique extension f ] : L1 ! [ 1,1]which is quasi-concave, upper
semicontinuous with respect to k · k1, and law-invariant. Moreover,
f ] is non-decreasing in the concave order, and properness of f
implies properness of f ].
Proof. By assumption on f , each upper level set Er (f ) is
  (X , L1)-closed and (11) holds. Define
Ar := clL1 (Er (f )).
If Er (f ) 6= ;, the representation
Ar = {W 2 L1 | 8Q 2 dom( r ) \ L1 : E[QW ]    r (Q )}
holds, where  r is as in (11), and
f ](X) := sup{r 2 R | X 2 Ar}, X 2 L1.
f ] is law-invariant and quasi-concave. Indeed, for
law-invariance, note that f ](X)   r is equivalent to E[QX]  
 r (Q ) for all Q in the rearrangement invariant set L1 \ dom( r )
and in terms of the law-invariant function  r . For quasi-concavity,
let X, Y 2 L1 and   2 (0, 1), X, Y 2 Ar implies  X+ (1  )Y 2 Ar
by convexity of the latter set. As min{f ](X), f ](Y )} = sup{r 2 R |
{X, Y } ⇢ Ar}, the inequality f ]( X+(1  )Y )   min{f ](X), f ](Y )}
follows.
Moreover, f ] is upper semicontinuous. Indeed, suppose Xn !
X in L1. Without loss of generality, we may assume that s :=
limn!1 f ](Xn) 2 [ 1,1] exists. Suppose r 2 R is such that
r < s. Xn 2 Ar has to hold for all n large enough, hence, for all
Q 2 L1 \ dom( r ),
E[QX] = lim
n!1E[QXn]    r (Q ),
which means X 2 Ar . This shows upper semicontinuity.
We now show that f ] extends f . Clearly, f ]|X  f , and we
hence assume for contradiction the existence of some X 2 X such
that f ](X) > f (X). This allows us to find some r 2 R such that
X 2 Ar , whereas X /2 Er (f ). The latter set is   (X , L1)-closed. We
can thus find some Q 2 L1 which gives a separating hyperplane
in that
E[QX] < inf
Y2Er (f )
E[QY ] = inf
W2Ar
E[QW ],
where we have used Ar = clL1 (Er (f )) in the last equality. This
contradicts X 2 Ar . f ](X) > f (X) has to be absurd.
f ] is the unique extension of f to L1 which is quasi-concave,
upper semicontinuous, and law-invariant. Indeed, let fˆ : L1 !
[ 1,1] be any extension of f with these properties. As L1 ⇢ X ,
the restrictions f ]|L1 and fˆ |L1 agree. Let X 2 L1 and let (Gn)n2N
be a sequence of finitely generated sub-  -algebras such that
limn!1 E[X |Gn] = X holds in L1. f ] and fˆ being non-decreasing
in the concave order follows from Theorem 18(i). Together with
upper semicontinuity, we obtain
fˆ (X) = lim
n!1 fˆ (E[X |Gn]) = limn!1 f (E[X |Gn])
= lim
n!1 f
] (E[X |Gn]) = f ](X).
Thus, both extensions f ] and fˆ agree.
It remains to prove that properness of f implies properness
of f ]. By Corollary 19, f ](E[X]) = 1 whenever X 2 L1 satisfies
f ](X) = 1. As f ](E[X]) = f (E[X]), f ] only attains the value +1
if f does. ⇤
4.2. The existence theorem for general commodity spaces
We shall assume X ( L1 here. If k · k is order contin-
uous, Proposition 16 states that for a quasi-concave and law-
invariant function f : X ! [   1,1), the Fatou property, the
strong Fatou property, and upper semicontinuity with respect to
the   (X , L1)-topology are all equivalent. This leads to following
assumption:
Assumption 21. The commodity space satisfies X ( L1 as well
as properties (a)–(c) above. For each agent i 2 [n], its individual
utility assessment is given by a function Ui : X ! [   1,1),
which is proper, quasi-concave, law-invariant, and has the strong
Fatou property.
By Proposition 20, each Ui has a canonical extension U
]
i : L1 !
[ 1,1) which is proper, quasi-concave, upper semicontinuous,
and law-invariant. Consequently, the family of functions U] :=
(U]i )i2[n] checks Assumption 3.
The following two results prove that we can extend the opti-
misation problem to L1 and solve it in the larger space. Note that
we extend the definition of the attainable sets  X and b X , X 2 X ,
by
  XX =  X \ X n and b  XX = b X \ X n.
Lemma 22. Suppose U := (Ui)i2[n] : X n ! [ 1,1)n is a vector
of utility functions satisfying Assumption 21. Let ⇤ : [ 1,1)n !
[ 1,1) be an aggregation function and X 2 X . Then:
(i) f(X) 2 X n holds for every comonotone function f 2 C(n).
(ii) The identities
sup
X2 XX
⇤(U(X)) = sup
Y2 X
⇤(U](Y))
and
sup
X2b XX ⇤(U(X)) = supY2b X ⇤(U
](Y))
hold.
(iii) ⇤ is coercive for (Ui|R)i2[n] if, and only if, it is coercive for
(U]i |R)i2[n].
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Proof.
(i) By (3), the estimate |fi(X)| |fi(0)|+|X | holds for all i 2 [n].
The right-hand side is an element of X and this space is
solid as a subset of L1. We infer that the left-hand side has
to be an element of X as well.
(ii) As none of the functions U]i attains the value +1, the
expression
⇤(U](Y)) = ⇤(U]1(Y1), . . . ,U]n(Yn))
is well-defined for all Y 2 (L1)n. As the family U] =
(U]i )i2[n] checks Assumption 3, Proposition 7 together with
(i) implies
sup
Y2 X
⇤(U](Y)) = sup
f2C(n)
⇤
 
U](f(X))
  = sup
f2C(n)
⇤ (U(f(X))) .
As for f 2 C(n) the vector f(X) lies in   XX we obtain
sup
Y2 X
⇤(U](Y))  sup
X2 XX
⇤ (U(X)) .
The converse inequality holds a priori. Note that the second
equality is derived from Proposition 7 in an analogous way.
(iii) This follows from the equality U(r) = U](r), which holds
for all r 2 R. ⇤
The following local version of the existence theorem,
Theorem 12, is an immediate consequence of the preceding
lemma.
Theorem 23. Theorem 12 holds true verbatim if we replace L1 by
X ,  X by   XX , and b X by b  XX .
Proof. It only remains to verify (iv) from Theorem 12. Note that
the following proof works in L1 as well as in the setting of a
general commodity space X of this section.
Let (Xk)k2N ⇢   be a sequence and X1 2   such that
limk!1 kXk   X1k = 0. We shall prove that
⌘(X1)   lim sup
k!1
⌘(Xk).
The proof for b  andb⌘ is completely analogous. We proceed sim-
ilarly to the proof of Proposition 8, however under the additional
problem that not a fixed X is considered, but a sequence thereof.
First of all, we may assume that limk!1 ⌘(Xk) = lim supk!1
⌘(Xk) up to passing to a subsequence and that lim supk ⌘(Xk) > 1 — otherwise, the desired inequality is trivial. Now, for all
k 2 N choose gk 2 C(n) such that ⇤  U(gk(Xk))  = ⌘(Xk). The
proof of Theorem 12(ii) together with (10) yields
nX
i=1
|gki (0)|  G(E[Xk], ⌘(Xk)  1)+ E[|Xk|]  G(E[Xk], ⌘(Xk)  1)
+ KkXkk
 G(E[Xk], ⌘(Xk)  1)+ K sup
k2N
kXkk.
By the convergence of ⌘(Xk), L := infk2N ⌘(Xk) >  1. The
estimate E[Xk]  K supk2N kXkk holds for all k 2 N. In con-
junction with G being non-decreasing in the first coordinate and
non-increasing in the second, we obtain the bound
nX
i=1
|gki (0)| G(K sup
k2N
kXkk, L  1)+ K sup
k2N
kXkk =: ⇢ <1,
a constant which is in particular independent of k. We conclude
(gk)k2N ⇢ C(n)⇢ .
Recall that Xk ! X1 holds in L1, as well. After passing to
subsequences twice, we may hence infer by Proposition 6(i) that
for a suitable subsequence (k ) 2N and a suitable g 2 C(n)⇢ , we
have
gk  (x)! g(x),  !1,
for all x 2 R, and
P( lim
 !1 Xk  = X1) = 1.
Hence,
gk  (Xk  )! g(X1) a.s.
If the norm k · k is order continuous, this convergence holds in
norm as well. At last, choosing the constant  as in (10), for all
  2 N and all i 2 [n] we can estimate
kgk i (Xk  )k  |gk i (0)| + kXk k  ⇢ + sup
k2N
kXkk.
This allows us to reason as in the proof of Proposition 8, how-
ever invoking the strong Fatou property of the individual utility
functions if necessary. We obtain
lim sup
k!1
⌘(Xk) = lim sup
 !1
⇤
 
U(gk  (Xk  ))
   ⇤ (U(g(X1)))
 sup
f2C(n)
⇤ (U(f(X1))) = ⌘(X1). ⇤
The crucial message of this section is that in a situation of
law-invariant utilities with minimal order continuity properties
it does not matter on which commodity space we solve the opti-
misation problem. Without loss of generality, it may be solved on
the canonical commodity space L1 as the solution automatically
localises to the commodity space in question. This is due to the
homogeneity of the only solutions which are guaranteed to exist,
being comonotone transformations of the aggregate wealth.
5. Applications
In this section, the main existence theorem, Theorem 12, will
be applied to a number of optimisation problems involving indi-
vidual preferences within a system of agents and an aggregation
thereof. We shall see that the solutions have various economic
interpretations.
For the sake of clarity, we assume that a system of n  
2 agents i 2 [n] is given who all have preferences over the
commodity space L1. These can be represented numerically by
a vector of utility functions U : (L1)n ! [ 1,1)n satisfying
Assumption 3. The localisation procedure discussed in Section 4
shows that we are simultaneously solving the problem in all
spaces X and for all individual utility functions Ui : X ! [  
1,1) which satisfy the assumptions of Section 4, in particular
Assumption 21.
Before we can discuss the promised applications, we need
to introduce more notation: Given a vector x 2 [ 1,1]n, x⇤
denotes the maximum and x⇤ the minimum of the entries of x,
respectively;
x⇤ := max
i2[n] xi and x⇤ := mini2[n] xi.
If x, y 2 Rn, x · y denotes the Hadamard product of the two
vectors, i.e. x · y = (xiyi)i2[n]. Also, in order to make fruitful
use of the concept of a coercive aggregation function, we shall
focus on utilities whose behaviour on riskless commodities can
be controlled in the following way:
Definition 24. A function u : R ! [   1,1) is an (A, B, C)-
function, (A, B, C) 2 R⇥ (0,1)⇥ (0,1), if
u(x)  A + Bx+   Cx , x 2 R,
where x+ := max{x, 0} and x  := max{ x, 0}.
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Remark 25.
(i) u : R ! [   1,1) is an (A, B, C)-function for some
(A, B, C) 2 R ⇥ (0,1) ⇥ (0,1) if, and only if, there are
↵± 2 R and  ± > 0 such that for all x 2 R
u(x) 
⇢
↵+ +  +x, x   0,
↵      |x|, x < 0,
that is, u can be controlled from above by affine functions.
(ii) Any proper concave function u : R ! [   1,1) is an
(A, B, C)-function.
(iii) Suppose (A, B, C) and (Aˆ, Bˆ, Cˆ) are elements of R⇥(0,1)⇥
(0,1) with the property that A  Aˆ, B  Bˆ and Cˆ 
C . One easily sees that every (A, B, C)-function is also a
(Aˆ, Bˆ, Cˆ)-function.
In this section, we will work under the following assumption:
Assumption 26. The vector of utility functions U = (Ui)i2[n]
satisfies Assumption 3. Moreover, setting ui(x) := Ui(x), x 2 R,
we impose that each ui is an (Ai, Bi, Ci)-function, i 2 [n].
We remark that in some of the case studies below, the addi-
tional control of the behaviour on riskless commodities rules out
cash-additivity of the corresponding utility functions.10
5.1. (Biased) weak Pareto efficiency
In this section, we prove the existence of (biased) weak Pareto
optima as solutions to a suitable optimisation problem.
Definition 27. Let   ⇢ (L1)n be an attainable set. X 2   is called
weakly Pareto efficient or a weak Pareto optimum, if there is
no Y 2   with Ui(Yi) > Ui(Xi), i 2 [n].
The aggregation function we shall be interested in,
⇤↵(y) := ↵min
i2[n] yi + (1  ↵)maxi2[n] yi, y 2 [ 1,1)
n,
where 0 < ↵  1 is a parameter, is easily seen to be upper
semicontinuous. We remark that the function
L1 3 X 7! sup
Y2 X
⇤1(U(Y))
is the quasi-concave sup-convolution of the individual utilities;
c.f. Mastrogiacomo and Rosazza Gianin (2015).
The following observation is immediate:
Lemma 28. Suppose 0 < ↵  1. If X 2  X is such that
⇤↵(U(X)) = sup
Y2 X
⇤↵(U(Y)) 2 R,
then X is a weakly Pareto efficient allocation of X within  X . The
analogous result holds when  X is replaced by b X .
Theorem 29. Suppose U = (Ui)i2[n] fulfils Assumption 26 and let
0  ↵ < 1. If ↵ > 0, assume that B = (Bi)i2[n] and C = (Ci)i2[n]
additionally satisfy
B2
C1
<
↵
1  ↵ <
C2
B1
if n = 2, (15)
or
(n  1)B⇤
C⇤
<
↵
1  ↵ if n   3. (16)
10 Ui would be cash-additive if Ui(X + r) = Ui(X)+ r holds for all X 2 L1 and
all r 2 R. In that case, quasi-concavity automatically implies concavity.
(i) For all X 2Pni=1 dom(Ui) there is g 2 C(n) such that
⇤↵ (U(g(X))) = sup
Y2 X
⇤↵(U(Y)) 2 R.
g(X) is a weakly Pareto efficient allocation of X in case free
disposal is not allowed.
(ii) For all X 2 Pni=1 dom(Ui) + L1+ there is g 2 C(n + 1) such
that gn+1(X)   0 and
⇤↵ (U1(g1(X)), . . . ,Un(gn(X))) = sup
Y2b X ⇤↵(U(Y)) 2 R.
(g1(X), . . . , gn(X)) is a weakly Pareto efficient allocation of X
in case free disposal is allowed.
Proof. (i) is an immediate consequence of Lemmas A.1 and A.2
and Theorem 12(ii) if one notices that X 2   if, and only if,
X 2Pni=1 dom(Ui).
(ii) follows from Lemmas A.1 and A.2 and Theorem 12(iii) as
X 2 b  if, and only if, X   Y for some Y 2   = Pni=1 dom(Ui), or
equivalently, X 2Pni=1 dom(Ui)+ L1+. ⇤
The reason not only to look at the quasi-concave
sup-convolution given by ⇤1, but also at the weighted aggre-
gation functions ⇤↵ for 0 < ↵ < 1, is the following: ⇤1 only
depends on the worst utility achieved by redistribution. It is
unaffected by positive deviations from the worst utility other
agents may achieve. Therefore it has a bias to overemphasise and
sanction negative deviations from a systemic mean utility. The
smaller one chooses ↵ 2 (0, 1), the more the optimal value under
aggregation ⇤↵ depends on the best utility achieved by redistri-
bution. Within the set of weak Pareto optima, ⇤↵ therefore has
a bias towards those allowing for well-performing agents, while
the situation of the worst-performing agents is not too dire at the
same time.
5.2. Game theory and core allocations
For this application, we consider the case n   3 for the sake of
non-triviality. The following notions are adopted from Aliprantis
and Burkinshaw (2003, Section 8.10).
Definition 30. Given a vector W 2 (L1)n of initial endowments
set W := W1 + · · · + Wn. A core allocation of W is a vector
X 2  W such that no ; 6= S ⇢ [n] and Y 2  W with the following
properties can be found:
• Pi2S Yi =Pi2S Wi;
• for all i 2 S, Ui(Yi) > Ui(Xi).
The set of all core allocations of W is denoted by core(W).
Core allocations are fair redistributions of a vector of initial
endowments: no subsystem S ⇢ [n] of agents is disadvantaged in
that they would be better off by withdrawing their resources from
the larger system [n] and distributing them among themselves.
We are interested in the closely related question whether an
aggregated quantity W 2 L1 can be split into initial endowments
such that, relative to these, the allocation is already perceived as
fair in the sense of core allocations. More precisely, we ask if there
is an allocation W 2  W such that W 2 core(W). We prove that
solutions to a suitable optimisation problem of type (1) do exactly
satisfy this. For 0 < ↵ < 1 consider the aggregation function
⌅↵(y) :=
X
;6=S⇢[n]
↵min
i2[n] yi + (1  ↵)maxi2S yi
= (2n   1)↵min
i2[n] yi + (1  ↵)
X
;6=S⇢[n]
max
i2S yi,
y 2 [ 1,1)n,
⌅↵ is easily seen to be upper semicontinuous.
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Theorem 31. Suppose U = (Ui)i2[n] satisfies Assumption 26. Then
there is 0 < ↵ < 1 such that for any W 2 Pni=1 dom(Ui) there is
g 2 C(n) with the property
⌅↵ (U(g(W ))) = sup
W2 W
⌅↵(U(W)) 2 R.
In particular, g(W ) 2 core(g(W )) holds.
Proof. Let W 2 Pni=1 dom(Ui). As lim↵"1 ↵1 ↵ = 1, we may
choose ↵ 2 (0, 1) with the property that
(n  1)B⇤
C⇤
<
↵
1  ↵ ,
i.e. (16) is satisfied. As for all ; 6= S ⇢ [n] and all y 2 [ 1,1)n,
we have
↵min
i2[n] yi + (1  ↵)maxi2S yi  ⇤↵(y)
and the latter function is coercive for (Ai, Bi, Ci)-functions satisfy-
ing (16) by Lemma A.1, the mapping
[ 1,1)n 3 y 7! ↵min
i2[n] yi + (1  ↵)maxi2S yi
is coercive for u = (u1, . . . , un) by Proposition 11(iii). By Propo-
sition 11(ii), ⌅↵ is coercive for u. By Theorem 12(ii), there is
g 2 C(n) with the claimed properties.
It remains to prove that g(W ) 2 core(g(W )). To this end,
assume there is ; 6= S⇤ ⇢ [n] and Y 2  W such thatX
i2S⇤
Yi =
X
i2S⇤
gi(W ) and 8 i 2 S⇤ : Ui(gi(W )) < Ui(Yi).
Without loss of generality, we may assume Yi = gi(W ) for all
i /2 S⇤. This implies
min
i2[n] Ui(Yi)   mini2[n] Ui(gi(W )) and
max
i2S Ui(Yi)   maxi2S Ui(gi(W )), ; 6= S ⇢ [n].
As furthermore maxi2S⇤ Ui(Yi) > maxi2S⇤ Ui(gi(W )), we obtain
⌅↵ (U(g(W ))) < ⌅↵(U(Y)) which is a contradiction to g(W )
being a maximiser. Hence, g(W ) has to be a core allocation of
itself. ⇤
5.3. Pareto efficiency with and without free disposal
In this section we turn to the more restrictive and, compared
to weak Pareto efficiency, economically more desirable property
of Pareto efficiency.
Definition 32. Let   ⇢ (L1)n be a attainable set. X 2   is
called Pareto efficient or a Pareto optimum, if Y 2   and
Ui(Yi)   Ui(Xi), i 2 [n], implies Ui(Xi) = Ui(Yi), i 2 [n].
Clearly, every Pareto efficient allocation is weakly Pareto ef-
ficient. Suppose now w := (w1, . . . , wn) 2 (0,1)n is a vec-
tor of positive weights. We define the upper semicontinuous
aggregation function
⇤w(y) :=
nX
i=1
wiyi, y 2 [ 1,1)n.
As elaborated in the introduction, if X 2  X satisfies
nX
i=1
wiUi(Xi) = ⇤w(U(X)) = sup
Y2 X
⇤w(U(Y)) 2 R,
then X is Pareto efficient within  X . Analogously, X 2 b X is Pareto
efficient within b X whenever Pni=1 wiUi(Xi) = supY2b X ⇤w(U(Y))2 R. A natural question is whether for a particular choice of w 2
(0,1)n the function ⇤w checks the assumptions of Theorem 12.
Theorem 33. Suppose U = (Ui)i2[n] fulfils Assumption 26. If
w 2 (0,1)n, B = (Bi)i2[n] and C = (Ci)i2[n] satisfy
B2
C1
<
w1
w2
<
C2
B1
if n = 2, (17)
or
(w · B)⇤ < (w · C)⇤ if n   3, (18)
the following assertions hold:
(i) If X 2Pni=1 dom(Ui) there is g 2 C(n) such that
⇤w (U(g(X))) = sup
Y2 X
⇤w(U(Y)) 2 R.
Consequently, g(X) is a Pareto efficient allocation of X in case
free disposal is not allowed.
(ii) If X 2 Pni=1 dom(Ui) + L1+ there is g 2 C(n + 1) such that
gn+1(X)   0 and
⇤w (U1(g1(X)), . . . ,Un(gn(X))) = sup
Y2b X ⇤w(U(Y)) 2 R.
Consequently, (g1(X), . . . , gn(X)) is a Pareto efficient alloca-
tion of X in case free disposal is allowed.
Proof. Both (i) and (ii) follow from Lemma A.3 and Theorem 12
if one notices that   = Pni=1 dom(Ui) and b  = Pni=1 dom(Ui) +
X+. ⇤
Example 34. In this example, we consider two agents with
different law-invariant utility assessments. First, given some fixed
constant   > 1, we set Q := {Q 2 L1+ | E[Q ] = 1, Q    P-a.s.}.
The preferences of agent 1 over L1 are of Yaari type and given
by the concave law-invariant and positively homogeneous utility
function
U1(X) := inf
Q2QE[QX], X 2 L
1,
for which U1|R is a (0, 1, 1)-function; c.f. Yaari (1987). Regard-
ing agent 2, we assume that she has law-invariant variational
preferences. More precisely, assume that u2 : R ! [   1,1)
is a utility function, i.e. u2 is concave, right-continuous, non-
decreasing, dom(u2) 6= ; and such that there are x, y 2 dom(u2)
such that u2(x) 6= u2(y). Moreover, let Q2 ⇢ L1+ be law-invariant
with the property that E[Q ] = 1 for all Q 2 Q2, i.e. Q2 is a
set of probability densities with respect to P. We furthermore
suppose a convex and law-invariant function ↵2 : Q2 ! R with
the property ◆ := infQ2Q2 ↵2(Q ) >  1 is given. Eventually, the
preferences of agent 2 are given by the utility function
U2(X) = inf
Q2Q2
E[Qu2(X)] + ↵2(Q ).
The right derivative u02(x) := limy#x u2(y) u2(x)y x 2 [0,1], x 2
R, exists and is non-decreasing. Let us assume we can find
z  < z+ such that 1 > u02(z ) > u02(z+). Then U2|R is an
(A, u02(z+), u02(z ))-function, where
A := max{u2(z+)  u02(z+)z+ + ◆, u2(z )  u02(z )z  + ◆}.
If we choose w1, w2 > 0 such that
u02(z+) <
w1
w2
< u02(z ),
(17) is satisfied. By Theorem 33(i), for every X 2 dom(U1) +
dom(U2) = L1 + dom(U2) there is g 2 C(2) such that
1 > w1U1(g1(X))+ w2U2(g2(X)) = sup
X2 X
w1U1(X1)+ w2U2(X2).
If we want to say more about the concrete shape of g, we need
to make further assumptions on U2. Hence, let us assume
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• dom(U2) = dom(U2)+ R;
• U2 is strictly monotone with respect to the a.s. order, i.e.
X  Y a.s. and P(X < Y ) > 0 implies U2(X) < U2(Y );
• U2 is strictly risk averse conditional on lower tail events, that
is,
U2(X) < U2
⇣
X1Ac + E[X1A]P(A) 1A
⌘
whenever A is a lower tail event for X . The latter means that
P(A) > 0 and
sup{m 2 R | P({X  m} \ A) = 0}
< inf{m 2 R | P({X  m} \ A) = P(A)}
 sup{m 2 R | P({X  m} \ Ac) = 0}.
Interpretationally, the infimal value X attains on A is strictly
less than the supremal value it attains on A, which is
bounded from above by the infimal value attained on Ac .
As an illustrating example, assume that for some m 2 R and
some   > 0 the three probabilities P(X  m), P(m < X 
m+  ), and P(X > m+  ) are all positive. Then {X  m+  }
is a lower tail event for X .
If these additional conditions are met, then Ravanelli and Svind-
land (2014, Proposition 5.2) shows that g is of the shape
g(x) = ( (x  `)  + k,max{x, `}  k), x 2 R,
for suitable constants k, ` 2 R.
5.4. Pareto efficiency under individual rationality constraints
Here we solve the problem of finding Pareto efficient al-
locations under individual rationality constraints as posed in
Ravanelli and Svindland (2014).
As in Section 5.2 we assume all agents i 2 [n] enter the system
with an initial endowment. These are given by a vector W 2
(L1)n. Now, by means of redistribution, they aim to improve the
aggregated situation within the system, but in that redistribution
they are not willing to accept a loss in utility beyond a certain
threshold compared to the utility of their initial endowment.
Given these thresholds ci 2 [ 1,1)n and some sensible
positive weights w 2 (0,1)n, we thus consider the optimisation
problem
nX
i=1
wiUi(Yi)! max subject to
Y 2  W (or Y 2 b W ), Ui(Yi)   Ui(Wi)+ ci, i 2 [n],
where W := W1 + · · · + Wn, depending on whether free dis-
posal is allowed in the redistribution or not. Any solution of this
optimisation problem will be a Pareto efficient allocation of the
aggregated initial endowmentW . We will model this situation by
altering the attainable sets, which are now defined by
Ac(W) := {X 2  W | Ui(Xi)   Ui(Wi)+ ci},
if free disposal is not allowed, or, provided free disposal is al-
lowed,bAc(W) := {X 2 b W | Ui(Xi)   Ui(Wi)+ ci},
where W 2 (L1)n is the vector of initial endowments. Clearly, the
inclusion Ac(W) ⇢ bAc(W) holds. However, it is not a priori clear
whether for a given vector of initial endowments W any of these
two sets is non-empty.
For the next theorem, we set I1 := {i 2 [n] | ci =  1},
a possibly empty set. However, we may assume without loss
of generality that I1 ( [n], as otherwise we are in the situa-
tion of Theorem 33. We also define the upper semicontinuous
aggregation function
⇤(y) :=
nX
i=1
yi, y 2 [ 1,1)n.
Theorem 35. Suppose U = (Ui)i2[n] fulfils Assumption 26 and
assume B = (Bi)i2[n] and C = (Ci)i2[n] satisfy
max
i2[n] Bi   infi2I1 Ci < 0,
where infi2I1 Ci := 1 if I1 = ;. Furthermore, let W 2
Qn
i=1
dom(Ui), W := W1 + · · ·+Wn, and let c 2 [ 1,1)n be a vector
of individual rationality constraints.
(i) If Ac(W) 6= ; and supY2Ac(W)⇤(U(Y)) >  1, there is
g 2 C(n) such that
⇤ (U(g(W ))) = sup
Y2Ac(W)
⇤(U(Y)) 2 R.
g(W ) is a Pareto efficient allocation of W which respects the
individual rationality constraints c in case free disposal is not
allowed.
(ii) If bAc(W) 6= ; and supY2bAc(W)⇤(U(Y)) >  1 there is g 2
C(n + 1) such that gn+1(W )   0 and
⇤ (U1(g1(W )), . . . ,Un(gn(W ))) = sup
Y2bAc(W)⇤(U(Y)) 2 R.
(g1(W ), . . . , gn(W )) is a Pareto efficient allocation of W which
respects the individual rationality constraints c in case free
disposal is allowed.
Proof. Both in (i) and (ii), if (g1(W ), . . . , gn(W )) is a maximiser,
its Pareto efficiency within Ac(W) – or bAc(W), respectively – is
immediately verified.
(i) We aim to apply Theorem 33 and therefore have to verify
condition (18). Consider the utility functions U˜i := Ui +
 (·|Ci), where Ci := {Y 2 L1 | Ui(Y )   Ui(Wi) + ci} is closed
and  (·|Ci) is the concave indicator of this set. The family U˜
of new utility functions U˜i checks Assumption 3. Further-
more, U˜i  Ui. Hence, U˜i|R is also an (Ai, Bi, Ci)-function,
and Assumption 26 is checked.
We shall now demonstrate that for all i 2 [n], the param-
eter Ci can be assumed to satisfy B⇤ < Ci after potential
manipulation. This would entail that (U˜1, . . . , U˜n) checks
the hypotheses of Theorem 33, namely (18) if we choose
w = (1, 1, . . . , 1).
To this end, note first that for all i 2 I1 the estimate
B⇤ < Ci holds by assumption. Second, if i 2 [n]\I1, assume
r 2 R satisfies U˜i(r) >  1. This implies U˜i(r) = ui(r)  
Ui(Wi)+ ci >  1. Hence, if additionally r < 0,
Ui(Wi)+ ci  ui( |r|)  Ai   Ci|r|,
which can be rearranged as
|r| 
    Ui(Wi)+ ci   AiCi
     =:  i.
For ni 2 N large enough, we have for all y 2 [  i,1) that
Ai + Biy+   Ciy   ni + Biy+   (B⇤ + 1)y .
Hence, Ui is also a (ni, Bi,B⇤ + 1)-function.
Now we can conclude with Theorem 33 the existence of
some g 2 C(n) such that
nX
i=1
U˜i(gi(W )) = sup
Y2 W
nX
i=1
U˜i(Yi) 2 R.
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The left-hand side would be  1 if g(X) were not in the
attainable set Ac(W), whence we infer g(W ) 2 Ac(W). This
implies U˜i(gi(W )) = Ui(gi(W )) for all i 2 [n]. Using again
that
Pn
i=1 U˜i(Yi) =  1 if Y 2  W\Ac(W),
sup
Y2 W
nX
i=1
U˜i(Yi) = sup
Y2Ac(W)
nX
i=1
U˜i(Yi) = sup
Y2Ac(W)
nX
i=1
Ui(Yi).
(ii) The argument is in complete analogy with the argument
for (i). ⇤
5.5. Aggregation with a view towards systemic risk
Throughout this section let p, q, r 2 Rn+ be such that
Pn
i=1 pi =
1. We consider the upper semicontinuous aggregation function
⇤p,q,r(y) :=
nX
i=1
 piy i + qi(yi   ri)+, y 2 [ 1,1)n. (19)
It was suggested by Brunnermeier and Cheridito (2013) as a way
to aggregate individual profits net of losses in a system of agents
in a meaningful way to account for systemic risk; c.f. Hoffmann
et al. (2016, Example 4.3).
In the present setting, we may consider the quantity
⇤p,q,r(U(X)), X 2 (L1)n, and use ⇤p,q,r to aggregate the individual
utilities of the n agents. In such an application, it would be more
appropriate to think of ⇤p,q,r to account for systemic fairness.
Note that for some X 2 (L1)n, ⇤p,q,r(U(X)) has a clear-cut in-
terpretation:  piUi(Xi) , i 2 [n], only appears in the aggregation
if i incurs a negative utility and is then weighted according to the
impact or importance of agent i. Conversely, the term qi(Ui(Xi) 
ri)+ accounts, likewise in a weighted way, for the positive utility
agent i gains as far as it exceeds a certain individual threshold ri.
One easily sees that ⇤p,q,r is an upper semicontinuous aggre-
gation function.
Theorem 36. Suppose U = (Ui)i2[n] fulfils Assumption 26 and
assume B = (Bi)i2[n], C = (Ci)i2[n], and p, q 2 Rn+ satisfy
(q · B)⇤ < (p · C)⇤. (20)
Let r 2 Rn+ be arbitrary and define ⇤p,q,r as in (19).
(i) For all X 2Pni=1 dom(Ui) there is g 2 C(n) such that
⇤p,q,r (U(g(X))) = sup
Y2 X
⇤p,q,r(U(Y)) 2 R.
(ii) For all X 2 Pni=1 dom(Ui) + L1+ there is g 2 C(n + 1) such
that gn+1(X)   0 and
⇤p,q,r(U1(g1(X)), . . . ,Un(gn(X))) = sup
Y2b X ⇤p,q,r(U(Y)) 2 R.
Proof. Combine Lemma A.4 with Theorem 12. ⇤
Appendix. Coercivity results
In the following, given a vector u = (u1, . . . , un) of (Ai, Bi, Ci)-
functions, we set A := (Ai)i2[n], B := (Bi)i2[n], and C := (Ci)i2[n].
Lemma A.1. Assume u = (u1, . . . , un) is a vector of (Ai, Bi, Ci)-
functions ui : R ! [   1,1), i 2 [n]. Let 0 < ↵ < 1 be a
parameter which satisfies (15) if n = 2, or, provided n   3, (16).
Then the aggregation function
⇤↵(y) := ↵min
i2[n] yi + (1  ↵)maxi2[n] yi, y 2 [ 1,1)
n,
is upper semicontinuous and coercive for u.
Proof. The aggregation function ⇤↵ is clearly upper semicontin-
uous and non-decreasing in the pointwise order on [ 1,1)n.
Fix x,m 2 R and consider the set S(x,m) defined in (6). In order to
find the bound G(x,m) as in (7), we choose y 2 S(x,m) arbitrary,
set I := {i 2 [n] | yi < 0}, and distinguish the following cases:
Case 1: I = ;. ThenPni=1 |yi| =Pni=1 yi  x.
Case 2: y 2 Rn . Then
m  ↵min
i2[n] Ai Ci|yi|+ (1 ↵)maxi2[n] Ai Ci|yi|  A
⇤  ↵C⇤max
i2[n] |yi|.
Rearranging this inequality yields
nX
i=1
|yi|  nmax
i2[n] |yi| 
n(A⇤  m)
↵C⇤
. (A.1)
Case 3: I 6= ; and J := {i 2 [n] | yi > 0} 6= ;.
Case 3.1: If n = 2 and I = {1}, we have J = {2}. From the property
y1 + y2  x we infer |y2| = y2  x + |y1|. Using this and each ui
being an (Ai, Bi, Ci)-function, we can estimate
m  ↵min
i=1,2 ui(yi)+ (1  ↵)maxi=1,2 ui(yi)
 ↵u1(y1)+ (1  ↵)max
i=1,2 ui(yi)
 ↵(A1   C1|y1|)+ (1  ↵)max{A1   C1|y1|, A2 + B2y2}
 ↵(A⇤   C1|y1|)+ (1  ↵)(A⇤ + B2y2)
= A⇤   ↵C1|y1| + (1  ↵)B2(x + |y1|)
= A⇤ + (1  ↵)B2x + ((1  ↵)B2   ↵C1) |y1|.
By the first inequality in (15), (1   ↵)B2   ↵C1 < 0. Hence,
rearranging terms yields
|y1|  A
⇤ + (1  ↵)B2x m
|(1  ↵)B2   ↵C1| ,
and eventually
|y1| + |y2|  x + 2|y1|  x + 2(A
⇤ + (1  ↵)B2x m)
|(1  ↵)B2   ↵C1| . (A.2)
Case 3.2: If n = 2 and I = {2}, we obtain completely analogously
to Case 3.1 that
|y1| + |y2|  x + 2|y2|  x + 2(A
⇤ + ↵B1x m)
|↵B1   (1  ↵)C2| . (A.3)
Case 3.3: n   3. As above,
max
j2J |yj| 
X
j2J
yj  x + (n  1)max
i2I |yi|.
This allows us to infer
m  ↵min
i2[n] Ai + Biy
+
i   Ciy i + (1  ↵)maxi2[n] Ai + Biy
+
i   Ciy i
 ↵min
i2I (A
⇤   Ci|yi|)+ (1  ↵)max
j2J (A
⇤ + Bjyj)
 A⇤   ↵C⇤max
i2I |yi| + (1  ↵)B
⇤max
j2J |yi|
 A⇤ + (1  ↵)B⇤x +  (1  ↵)(n  1)B⇤   ↵C⇤ max
i2I |yi|.
Rearranging the preceding inequality and using that, by (16),
(1  ↵)(n  1)B⇤   ↵C⇤ < 0, we conclude
max
i2I |yi| 
A⇤ + (1  ↵)B⇤x m
|(1  ↵)(n  1)B⇤   ↵C⇤| ,
and eventually
nX
i=1
|yi|  x + 2
X
i2I
|yi|  x + 2(n  1)max
i2I |yi|
 x + 2(n  1)(A
⇤ + (1  ↵)B⇤x m)
|(1  ↵)(n  1)B⇤   ↵C⇤| .
(A.4)
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Let G˜(x,m) be defined as the maximum of the bounds (A.1)–(A.3)
(if n = 2) or of (A.1), and (A.4) (if n   3). Then
G(x,m) := max{G˜(x,m), x}, (x,m) 2 R⇥ R,
gives the desired bound (7).
Note that for all x 2 R, G˜(x,m) #  1 as m ! 1. We may
hence consider the real-valued function
H(x) := max{inf{s 2 R | G˜(x, s)   1},A⇤ + B⇤x + 1}, x 2 R.
Fix m   H(x) and suppose we can choose y 2 S(x,m). By
construction, y 2 Rn+ has to hold. We estimate
m  max
i2[n] Ai + Biyi < A
⇤ + B⇤x + 1  H(x)  m.
No such y can exist, and the function H has property (8). ⇤↵ is
coercive for u. ⇤
Lemma A.2. Assume u = (u1, . . . , un) is a vector of (Ai, Bi, Ci)-
functions ui : R! [ 1,1), i 2 [n]. Then the aggregation function
⇤1(y) = mini2[n] yi, y 2 [ 1,1)n, is upper semicontinuous and
coercive for u.
Proof. ⇤1 is upper semicontinuous and non-decreasing in the
pointwise order on [ 1,1)n. For coercivity in the case n   3,
note that (n 1)B
⇤
C⇤ < 1. Hence, for 0 < ↵ < 1 close enough to 1,
the estimate
(n  1)B⇤
C⇤
<
↵
1  ↵
holds. Hence, ⇤1(y)  ⇤↵(y) holds for all y 2 [ 1,1)n, and
the latter function is coercive for u by Lemma A.1. Coercivity of
⇤1 follows with Proposition 11(iii).
It remains to treat the case n = 2. Let x,m 2 R be arbitrary
and suppose y 2 S(x,m). Set I := {i 2 [n] | yi < 0} and consider
the following cases:
Case 1: I = ;. Then |y1| + |y2| = y1 + y2  x.
Case 2: y 2 Rn . Then
m  ⇤1(u(y))  min{A1   C1|y1|, A2   C2|y2|}  A⇤   C⇤max
i=1,2 |yi|.
From a rearrangement of this inequality, we infer
|y1| + |y2|  2max
i=1,2 |yi| 
2(A⇤  m)
C⇤
.
Case 3: |I| = 1.
Case 3.1: I = {1}. We use again that |y2| = y2  x  y1 = x+ |y1|.
Note that
m  ⇤1(u(y))  min{A1   C1|y1|, A2 + B2y2}  A⇤   C⇤|y1|.
From a rearrangement of this inequality, we obtain
|y1| + |y2|  x + 2|y1|  x + 2(A
⇤  m)
C⇤
.
Case 3.2: I = {2}. In this case, we obtain the same bound as in
Case 3.1.
Consequently, the function
G(x,m) := max{x, x+ + 2(A⇤ m)C⇤ }, (x,m) 2 R⇥ R,
has the desired property (7).
Now consider the function
H(x) := max  A⇤ + C⇤( 12x+ + 1), A1 + B1x + 1 , x 2 R.
If m   H(x), max{ 2(A⇤ m)C⇤ , x + 2(A
⇤ m)
C⇤ }   1. Thus, if we could
choose y 2 S(x,m), Case 1 above would have to hold, i.e. y 2 R2+.
Using that each ui is an (Ai, Bi, Ci)-function,
⇤1(u(y))  u1(y1)  A1 + B1y1 < A1 + B1x + 1  H(x)  m.
This is a contradiction, and S(x,m) = ; has to hold. Hence, the
function H has the desired property (8), and ⇤1 is coercive for
u. ⇤
Lemma A.3. Assume u = (u1, . . . , un) is a vector of (Ai, Bi, Ci)-
functions ui : R ! [   1,1), i 2 [n]. Moreover, suppose
w 2 (0,1)n satisfies (17) if n = 2, or, if n   3, (18). Then the
aggregation function
⇤w(y) :=
nX
i=1
wiyi, y 2 [ 1,1)n,
is upper semicontinuous and coercive for u.
Proof. The function ⇤w is clearly upper semicontinuous and
non-decreasing in the pointwise order on [ 1,1)n. In order
to find a function G with property (7), fix x,m 2 R and assume
y 2 S(x,m) is arbitrarily chosen.
Case 1: y 2 Rn+. Then
Pn
i=1 |yi| =
Pn
i=1 yi  x.
Case 2: y 2 Rn . Then
m  ⇤w(u(y)) =
nX
i=1
wiui(yi) 
nX
i=1
wi(Ai   Ci|yi|)
 n(w · A)⇤   (w · C)⇤
nX
i=1
|yi|.
Rearranging this inequality yields
nX
i=1
|yi|  n(w · A)
⇤  m
(w · C)⇤ . (A.5)
Case 3: y 2 Rn\(Rn+ [ Rn ). We set I = {i 2 [n] | yi < 0}.
Case 3.1: n = 2 and I = {1}. We have
m  w1u1(y1)+w2u2(y2)  w1A1  w1C1|y1| +w2A2 +w2B2|y2|.
Using |y2| = y2  x + |y1|, one obtains
m  2(w · A)⇤ + w2B2x + (w2B2   w1C1)|y1|.
By the first inequality in (17), w2B2 w1C1 < 0. Hence, rearrang-
ing this inequality yields
|y1| + |y2|  x+ 2|y1|  x+ 4(w · A)
⇤ + 2(w · B)⇤|x|  2m
|w2B2   w1C1| . (A.6)
Case 3.2: If n = 2 and I = {2}, we obtain completely analogously
to Case 3.1 that
|y1| + |y2|  x+ 2|y2|  x+ 4(w · A)
⇤ + 2(w · B)⇤|x|  2m
|w1B1   w2C2| . (A.7)
Combining Cases 1–3.2 implies that the function
G(x,m) := max
⇢
x,
2(w · A)⇤  m
(w · C)⇤ ,
x + 4(w · A)
⇤ + 2(w · B)⇤|x|  2m
⇠
 
has property (7). Here, ⇠ := min{|w1B1   w2C2|, |w2B2   w1C1|}.
Case 3.3: n   3. As in preceding proofs,Pi2[n]\I yi  x+Pi2I |yi|.
This allows us to infer
m 
nX
i=1
wiui(yi) 
X
i2[n]\I
wi(Ai + Bi|yi|)+
X
i2I
wi(Ai   Ci|yi|)

nX
i=1
wiAi + (w · B)⇤
X
i2[n]\I
|yi|  (w · C)⇤
X
i2I
|yi|
 n(w · A)⇤ + (w · B)⇤x +  (w · B)⇤   (w · C)⇤ X
i2I
|yi|
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Rearranging this inequality using (18) yieldsX
i2I
|yi|  n(w · A)
⇤ + (w · B)⇤x m
|(w · B)⇤   (w · C)⇤| ,
and, eventually,
nX
i=1
|yi|  x+2
X
i2I
|yi|  x+ 2 (n(w · A)
⇤ + (w · B)⇤x m)
|(w · B)⇤   (w · C)⇤| . (A.8)
Combining equations (A.5) and (A.8) shows that the function
G(x,m) := max
⇢
x,
n(w · A)⇤  m
(w · C)⇤ ,
x + 2 (n(w · A)
⇤ + (w · B)⇤x m)
|(w · B)⇤   (w · C)⇤|
 
has property (7), provided n   3.
We now turn our attention to the existence of a function H
with property (8). Fix x 2 R and let H˜(x) := n(w·A)⇤+(w·B)⇤x+1.
If n = 2, consider
H(x) := max
⇢
H˜(x), (w · C)⇤ + 2(w · A)⇤,
⇠ (x+1)
2 + 2(w · A)⇤ + (w · B)⇤|x|
 
,
where ⇠ is defined as above. If m   H(x), the right-hand sides of
(A.5)–(A.7) are less or equal to  1. If n   3, consider
H(x) := max
⇢
H˜(x), n(w · A)⇤ + (w · C)⇤,
|(w·B)⇤ (w·C)⇤|(x+1)
2 + n(w · A)⇤ + (w · B)⇤x
 
.
If m   H(x) in this case, the right-hand sides of (A.5) and (A.8)
are less or equal to  1.
Suppose now m   H(x) and S(x,m) 6= ;. Then for all y 2
S(x,m), Case 1 from above has to hold, i.e. y 2 Rn+. Moreover,
nX
i=1
wiui(yi) 
nX
i=1
wi(Ai + Biyi) < n(w · A)⇤ + (w · B)⇤x + 1
= H˜(x)  H(x)  m,
which is absurd. Hence, the function H has property (8). ⇤
Lemma A.4. Assume u = (u1, . . . , un) is a vector of (Ai, Bi, Ci)-
functions ui : R! [ 1,1), i 2 [n]. If p, q 2 Rn+ satisfy (20) and
r 2 Rn+ is arbitrary, the aggregation function
⇤p,q,r(y) :=
nX
i=1
 piy i + qi(yi   ri)+, y 2 [ 1,1)n,
is upper semicontinuous and coercive for u.
Proof. By Remark 25(iii), we may assume without loss of gener-
ality that Ai   0 holds for all i 2 [n].
As already observed, the function ⇤p,q,r is upper semicontin-
uous and non-decreasing in the pointwise order on [ 1,1)n.
In order to find the function G, fix x,m 2 R and let y 2 S(x,m)
be arbitrary. Again, we set I := {i 2 [n] | yi < 0}.
Case 1: I = ;, i.e. y 2 Rn+. As in the preceding proofs,
Pn
i=1 |yi| x.
Case 2: y 2 Rn . Then
m  ⇤p,q,r (u(y)) 
nX
i=1
 pi(Ai   Ci|yi|)  + qi(Ai   Ci|yi|  ri)+

nX
i=1
pi(Ai   Ci|yi|)+ qi(Ai   ri)+
 n(p · A)⇤   (p · C)⇤
nX
i=1
|yi| +
nX
i=1
qi(Ai   ri)+.
As piCi > 0 for all i 2 [n], we obtain
nX
i=1
|yi|  n(p · A)
⇤ +Pni=1 qi(Ai   ri)+  m
(p · C)⇤ . (A.9)
Case 3: I 6= ; and yj > 0 for some j 2 J := [n]\I .
Setting I 0 := {i 2 I | Ai Ci|yi| > ri} and J 0 := {j 2 J | Aj+Bjyj >
rj}, we have
m  ⇤p,q,r (u(y)) 
X
i2I
 pi(Ai   Ci|yi|)  + qi(Ai   Ci|yi|  ri)+
+
X
j2J
 pj(Aj + Bj|yj|)  + qj(Aj + Bj|yj|  rj)+

X
i2I
pi(Ai   Ci|yi|)+
X
i2I 0
qi(Ai   Ci|yi|)
+
X
j2J 0
qj(Aj + Bj|yj|).
In the last step, we have used that for j 2 J , our assumption Aj   0
implies (Aj + Bjyj)  = 0.
• The estimateX
i2I
pi(Ai Ci|yi|)  n(p·A)⇤ (p·C)⇤
X
i2I
|yi| =: ⇢1 (p·C)⇤
X
i2I
|yi|
is immediate.
• We havePi2I 0 qi(Ai   Ci|yi|)  n(q · A)⇤ =: ⇢2.
• FromPj2J 0 |yj| Pj2J yj  x +Pi2I |yi|, we concludeX
j2J 0
qj(Aj + Bj|yj|)  ⇢2 + (q · B)⇤
 
x +
X
i2I
|yi|
!
.
Combining all estimates above, we obtain
m  ⇢1   (p · C)⇤
X
i2I
|yi| + 2⇢2 + (q · B)⇤
 
x +
X
i2I
|yi|
!
=: ⇢3 +
 
(q · B)⇤   (p · C)⇤
 X
i2I
|yi|.
The constant ⇢3 2 R is independent of y. We rearrange the
inequality and use (20) in order to obtainX
i2I
|yi|  ⇢3  m|(q · B)⇤   (p · C)⇤| .
Consequently, the boundX
i2[n]
|yi|  x + 2
X
i2I
|yi|  x + 2(⇢3  m)|(q · B)⇤   (p · C)⇤| (A.10)
holds. Let G˜(x,m) be defined as the maximum of the bounds
in (A.9) and (A.10). As in the preceding proofs, the function
G(x,m) := max{x, G˜(x,m)}, (x,m) 2 R⇥ R, has property (7).
Note that for all x 2 R we have G˜(x,m) #  1 as m ! 1.
This allows us to define a function H which has property (8)
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by
H(x) := max{inf{s 2 R | G˜(x, s)   1},
n(q · A)⇤ + (q · B)⇤x + 1}, x 2 R.
The proof of the assertion is completely analogous to the preced-
ing cases. ⇤
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